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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Bryan Walter appeals the trial court’s order making certain property awards to Barbara Walter pursuant to the parties’ divorce. HOLDING:Affirmed. The appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury trial. In a suit for dissolution of a marriage, either party may demand a jury trial. Texas Family Code �6.703. However, a refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error if the record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified. The division of property in a divorce action is exclusively within the province of the trial judge, not the jury. Here, appellant did not appeal the granting of the divorce, and there was no child custody involved. The only issues before the trial court were the division of the parties’ property and the imposition of restrictions on the parties’ contact. Even assuming the trial court erred in denying appellant’s request for a jury trial, any error was harmless because appellant appeals only issues where no material issues of fact existed. In his second issue, the appellant complains the trial court erred in ordering a permanent injunction against him. The court concludes there is adequate evidence to support the permanent injunction against appellant. The appellant argues the trial court erred in awarding the parties’ residence and certain property to the appellee. The appellant complains of the trial court’s award to appellee of the residence in McKinney and a number of items the evidence showed were appellee’s separate property. Additionally, appellant argues: “The trial court awarded Appellant’s separate property to Appellee (RR 4/26/02 41-45). The trial court awarded Appellant’s separate property located on the deck of the marital residence, i.e., grill, bench, statutes [sic]; camcorder tapes, paintings, brass soap dispenser and wedding ring.” Appellant argues the award of the residence constitutes a disproportionate share of the community estate. Even assuming appellant is correct, the trial judge may order an unequal division of marital property where a reasonable basis exists for doing so. The court may consider many factors in making an unequal division of property, including education, respective earning power, business and employment opportunities, physical health, probable future need for support, the size of the parties’ separate estates, the length of the marriage, and fault in its breakup. The record shows appellant is a licensed attorney, and appellee was unemployed at the time of trial. In fact, the record contains appellant’s admission that he called appellee’s former employer to ask what appellee “had told him her grade point average was.” Appellant characterized this call as “making an inquiry” but did not dispute the fact that appellee lost her job as a result. The court concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the residence to appellee. Further, although appellant characterizes the items on the deck of the residence as separate party in a two-sentence point of error, the court concludes appellant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion with respect to the items on the deck. The appellant complains the trial court erred in failing to permit appellant to take the depositions of two witnesses. The appellant argues “[d]epositions are allowed to fish for information, and denial of the right to conduct a deposition is an abuse of discretion.” As authority for this statement, appellant cites Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1989). In Loftin, the court held that, because the trial court had denied discovery of allegedly privileged documents in the absence of evidence to substantiate the claim of privilege and did not conduct an in camera review of the documents, the trial court abused its discretion in denying discovery of the documents. The court does not agree that Loftin supports appellant’s asserted right to “fish” by taking the depositions he was denied. The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that discovery may not be used as a “fishing expedition.” In Re: American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998). The court concludes the trial court did not err in refusing to permit appellant to take two depositions in order to “fish for information.” OPINION:Bridges, J.; Whittington, Wright and Bridges, JJ.

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