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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Mark and Dawn Ulmer divorced on Dec. 14, 2001. Shortly after that, Dawn went to the police and alleged that Mark had been harassing and threatening, and was satisfied when the police said they would send a letter to Mark. According to Dawn, on Dec. 26, 2001, Mark came to her house to pick up the children. He demanded his coat, and when she refused, he allegedly pushed the door down, shoved Dawn and again told her that he would one day make good on his threats. Also Dawn alleges, Mark yelled at her and her boyfriend while all three attended their son’s soccer game. Mark allegedly yelled at the younger of their children when the child hugged the boyfriend. Mark allegedly complained to the boyfriend’s employer � the church where the boyfriend was an associate pastor and which Mark and Dawn attended � about his relationship with Dawn. And he allegedly printed fliers complaining about the relationship and put them on cars in the church parking lot. Dawn alleges Mark made unannounced visits at the school where she taught, showed up at athletic events and berated her in front of people, and yelled at their child when the child hugged Dawn. Dawn got a dog, changed the locks on her doors, installed an alarm system and told her neighbors of her situation and that she was scared. She alleged he constantly called her at home and on her cell phone and sent her e-mail. Dawn filed for a protective order in October 2002 and testified to all of these events at the hearing. Also at the hearing, Dawn testified that during the marriage, Mark was allegedly controlling and vengeful, and that he had allegedly threatened to kill her and kill himself. He told her that some day everyone in the country was going to know his name after he got done with her. Mark himself contradicted most of what Dawn said. He said he did not shove her or threaten her on Dec. 26. He only came to school to retrieve a soccer ball from Dawn’s car. He did not park outside of the boyfriend’s house when Dawn was there. He admitted to grabbing his child away from the boyfriend, and to speaking sternly to Dawn, but not to yelling at either of them. He admitted calling the boyfriend a “bad man.” He admitted to talking to church officials and to placing one flier on one car in the church parking lot, but no more. One of Dawn’s friends testified that she came over on Dec. 26 at Dawn’s request. She said there was no sign of a struggle, but that Dawn was shaken. One of Dawn’s colleagues testified to her conversation with Mark at the school when he came looking for the soccer ball, saying he appeared normal at the time. A police officer confirmed that Dawn had come to the police station shortly after the divorce. He said Dawn seemed distressed and in fear of her safety. He had no reason to doubt Dawn, but he said there wasn’t probable cause to support charges. The trial court made a family-violence finding in granting the protective order under Title IV of the Family Code. Mark appeals the factual and legal sufficiency of the order. Previously, this court has ruled that there is no appellate review of a protective order, so Mark and the state also argue that this court’s prior holding be overturned. HOLDING:Affirmed. In an en banc decision, the court disavows its prior rulings that there is no appellate review of protective orders. Following the lead of the 10th Court of Appeals, and followed by the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 13th courts of appeals, the court holds that the general prohibition applies only when a protective order is issued in conjunction with a pending proceeding. That’s because within the confines of the underlying proceeding, the trial court retains jurisdiction over the order and is free to modify it during the course of the proceeding. Though the trial court can modify a protective order outside a pending proceeding, the power is more theoretical, much as it is when a trial court issues a permanent injunction. It is possible for the trial court to modify a permanent injunction, but at the time of issuance and judgment, the court is disposing of all issues and parties before it Consequently, the court “conclude[s] that a family-violence protective order that gives injunctive relief and disposes of all issues and parties is a final, appealable order.” Turning to the protective order issued in the case, the court finds more than a scintilla of evidence to support the order. The court also finds that the evidence underlying the order is not too weak to support the court’s finding or that it is so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence to be manifestly unjust. OPINION:Yates, J., delivered the court’s opinion.

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