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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:This is an appeal from an interlocutory order directing a court-appointed receiver for two of appellees to pay an amount of attorneys’ fees to appellees’ attorneys out of the receivership assets. In three issues, the Art Institute of Chicago argues the trial court had no basis for entering the order because the court refused to find the fees reasonable and necessary, no evidence was admitted of an agreement authorizing the fees or of the fee statements supporting the amount of fees, and the issue of liability for the fees had not yet been determined in the institute’s pending application for a temporary injunction. HOLDINGDismissed for lack of jurisdiction. To come within this exception to the final judgment rule, the order appealed from must finally dispose of all issues in a discrete part or phase of the receivership. The court concludes the order before the court did not. At the time the order was signed, appellees had submitted an application for more than $359,000 in attorneys’ fees and expenses and the institute had filed and argued several objections to those fees. The record shows the hearing on the objections had not been completed. The record of the trial court’s ruling on the order makes it clear the trial court was not finished with the application for attorneys’ fees or with the institute’s objections to the application. The trial court repeatedly stated the institute would not waive any objections to the additional fees and the trial court refused to make a finding that the $150,000 was reasonable and necessary or even that appellees were entitled to an award of that amount. These issues were left open for further consideration by the trial court. Thus, the order was not final. The institute relies on Azbill v. Dallas County Child Protective Services, 860 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App. � Dallas 1993, no writ) and Ashmore v. North Dallas Bank & Trust, 804 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. App. � Dallas 1990, no writ) to argue for jurisdiction of this appeal. Neither case supports jurisdiction over this order. Azbillwas neither a receivership nor a probate appeal, but an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights and a divorce decree in the same proceeding. The court applied the one final judgment rule and determined the termination judgment was the final judgment of the court and the divorce decree was a nullity. Azbilldoes not apply to this case. Ashmorewas a probate case where a successor trustee appealed three separate orders awarding attorneys’ and trustee’s fees and custodian fees to the former trustee of several trusts. The bank resigned as trustee of several trusts and filed a petition in probate court for the appointment of a successor trustee and for instructions for handling the trust property in the interim. The probate court appointed Ashmore as receiver, and the bank as temporary custodian until a successor custodian was selected by the receiver and approved by the court. The bank then filed an application for all of its attorneys’ fees from the filing of the petition to just prior to the date of the motion and for trustee’s fees for the time it acted as trustee from the date it filed the petition to the date the court appointed it temporary custodian. The probate court signed two orders approving the applications and authorizing Ashmore to pay the attorneys’ and trustee’s fees out of the trust estate. Several months later, and after Ashmore was appointed successor trustee, the bank applied for custodian fees for the time it acted as temporary custodian. The probate court authorized the custodian fees and 30 days later, Ashmore filed a notice of appeal from all three orders. This court concluded “the two orders signed Jan. 4, 1989, awarding attorney’s fees and trustee’s fees for services to the date of the orders, were final and appealable and further conclude[d] that the appellate timetable began operating on that date.” The appeal of the two orders was dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the appeal was not timely perfected. Ashmore is distinguishable because the orders in that case finally disposed of all issues in distinct phases of the proceeding. The bank applied for all of its attorneys’ fees in the probate proceeding and the order finally disposed of that application through the date of the order. Similarly, the bank filed an application for all of its trustee’s fees for the time it continued to act as trustee after filing the petition for appointment of a successor trustee. The bank would not make any additional applications for trustee’s fees because it had been appointed temporary custodian and no longer served as trustee. The probate court finally disposed of this application in its order approving the trustee’s fees. In contrast, the order before the court merely ordered a certain amount paid to appellees’ attorneys without disposing of all the issues raised in appellees’ application for attorneys’ fees and in the institute’s objections to those fees. Thus, it was not a final determination. Further, appellees’ application for attorneys’ fees was only the first in what will likely be several such applications during the course of the receivership. Thus, this phase of the receivership, appellees’ entitlement to and the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses will not be finally decided until much later in the proceeding. Therefore, the court distinguishes Ashmorefrom this case. The institute argues strenuously that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering payment of fees without, among other things, receiving evidence of signed limited partnership agreements allowing payment of such fees, without receiving the fee statements in evidence, without finding the fees were reasonable and necessary, and without ruling on the institute’s objections to the fees. Whatever the claimed errors of the trial court, the court concludes the institute has no remedy by appeal of this interlocutory order. No statute authorizes an appeal from this interlocutory order. Further, the order did not finally resolve all issues in a distinct phase of the receivership proceeding. Thus it is not a final order and is not appealable. OPINION:Moseley, J.; Moseley, Lang and Lagarde, JJ.

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