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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:John Knight abandoned his family in 1998 and moved to New Mexico with essentially all the family’s monetary assets. The Knights had been married for more than 23 years when Suzi Knight filed for divorce. Suzi was unsuccessfully in serving John at his Albuquerque residence. The trial court granted her request for substituted service, which meant that an agent affixed to John’s apartment door the original petition, the order for substitute service, a temporary restraining order and an order setting a hearing for temporary orders. An attorney ad litem was appointed for John in September 1999, and the date for the final hearing was set for Dec. 4, 2001. Because the first ad litem moved, a substitute attorney ad litem was appointed in October 2001, and he notified John via Federal Express on Nov. 29 of the final hearing date. The notice also asked John if he wanted a postponement. John notified the attorney ad litem that he did not plan to attend the hearing; therefore, when the hearing was ultimately postponed to Dec. 31, the ad litem did not notify John. At the hearing, Suzi introduced John’s tax records from 1998, reflecting an income of $60,000, since she had not seen her husband since then. She asked the court for child support for her daughter who was about to turn 18, and retroactive child support for her daughter and son from the time of the separation (the son was already 18 by the time of the hearing). The court granted Suzi sole custody of the daughter and ordered John to pay $761 per month for his daughter’s support. The court also ordered John to pay more than $30,000 in retroactive child support, payable in monthly installments of $500, to cover the three-year period between the separation and the final hearing. John filed a motion for new trial, asking for leave to present evidence of his current income, which was denied. John raises abuse-of-discretion and sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges to the trial court’s findings. He argues that, in the absence of current income figures, the trial court was required to calculate support based on the minimum wage. HOLDING:Affirmed. The court explains that when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence of a child support order, a reviewing court will ask whether the trial court had sufficiency information upon which to exercise its discretion, and whether the trial court erred in its application of discretion. Because the application of the minimum wage standard was not raised by the ad litem at the final hearing, or by John in his motion for new trial, the court considers John’s argument that the support order was not based on his current income. Support is calculated on the basis of the parties’ net resources. For purposes of the court’s analysis, “net resources” includes all wage and salary income, self-employment income, and all other income actually being received, including capital gains. Family Code �154.063 says that tax returns for the past two years, as well as a financial statement and current pay stubs should be submitted to the court. The court points out that John did not participate in the final hearing, and he did not testify at the motion for new trial hearing. He attached current pay stubs and incomplete tax returns to his motion for new trial, but he did not offer these records into evidence. Consequently, there was no evidence of John’s current income. The court finds the trial court was forced to calculate the support obligation of a person who abandoned the family and moved out of state; refused to accept certified mail; evaded service of process; did not communicate with his wife or children for three years; and told his attorney at litem that he did not intend to appear for the final hearing. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in basing its calculation on the 1998 return. Applying the child support guidelines, the court finds the amounts were “remarkably close” to the figures the trial court came up with. Lastly, the court rejects John’s argument that notice to him of the final hearing � the one postponed to Dec. 31 � was deficient. John did not have 45 days notice of the Dec. 4 final hearing, as required by T.R.Civ.P. 245, but the rules do not require that he have 45 days notice of a postponement. At any rate, John’s attorney knew of both dates, and he participated in the final hearing, even though John said he would not attend. Notice was thus reasonable under the rules. OPINION:McClure, J.; Larsen, McClure and Chew, JJ.

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