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The contacts sufficient to maintain jurisdiction over an individual are those of the individual. Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Morgan Dowdy brings this interlocutory appeal from the denial of his special appearance challenging the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over him in his individual capacity in a suit for breach of a lease by a corporation of which he is an officer and director. HOLDING:Reversed and remanded. The plaintiff, Dovie Miller, contends the evidence supports a finding that Dowdy established minimum contacts to support jurisdiction over him in two ways: by his execution of a personal noncompete agreement, and by his actions as an officer and director of West Texas Broadcasting Inc., which did business in Texas. The court cannot agree that Dowdy’s execution of the noncompete agreement warrants the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Miller’s causes of action did not arise out of the noncompete agreement, nor from the contract for sale of the station; her claims arose from her lease with WTB. The noncompete agreement’s relation to the lease and to Miller’s claims under the lease is too attenuated to give rise to specific jurisdiction. Miller next argues that “[Morgan] Dowdy purposefully directed his conduct as a corporate officer and director toward Texas and personally assumed the benefits and burdens of running his company under Texas law.” As Miller characterizes the events, Dowdy “brought his company into Texas to do business,” thereby becoming subject to Texas corporate laws, including those condemning corporate denuding and breach of fiduciary duty. Those actions, Miller argues, constituted the type of purposeful acts that justify exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dowdy for his alleged violation of those corporate laws. Miller places reliance on various provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act. She initially points to Article 8.02 of the Act which provides that foreign corporations doing business in Texas under a certificate of authority, and its officers and directors, “shall be subject to the same duties, restrictions, penalties, and liabilities” as domestic corporations. Miller’s argument is flawed. As Article 8.02 makes clear, every foreign corporation that qualifies to do business in Texas undertakes certain obligations under Texas law. Miller does not go so far as to assert that the officers or directors of a corporation authorized to do business in Texas are automatically subject to personal jurisdiction in the state in causes of action arising from corporate activities. At oral argument, counsel for Miller argued that such jurisdiction properly is limited to control persons such as Dowdy. Even so limited, though, such a rule amounts to the kind of mechanical test the courts have rejected. Miller next cites article 6.04 and Henry I. Siegel Co. v. Holliday, 663 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 1984), arguing that “once the [station sale proceeds] hit the closing table, Texas law impressed a trust on it that required Dowdy to make arrangements to pay Miller before he paid himself.” The court sees nothing to indicate that, so far as WTB was concerned, the sale proceeds “hit the closing table” in Texas, nor that any of Dowdy’s activities involving the proceeds occurred in the state. Miller’s claims of breach of duty by Dowdy through his handling of the sale proceeds cannot be said to arise from acts committed in Texas. Moreover, Miller cites no authority holding that the presence of a trust beneficiary in Texas, standing alone, confers personal jurisdiction here on the purported trustee. Miller’s argument also disregards the distinction between Dowdy’s individual liability and WBT’s corporate liability, and the nature of a corporate entity. The evidence supports the statement that he directed his conduct “as a corporate officer” to Texas, but the contention that his acts as a corporate officer necessarily resulted in his personal assumption of the benefits and burdens of running a company in Texas is contrary to established law. Dowdy has cited a line of Texas authority for the proposition that personal jurisdiction over a corporation does not extend to individual corporate officers, directors or employees unless the corporation is the alter ego of the defendant. Vosko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 909 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.App. � Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied). Here, Miller has not pleaded or presented evidence supporting an alter ego theory. The U.S. Supreme Court also has made clear that the contacts sufficient to maintain jurisdiction over an individual are those of the individual. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The record does not support a conclusion that Dowdy’s activities established the minimum contacts with Texas such as to subject him to personal jurisdiction OPINION:Campbell, J.; Johnson, C.J., Quinn and Campbell, JJ.

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