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Click here for the full text of this decision Because Texas now recognizes multiple employers in the workers’ compensation setting and U.S. Fire does not dispute that Alsup timely informed his supervisor at Mackie, the court holds that there is no material issue of fact as to whether Alsup complied with the notice requirements under the TWCA. FACTS:In this workers’ compensation case, the appellant, United States Fire Insurance Co. appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the appellee, William J. Alsup. HOLDING:Affirmed. The crux of U.S. Fire’s argument is that although Alsup informed Mackie Automotive Systems of his injury within 30 days of the alleged accident, he did not meet the notification requirements of the TWCA because his employer is DLS and not Mackie. U.S. Fire relies on Archem Company v. Austin Industrial Inc., 804 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App. � Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (op. on reh’g), to assert that there can only be one employer in the application of workers’ compensation law. Under Archem, only one party is the employer and all other parties are treated as third parties. U.S. Fire argues that because Alsup concedes that DLS is his employer, Alsup cannot now claim that Mackie is his employer or, in the alternative, that DLS and Mackie both qualify as employers. The Texas Supreme Court, however, recently disapproved Archem and the line of cases that follow its reasoning, stating that the purpose of the TWCA is frustrated when there can only be one employer for workers’ compensation purposes. Wingfoot Enters. v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. 2003). The court reasoned that the purposes of the TWCA are best served by a definition of employer that may, at times, encompass more than one employer. In Wingfoot, the Supreme Court decided whether a general employer that provides workers’ compensation coverage can rely on the exclusive remedy provision of the TWCA when the employee was injured while working under the course and scope of the special employer. Although the Supreme Court was addressing the TWCA’s exclusive remedy provision rather than the its notification provision, the court’s analysis applies to the case at hand. In both instances, the primary issue rests on the definition of employer under the TWCA, specifically whether the TWCA’s definition of employer may encompass a general and special employer. The Supreme Court determined that there was nothing in the TWCA’s definition of employer that expressly precluded more than one entity from falling within the its definition of employer. Recognizing the purposes of the TWCA and expressing an intent to promote its overall intent to protect workers, the court determined that, “the [TWCA's] decided bias in favor of employers electing to provide coverage for their employees supports our conclusion that the [TWCA] permits more than one employer for workers’ compensation purposes.” Alsup was employed by DLS, which assigned Alsup to work at Mackie. In situations such as this, the company that assigns the employee is termed the “general employer” while the second company is referred to as the “special employer.” Rodriguez v. Martin Landscape Mgmt. Inc., 882 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App. � Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). As such, DLS was the general employer and Mackie was the special employer. The question at hand is whether the general employer, the special employer or both qualify as an employer under the TWCA. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Wingfoot, DLS and Mackie may be Alsup’s employer in the context of workers’ compensation law. Thus, Alsup is not precluded from protection under the TWCA simply because he admits that DLS is his employer. Because Texas now recognizes multiple employers in the workers’ compensation setting and U.S. Fire does not dispute that Alsup timely informed his supervisor at Mackie, the court holds that there is no material issue of fact as to whether Alsup complied with the notice requirements under the TWCA. Because there is no controverting evidence showing the injury did not occur, the court holds that the trial court properly granted summary judgment regarding whether Alsup was injured in the course and scope of his employment. OPINION:Holman, J.; Livingston, Dauphinot and Holman, JJ.

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