Ex Parte Hale

During the years that have passed since our Griffin decision, constitutional and statutory law has changed so greatly that its reasoning simply fails to apply. We overrule that outmoded case and other cases that have repeated its holding, and we disapprove the recitation of its reasoning as dicta in other cases.

X

Thank you for sharing!

Your article was successfully shared with the contacts you provided.
Click here for the full text of this decision “During the years that have passed since our Griffin decision, constitutional and statutory law has changed so greatly that its reasoning simply fails to apply. We overrule that outmoded case and other cases that have repeated its holding, and we disapprove the recitation of its reasoning as dicta in other cases.” FACTS:The issue in this case is whether the applicant should be given credit on a subsequent sentence for the time during which he was erroneously released on mandatory supervision when he should have continued to be imprisoned under the previous sentence. HOLDING:The sentence for the applicant’s burglary offense has expired and he began accruing incarceration credit on the sentence for the weapon offense when he was arrested on Feb. 18, 2001. In Ex parte Griffin, 158 Tex. Crim. 570, the court quoted a statement made by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ in 1913 that a jail inmate “did no more than any other intelligent human being would have done under like circumstances � that is, to go home when the court who had sentenced him, the county attorney who had prosecuted him, and the sheriff who had incarcerated him told him he could do so.” During the years that have passed since Griffin, constitutional and statutory law has changed so greatly that its reasoning simply fails to apply. The court overrules that case and other cases that have repeated its holding, and disapproves the recitation of its reasoning as dicta in other cases. The limits on the period of conditional release are set by statute. For mandatory supervision, the period “is computed by subtracting from the term for which the inmate was sentenced the calendar time served on the sentence.” Texas Government Code �508.148. A person may not be supervised after that period expires. Under the law that was applicable to a releasee at the time that the applicant’s release was revoked, “If a person’s parole, mandatory supervision, or conditional pardon is revoked, the person may be required to serve the remaining portion of the sentence on which the person is released. The remaining portion is computed without credit for the time from the date of the person’s release to the date of revocation.” �508.283(c). The applicant’s seven-year burglary sentence began on Oct. 7, 1991. He was erroneously released to mandatory supervision on Dec. 12, 1994. At that point, the applicant had served 1,162 days of his 2,557-day sentence. He was arrested for violating the conditions of mandatory supervision on Feb. 3, 1996, and he remained incarcerated for 244 more days, which brought the total length of his incarceration for the burglary offense to 1,406 days. Then, on Oct. 4, 1996, he was again erroneously released to mandatory supervision. He remained on this second release until he was arrested for a new offense (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle) on Feb. 18, 2001 � 1,598 days later. That is 447 days after the applicant’s period of supervision on the burglary offense would have expired, had his release been proper. Because the court holds that the statute that should apply to the applicant is the statute that applied to prisoners who were released on mandatory supervision at the time the applicant was erroneously released, the court holds that the applicant’s burglary sentence was discharged when his period of supervision on that sentence would have expired. At the time that the burglary sentence was discharged, the applicant’s stacked sentence for the weapon offense should have started, but because he was not incarcerated, the time credit accrued only toward his period of supervision. Had the applicant spent the next eight years on supervision without a violation of his conditions, he would have discharged his weapon sentence as well. Instead, because his supervision was revoked, he was not eligible for credit under the statute that applied to prisoners who were released at the time he was released. Therefore, the applicant accrued no credit toward incarceration on the weapon sentence for his time spent on release. OPINION:Womack, J.; en banc.

Want to continue reading?
Become a Free ALM Digital Reader.

Benefits of a Digital Membership:

  • Free access to 3 articles* every 30 days
  • Access to the entire ALM network of websites
  • Unlimited access to the ALM suite of newsletters
  • Build custom alerts on any search topic of your choosing
  • Search by a wide range of topics

*May exclude premium content
Already have an account?

Trending Stories

 

Featured Product

Global Briefing

A weekly, curated selection of our international content from around the globe, across the business of law, in-house, regulatory, technology and more, with expert insights from our senior editors.

Learn More

More from ALM

 

ALM Legal Publication Newsletters

Sign Up Today and Never Miss Another Story.

As part of your digital membership, you can sign up for an unlimited number of a wide range of complimentary newsletters. Visit your My Account page to make your selections. Get the timely legal news and critical analysis you cannot afford to miss. Tailored just for you. In your inbox. Every day.

Privacy Policy

About Us / Contact Us / Site Map / Advertise With Us/ Customer Service / Terms of Service/ FAQ / Privacy Policy

Publications

Law Topics

Rankings

More

Law.com

Copyright © 2020 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All Rights Reserved.