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During its 2002-2003 term, which concluded on June 26, the U.S. Supreme Court issued 71 signed opinions on cases briefed and argued before it. Included here are the summaries of those decisions. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Barnhart v. Peabody Coal, 123 S. Ct. 748 In a 6-3 decision, the justices reversed the judgment of the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that initial assignments of eligible coal industry retirees to “signatory operators” could not be made after the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act’s Oct. 1, 1993, deadline. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., No. 01-705. The court held that the initial assignments after Oct. 1, 1993, were valid, and that it had never construed a provision that the government must act within a specified time as precluding later action. Justice David Souter’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Clarence Thomas, dissented. Pierce County v. Guillen, 123 S. Ct. 720 In a unanimous opinion written by Thomas, the justices reversed and remanded the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court that it was beyond Congress’ powers to enact a law that insisted that documents submitted by states pursuant to a request for funds to improve dangerous sections of state roads were exempt from disclosure in court proceedings. The court held that the statute fell within Congress’ commerce clause power. Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, No. 01-1229. U.S. v. Bean, 123 S. Ct. 584 In a unanimous decision, the justices reversed a 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision affirming a Texas federal court’s grant of relief to a convicted felon who filed suit after the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) declined to process his application for relief from the statute barring convicted felons from possessing firearms. United States v. Bean, No. 01-704. The court held that an actual decision by the ATF on the application was a prerequisite for judicial review. Thomas wrote the decision for the court. Yellow Transportation v. Mich., 123 S. Ct. 371 In a unanimous decision, the justices reversed and remanded the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court that the Interstate Commerce Commission had misinterpreted the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act when it issued regulations for annual registration fees for interstate motor carriers. Yellow Transportation Inc. v. Michigan, No. 01-270. The court held that the commission’s interpretation of the act was a permissible reading of the statutory language. O’Connor wrote the opinion. ADRGreen Tree Financial v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 in a 5-4 decision, the justices vacated a ruling by the South Carolina Supreme Court that held that, where an agreement is silent as to class arbitration, it may still be ordered by the court if the order doesn’t result in prejudice. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, No. 02-634. According to the justices, an arbitrator must determine whether a contract forbids class arbitration. In a case in which the parties had agreed to submit to the arbitrator all disputes arising from the contract, they have agreed that an arbitrator, not a judge, would answer all relevant questions. Breyer’s opinion was joined by Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg and Stevens. Rehnquist’s dissent was joined by O’Connor, Kennedy and Thomas. BANKING LAW Beneficial v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058 in a 7-2 decision, the justices reversed a decision of the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that held that a lawsuit accusing a national bank of charging usurious interest rates could not be removed to federal court. Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, No. 02-306. The court acknowledged that, except in instances where there is diversity jurisdiction, as a general rule a case is not removable unless the complaint affirmatively alleges a federal claim. One exception to that rule, however, is when a federal statute completely pre-empts a cause of action. Here, the National Bank Act provides the exclusive cause of action for usury claims against national banks, making this case removable. Stevens delivered the court’s opinion, in which Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas joined. BANKRUPTCY Archer v. Warner, 123 S. Ct. 1462 in a 7-2 decision, the justices reversed a ruling by the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that a promissory note, which was created as part of the settlement of a fraud case, could be discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding. Archer v. Warner, No. 01-1418. The court held that a debt for money promised in a settlement agreement accompanied by the release of underlying tort claims is a debt for money obtained by fraud, which is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Breyer’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg. Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Stevens. CIVIL PRACTICE Howsam v. Dean Witter, 123 S. Ct. 588 in unanimous ruling, the justices reversed a decision by the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that a National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rule, which requires an arbitration request to be brought within six years of the event that gave rise to the dispute, was a question of the underlying dispute’s arbitrability that is ordinarily decided by a court. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., No. 01-800. The court held that an NASD arbitrator should apply the time-limit rule to the underlying dispute. Breyer’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens and Thomas. O’Connor took no part in the case. CIVIL PROCEDURE Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete, 123 S. Ct. 1882 in a unanimous decision, the justices upheld a decision by the 11th Circuit that affirmed a Florida federal court’s denial of a plaintiff’s motion to remand to state court a suit filed under the Federal Labor Standards Act. Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard Inc., No. 02-337. The unpaid-wages claim had been removed to federal court by the defendant, who had been plaintiff Phillip T. Breuer’s employer. The justices held that the jurisdictional provision of the act did not bar removal of a suit to federal court because Congress had not expressly barred removal in the act. Souter wrote the court’s opinion. Jinks v. Richland County, 123 S. Ct. 1667 in a unanimous decision, the justices reversed a decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court that reversed a wrongful death verdict against a county. Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina, No. 02-258. The state court had held that the state law claims were untimely because 28 U.S.C. 1367, which tolls the statute of limitations for supplemental state claims during the pendency of related federal court claims, was unconstitutional as applied to claims filed against a state’s political subdivisions in a state court. Remanding, the high court ruled that the application of � 1367 to claims brought against a political subdivision is constitutional because it does not exceed Congress’ enumerated powers. Scalia wrote the court’s opinion. Nat’l Park Hospitality v. DOI, 123 S. Ct. 2026 in a 7-2 decision, the justices vacated a decision by the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Columbia upholding a National Park Service regulation that purports to render the Contract Disputes Act, which established rules governing disputes arising out of certain government contracts, inapplicable to concession contracts. National Park Hospitality Association v. Department of the Interior, No. 02-196. The court remanded the case on the ground that the controversy was not ripe for judicial resolution because mere uncertainty as to the validity of a rule does not constitute a hardship for purposes of the ripeness analysis. Thomas’ opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Stevens. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor joined. Roell v. Withrow, 123 S. Ct. 1696 in a 5-4 decision, the justices reversed a 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that a party’s failure to expressly consent to a proceeding before a magistrate judge is a nonwaivable jurisdictional error. Roell v. Withrow, No. 02-69. The case concerned a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment complaint that he hadn’t received adequate medical care. While the prisoner expressly consented to his claim being heard by the magistrate, two of three adverse parties did not. After the adversaries prevailed, the prisoner appealed, successfully arguing that, absent the express consent of all parties, the magistrate did not have jurisdiction over the case. Remanding, the high court ruled that consent to a magistrate judge’s designation can be inferred from a party’s conduct during litigation. Souter’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer. Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy joined. Scheidler v. NOW, 123 S. Ct. 1057 in an 8-1 decision, the justices reversed a decision by the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that upheld a nationwide injunction against anti-abortion organizations for engaging in a “pattern of racketeering activity,” in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and in acts of extortion, in violation of the Hobbs Act, by conspiring to shut down abortion clinics. Scheidler v. National Organization for Women Inc., No. 01-1118. The court held that there were no acts of extortion under the Hobbs Act and there were no predicate acts to support the RICO violation. Rehnquist’s opinion was joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer. Stevens dissented. Syngenta Crop v. Henson, 123 S. Ct. 366 in a unanimous opinion, the justices affirmed an 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that vacated a district court’s dismissal of a case that had been transferred from a state court. Syngenta Crop Protection Inc. v. Henson, No. 01-757. Underlying the court’s ruling was a suit filed against the Ciba-Geigy Corp. (now Syngenta) in a Louisiana state court, alleging tort claims related to Syngenta’s manufacture of a certain class of insecticides. When the plaintiff failed to abide by the terms of settlement in a parallel federal action, Syngenta’s lawyers petitioned for removal of this case to a Louisiana federal court, then transferred it to the Alabama federal court-where the other case was settled-where this case was dismissed and the plaintiff’s counsel was sanctioned. The court held that the All Writs Act cannot be used as a substitute for the statutory requirement that a federal court must have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be removed from a state court. Rehnquist wrote the court’s opinion. CIVIL RIGHTS Branch v. Smith,123 S. Ct. 1429 in a unanimous decision, the justices affirmed a ruling by a Mississippi federal court enjoining the state from using a state court-devised plan for congressional redistricting. Branch v. Smith, No. 01-1437; Smith v. Branch, No. 011596. The state had lost one congressional seat as a result of the 2000 Census. The Mississippi court fashioned its own plan when it became clear that no state plan would be in place in time to qualify congressional candidates. The justices held that the district court had properly enjoined the enforcement of the state plan because the state plan would not have been precleared by the U.S. Department of Justice by the March 1 deadline, as required by � 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Scalia wrote the court’s opinion. Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye, 123 S. Ct. 138 in a unanimous decision, the justices reversed a 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision holding that an Ohio city had acted with racial bias when it allowed a petition to repeal an ordinance providing for the building of low-income housing to stay the site plan’s implementation. City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, No. 01-1269. The court remanded the case on the ground that the respondent nonprofit corporation hadn’t presented an equal protection claim sufficient to survive summary judgment, and that the city’s referendum process did not violate substantive due process. O’Connor wrote the court’s opinion. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2664 in a 5-4 decision, the court vacated a ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that held that a Georgia state Senate redistricting plan violated � 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The plan had sought to redistrict minority voters from electoral districts in which they comprised the majority so as to increase the number of “influence” districts in which black voters would be able to exert a significant electoral force. Georgia v. Ashcroft, No. 02-182. According to O’Connor’s opinion, whether a redistricting plan diminishes blacks’ electoral power or not depends on a number of factors. In “order to maximize the electoral success of a minority group, a State may choose to create a certain number of ‘safe’ districts, in which it is highly likely that minority voters will be able to elect the candidate of their choice . . . .Alternatively, a State may choose to create a greater number of districts in which it is likely-although perhaps not quite as likely as under the benchmark plan-that minority voters will be able to elect candidates of their choice . . . .Section 5 does not dictate that a State must pick one of these methods of redistricting over another.” O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. According to Souter’s dissent, the issue was not whether minority voters in new districts may have some influence, but whether minority voters will have effective influence. A redistricting plan “must show that the probable voting behavior of nonminority voters will make coalitions with minorities a real prospect.” His dissent was joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 in a 5-4 decision, the justices held that University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science and the Arts’ use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 02-516. The current guidelines use a selection method under which every applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group is automatically awarded 20 points of the 100 needed to guarantee admission. According to the court, an admissions policy such as Michigan’s that considers race exclusively as a factual matter of an individual’s membership of a minority group, violates the equal protection clause. Michigan’s 20-point distribution has the effect of making “the factor of race . . . decisive” for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant. Rehnquist delivered the court’s opinion, in which O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined. Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter dissented. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 in a 5-4 decision, the justices upheld a ruling by the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that held that the University of Michigan Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not prohibited by the equal protection clause, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act or 42 U.S.C. 1981. Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 02-241. The court endorsed the view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify using race in university admissions. The justices rejected as unconstitutional a university’s enrollment of a “critical mass” of minority students simply to assure the presence of some specified percentage of a racial or ethnic group. However, a narrowly tailored admissions program, such as Michigan’s that is “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight,” is constitutional since the program ensures that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes race or ethnicity the defining feature of the application. O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined. Meyer v. Holley, 123 S. Ct. 824 in a unanimous opinion, the justices vacated and remanded a decision by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that held that a real estate corporation’s president and sole shareholder was vicariously liable for an employee’s acts of discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Meyer v. Holley, No. 01-1120. Ruling on an appeal in a suit filed by an interracial couple that had been trying to buy a home in California, the court held that, while the act forbids racial discrimination, it imposes liability only upon the corporation but not upon its officers or owners. Breyer wrote the court’s opinion. Sell v. U.S.,123 S. Ct. 2174 in a 6-3 decision, the justices vacated and remanded a ruling by the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that held that a prisoner awaiting trial can be forced to take anti-psychotic medication so as to make him competent for trial. Sell v. U.S., No. 02-5664 Forcible medication for trial competency purposes is constitutional only “if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the trial’s fairness, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary signi- ficantly to further important governmental trial-related interests,” the court said. While the government has an interest in timely prosecution, it also has a concomitant interest in assuring a defendant a fair trial. It is up to the courts to decide if medication is likely to render a defendant competent to stand trial and will not produce side effects that will interfere with a defendant’s ability to conduct his defense. Breyer delivered the opinion of the court, in which Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg joined. Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor and Thomas joined. COMMUNICATIONS U.S. v. American Library Ass’n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 in a 6-3 ruling, the court overturned a Pennsylvania district court ruling that the Children’s Internet Protection Act was unconstitutional. United States v. American Library Ass’n, No. 02-361. The act forbids public libraries from receiving federal assistance for Internet access unless they install software to block pornographic images. The district court argued that the act forces libraries to violate the First Amendment. According to the justices, since public libraries have traditionally excluded pornographic material from their collections, Congress could reasonably impose a similar limitation on its Internet assistance programs. Rehnquist’s opinion was joined O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy and Breyer. Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg dissented. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 in a unanimous opinion, the justices reversed the 9th Circuit’s judgment that a police officer’s failure to give a Miranda warning, coupled with coercive questioning of a defendant while he was being treated for gunshot wounds he received during a fight with police, violated the defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment, even though his statements were not used against him in a criminal proceeding. Chavez v. Martinez, No. 01-1444. The justices remanded the case on the ground that the language of the Fifth Amendment does not support the principle that mere compulsive questioning violates the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination is only violated if the statements are used against the defendant. Thomas delivered the court’s opinion. Conn. Dep’t Pub. Safety v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1160 in a unanimous decision, the justices reversed a ruling by the 2d U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that held that a law requiring sex offenders to register upon their release, and requiring the state to post that information on the Internet making it available to the public, violated the 14th Amendment’s due process clause and deprived registered sex offenders of a “liberty interest.” Conn. Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe, No. 01-1231. The court said that the due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the state’s statutory scheme, and mere injury to reputation does not constitute a deprivation of a liberty interest. Rehnquist wrote the court’s opinion. Cook County, Ill. v. U.S., 123 S. Ct. 1239 in a unanimous opinion, the justices affirmed a 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that held that Cook County, Ill., was a “person” subject to suit under the federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a). Cook County, Ill. v. U.S., No. 01-1572. The 7th Circuit had ruled that that Cook County can be sued under the act, after a researcher at a municipal hospital accused the institution of submitting false statements in order to obtain drug abuse research funds from the federal government. The county had obtained a dismissal of the qui tam action from an Illinois federal court. Souter delivered the court’s opinion. Demore v. Kim,123 S. Ct. 1708 in a unanimous opinion, the justices reversed a 9th Circuit decision that the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allows the U.S. attorney general to take into custody an alien who is deportable and has been convicted of certain crimes and to hold that alien without bail, violated substantive due process as applied. Demore v. Kim, No. 01-1491. The court held that although aliens are entitled to due process in a deportation proceeding, detention during the proceedings is a constitutionally valid part of the process. Rehnquist wrote the court’s opinion. Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 in a 5-4 ruling, the justices upheld a California appeals court decision affirming a 25-years-to-life sentence for a defendant convicted of a felony under California’s “three strikes” law. Ewing v. California, No. 01-6978. The court held that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate and therefore did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas. Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200 in a 7-2 ruling, the justices vacated a 4th Circuit decision that affirmed the right of a nonprofit advocacy corporation to contribute directly in a federal election. Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, No. 02-403. The court held that applying the direct-contribution prohibition to nonprofits is consistent with the First Amendment. “Any attack on the federal prohibition of direct corporate political contributions goes against the current of a century of congressional efforts to curb corporations’ ‘potentially deleterious influences on federal elections,’ which we have canvassed a number of times before,” it said. It added that in barring corporate earnings from turning into political war chests, the ban was, and is, intended to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. Souter’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer and Kennedy. Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia joined. Hillside Dairy v. Lyons, 123 S. Ct. 2142 in a unanimous opinion, the justices vacated a 9th Circuit ruling that held that a 1996 federal statute immunized California’s milk pricing and pooling laws from commerce clause challenges. Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, No. 01-950. The court held that California’s milk pricing and pooling regulations are not exempted from commerce clause scrutiny by the Federal Agriculture and Reform Act of 1996. The justices argued that the absence of a clear statement in the California laws and regulations identifying out-of-state residency or citizenship as a basis for disparate treatment wasn’t a sufficient basis for rejecting the out-of-state dairy farmers’ privileges and immunities clause claims. Stevens wrote the court’s opinion. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 in a 6-3 decision, the justices overturned a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in sodomy. Lawrence v. Texas, No. 02-102. The court held that the Texas statute, which makes it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in sodomy, violates the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court overturned its 1986 holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186. According to Kennedy’s opinion, though the laws in question in both cases do “no more than prohibit a particular sexual act, their penalties and purposes have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.” Individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical relationships are a form of “liberty” protected by due process. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into an individual’s personal life. Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer and O’Connor. Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist and Thomas joined. Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 in a 5-4 decision, the justices reversed a ruling by the 9th Circuit that had overturned a judgment by the California Court of Appeal that California’s “three strikes” law did not violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Lockyer v. Andrade, No. 01-1127 The court held that the California appeals court decision affirming a sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life on a defendant, who was charged with felony counts of petty theft with a prior conviction after stealing $150 worth of videotapes from two different stores, was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, the court’s clearly established law. O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Souter, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 123 S. Ct. 1829 the court unanimously reversed an Illinois Supreme Court judgment that the state attorney general’s suit against for-profit fundraising corporations was an attempt to regulate fundraisers’ ability to engage in an activity that is protected by the First Amendment, based upon the fact that the fundraisers would retain 85% of the gross receipts from Illinois donors. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates Inc., No. 01-1806. The court remanded the case on the ground that states may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used. Ginsburg wrote the court’s opinion. Nev. Dep’t. Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 in a 6-3 decision, the justices affirmed the 9th Circuit’s reversal of a district court grant of summary judgment to a state agency that claimed that an employee’s claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act was barred by the 11th Amendment. Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, No. 01-1368. The court held that a state employee may sue a state for money damages in federal court for violations of the act, because Congress had clearly abrogated the states’ immunity in the act. Rehnquist’s opinion was joined by O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer and Stevens. Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas dissented. Nguyen v. U.S.,123 S. Ct. 2130 in a 5-4 decision, the justices vacated and remanded a 9th Circuit decision affirming a Guamanian defendant’s convictions on the ground that the panel did not have the authority to decide the appeal because it wasn’t properly constituted. Nguyen v. U.S., No. 01-10873. The court explained that the one judge who served on this 9th Circuit panel, regularly sat on the district court for the Northern Mariana Islands, an Article IV territorial-court. That judge was not an Article III judge eligible to serve on an appellate panel. Stevens’ opinion was joined by O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas. Rehnquist’s dissent was joined by Scalia, Ginsburg and Breyer. Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1925 in a 6-3 decision, the justices reversed a decision by the 9th Circuit that held that Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act, which requires offenders who had been incarcerated to register with the state and submit to quarterly verifications, violated the ex post facto clause because its retroactive application was punitive. Smith v. Doe, No. 01-729. The justices held that the retroactivity was not punitive and did not violate the ex post facto clause because the state only intended to protect the public. Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas and Souter. Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg dissented. Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446 in a 5-4 decision, the justices reversed a California Court of Appeal ruling that affirmed a change to California’s statute of limitation, permitting prosecution of sex abuse crimes involving children when the prior limitation period had expired. Stogner v. California, No. 01-1757. According to the court, a law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the ex post facto clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution. Breyer’s opinion was joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Souter and Ginsburg. Kennedy’s dissent was joined by Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas. Virginia v. Black,123 S. Ct. 1536 in an 8-1 decision, the justices affirmed a Virginia Supreme Court ruling that held the state law making cross-burning with intent to intimidate a criminal offense is unconstitutional because the statute contains a provision that the simple act of burning the cross is prima facie proof of intent to intimidate. Virginia v. Black, No. 01-1107. The justices held, however, that cross-burning with intent is not protected by the First Amendment and may be banned by state law. The court vacated and remanded the sentences of the defendants who were convicted by courts that gave the prima facie evidence provision as a jury instruction, explaining that the provision makes it more likely than not that a jury will find that a defendant had burned the cross with intent to intimidate, whether that intent was there or not. O’Connor delivered the court’s opinion. Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191 in a unanimous decision, the justices reversed a ruling by the Virginia Supreme Court that a state housing agency’s policy of authorizing the police to serve notice on any person lacking a “legitimate business or social purpose” for being on the premises and to arrest for trespassing any person who remains or returns after having been so notified was an unconstitutionally overbroad First Amendment violation. Virginia v. Hicks, No. 02-371. The court held that the state housing agency’s trespass policy did not violate the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine because neither the basis for the barment sanction nor its purpose, that of preventing future trespasses, implicates the First Amendment. The regulation didn’t prohibit a “substantial amount of protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications. Both the notice-barment rule and the ‘legitimate business or social purpose’ rule apply to all persons . . . not just to those seeking to engage in expression,” the court explained. Scalia wrote the court’s opinion. Wiggins v. Smith,123 S. Ct. 2527 in a 7-2 decision, the justices reversed a ruling by the 4th Circuit that held that in a case in which the strategic decisions of trial counsel were reasonable, a capital defendant was not entitled to habeas relief on grounds of ineffective assistance. Wiggins v. Smith, No. 02-311. According to the court, the performance of the defendant’s attorneys at his sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The attorneys had failed to present mitigating evidence about their client though he had the kind of troubled history that is relevant to the assessment of moral culpability. “[H]ad the jury been confronted with this considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have returned with a different sentence,” O’Connor wrote. Her opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Scalia’s dissent was joined by Thomas. CONTRACTS PacifiCare Health v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531 in a unanimous decision, the justices reversed an 11th Circuit decision that arbitration clauses in agreements between managed health care organizations and physicians were not enforceable. PacifiCare Health Systems Inc. v. Book, No. 02-215. The 11th Circuit had held that the arbitration clauses improperly prohibited the award of treble damages, which can be awarded under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statute that the physicians sued under. The justices remanded the case, on the ground that it was unclear whether the agreements prevented an award of RICO treble damages. Scalia wrote the court’s opinion. Thomas took no part in the case. CRIMINAL PRACTICE Clay v. U.S.,123 S. Ct. 2659 in a unanimous opinion, the justices reversed a 7th Circuit decision affirming that the one-year period for filing a motion for post-conviction relief begins to run when the conviction becomes final, which the lower court held was when the court of appeals issued the mandate affirming the conviction. Clay v. U.S., No. 01-1500. The court said that for the purposes of starting the one-year term, the conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court’s affirmation of the conviction. Ginsburg wrote the court’s opinion. Massaro v. U.S.,123 S. Ct. 1690 in a unanimous decision, the justices reversed a 2d Circuit decision that held that a man convicted of murder had procedurally defaulted and could not move the trial court to vacate his conviction on ineffective-assistance grounds because he had already directly appealed the conviction on evidentiary grounds. Massaro v. U.S., No. 01-1559. When initially appealing the admission of a late-discovered piece of evidence that was not disclosed by the prosecution until after the trial started, the defendant’s new lawyer also failed to challenge the first attorney’s effectiveness. The prior attorney declined a trial court offer for a continuance to examine that late-discovered evidence before it was admitted. Reversing and remanding, the justices argued that forcing defendants to bring ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal would create a risk that defendants would feel compelled to bring such claims before there has been an opportunity fully to develop the claim’s factual predicate before the district court. Kennedy wrote the court’s opinion. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029 in an 8-1 ruling, the justices reversed a 5th Circuit ruling denying a certificate of appealability to a criminal defendant, remanding the case on the ground that the circuit court should have issued a certificate to review the denial of the defendant’s petition for habeas relief. Miller-El v. Cockrell No. 01-7662. The court said that the defendant had made a substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right on his claim that the state had been racially motivated in its use of peremptory challenges to potential jurors at his trial. Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Overton v. Bazzetta,123 S. Ct. 2162 in a unanimous opinion, the justices upheld a Michigan Department of Corrections regulation that limited the type and number of visitors a prison inmate may have. Overton v. Bazzetta, No. 02-94. Responding to concerns about security problems and substance abuse among inmates, the department limited all inmates to visits by immediate family members and no more than 10 other people. If the inmate has committed two or more substance abuse violations, visitation is limited to attorneys and members of the clergy. A group made up of prisoners, their friends and other family members, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the regulations violate the First, Eighth and 14th amendments. A Michigan federal court and the 6th Circuit said the regulations were invalid. Reversing, the justices held that the regulations bear a rational relationship to legitimate penalogical interests. “We must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them,” the court said. Kennedy wrote the court’s opinion. Price v. Vincent,123 S. Ct. 1848 in a unanimous opinion, the justices reversed a 6th Circuit decision affirming a Michigan federal court’s grant of habeas relief to a defendant who claimed that his continued prosecution for first-degree murder after the trial court had allegedly granted a motion of acquittal on that charge violated the double jeopardy clause. Price v. Vincent, No. 02-524. Michigan’s high court had held that because the trial judge had not entered a formal judgment on the record, jeopardy had not been terminated. The 6th Circuit reversed. The justices held that the 6th Circuit erred in failing to apply the standard that the defendant was entitled to relief only if he could demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication was contrary to the Supreme Court’s clearly established precedents. Submission of the murder charge to the jury was “not an objectively unreasonable application of . . . Supreme Court law,” the justices said. Rehnquist wrote the court’s opinion. Sattazahn v. Penn., 123 S. Ct. 732 in a 5-4 decision, the justices affirmed a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision that held that neither the double jeopardy clause nor the due process clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty on the retrial of a defendant on a capital murder charge. It held that the entry of a life sentence in the first trial did not implicate double jeopardy and that the state was free to seek the death penalty at a second trial. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, No. 01-7574. Scalia’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, O’Connor and Thomas. Ginsburg filed a dissent, which was joined by Stevens, Souter and Breyer. United States v. Recio, 123 S. Ct. 1342 in a unanimous opinion, the justices reversed and remanded a 9th Circuit ruling that there was insufficient evidence to show that two appellants had joined a conspiracy to distribute drugs before the police seized a shipment and set up a sting operation. United States v. Recio, No. 01-1184. After police in Nevada intercepted a truckload of illegal drugs, they drove the truck to its destination in Idaho, then using the trucks’ two drivers as bait, had them contact another confederate who said he would send someone to retrieve the truck. Shortly after the defendants arrived, they were arrested. The court held that a conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the government has defeated its object. Breyer wrote the court’s opinion. Woodford v. Garceau, 123 S. Ct. 1398 in a 6-3 decision, the justices reversed the 9th Circuit’s ruling that a defendant’s application for habeas relief was subject to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, where the defendant had filed a motion for appointment of federal habeas counsel and a stay of execution before the effective date of the act. Woodford v. Garceau, No. 01-1862. The justices remanded the case on the ground that a case is not “pending” until there is a filed application for habeas relief, which, in this case was after the effective date of the act. Thomas’ opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy and O’Connor. Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented. DAMAGES State Farm Mutual v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 in a 6-3 decision, the justices held that a punitive damages award of $145 million, where full compensatory damages are $1 million, is excessive and violates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, No. 01-1289. According to the court, compensatory damages are intended to redress a plaintiff’s concrete loss, while punitive damages are aimed at deterrence and retribution. The due process clause prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments. It should be presumed that a plaintiff’s injuries have been rectified by compensatory damages. Therefore, punitive damages should be awarded only if the defendant’s culpability is so reprehensible to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence. Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Souter and Breyer. Scalia, Thomas and Ginsburg filed dissenting opinions. EMPLOYMENT LAW Black & Decker v. Nord, 123 S. Ct. 1965 in a unanimous opinion, the court vacated a ruling by the 9th Circuit that the “treating physician rule,” which accords special weight to the opinion of a Social Security disability claimant’s treating physician, applies to disability determinations under employee benefit plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, No. 02-469. Remanding the case, the court said that the act doesn’t require a plan administrator to accord special deference to a treating physician’s opinion. Ginsburg delivered the court’s opinion. Clackamas Assocs v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673 in a 7-2 decision, the justices reversed a 9th Circuit ruling that four physician-shareholders of a medical clinic were employees for purposes of a suit filed against the clinic under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, No. 01-1435. The physicians had argued that the clinic was not covered by the act because it did not have the minimum required number of employees. In the absence of a statutory definition of “employee” within the ADA, the high court looked to the definition used by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. It concluded that under the EEOC’s definition, the shareholders would be considered employees. Acknowledging that the district court’s findings appeared to weigh in favor of the opposite result, the justices remanded for further proceedings. Stevens’ opinion was joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Thomas, Souter, Kennedy and Scalia. Breyer and Ginsburg dissented. Desert Palace v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 in a unanimous ruling, the justices held that direct evidence of discrimination is not required for a plaintiff to prove discrimination was a motivating factor in a mixed-motive case, in which an employer had both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for making a decision. Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, No. 02-679. According to the justices, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to any employment practice. On its face, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not mention that a plaintiff must make a heightened showing through direct evidence. In fact, Congress had explicitly defined “demonstrates” as to “mee[t] the burdens of production and persuasion.” Thomas delivered the opinion of the court. ENERGY LAW Entergy v. Louisiana PSC, 123 S. Ct. 2050 in a unanimous opinion, reversing a Louisiana Supreme Court decision, the justices held that a prior existing Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) ruling on interstate power rates will pre-empt later additional state regulations intended to alter intrastate rates charged by the same utility. Entergy Louisiana Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 02-299. The state’s public service commission had determined that Entergy Louisiana was paying too much money to its corporate siblings for their shared power grid. Accordingly, the commission ruled that Entergy would not be allowed to recoup the loss by charging more to its in-state regional customers. But applying the “filed rate doctrine,” the justices said that, because the FERC had already approved Entergy’s interstate cost allocations, the state could not second-guess that ruling. Thomas delivered the court’s opinion. GOVERNMENT U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 123 S. Ct. 1079 in a 6-3 decision, the justices reversed a Federal Circuit decision that the secretary of the interior’s exercise of control over the leasing of Indian lands for mineral development was sufficient to warrant a money judgment against the government on an Indian tribe’s claim that the leases represented a breach of trust. United States v. Navajo Nation, No. 01-1375. Remanding the case, the court held that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act did not provide any statutory authority for an award of damages. Ginsburg’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Breyer. Souter, Stevens and O’Connor dissented. U.S. v. White Mountain Tribe, 123 S. Ct. 1126 in a 5-4 decision, the justices affirmed a Federal Circuit ruling that a provision for the government’s exclusive control over buildings on the former Fort Apache Military Reservation created a trust relationship that was enforceable by a damage award. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, No. 01-1067. The justices said that the public law gave rise to Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over the tribe’s suit for money damages against the government. Souter wrote the court’s opinion, which was joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer. Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy joined. HEALTH LAW Kentucky Health Plans v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 in a unanimous decision, the justices rejected the argument of managed care organizations that that Kentucky’s any willing provider (AWP) statute is pre-empted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Kentucky’s law requires health insurers to open their networks to any health care provider willing to meet the conditions for participation. Kentucky Association of Health Plans v. Miller, No. 00-1471. Kentucky’s AWP prohibits “[a] health insurer [from] discriminat[ing] against any provider who is . . . willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the . . . insurer.” The managed care organizations claim that the AWP law is pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which pre-empts all state laws “insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan,” 29 U.S.C. 1144(a), but saves from pre-emption state “law[s] . . . which regulat[e] insurance.” � 1144(b)(2)(A). The justices held that Kentucky’s AWP law does regulate insurance. To come within ERISA’s savings clause the statute must affect the risk pooling arrangement between insurer and insured. Kentucky’s statute clearly does this by altering the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds. Scalia delivered the court’s opinion. Pharm. Research v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 in a unanimous decision, the justices affirmed the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals’ reversal of a Maine federal court order preliminarily enjoining the implementation of a state statute that would reduce prescription drug prices for state residents by allowing the state to negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers. Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, No. 01-188. The justices held that the petitioners had not met their burden of showing the probability of success on the merits of their claims. Stevens delivered the court’s opinion. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Dastar v. 20th Century Fox, 123 S. Ct. 2041 in a unanimous opinion, the justices reversed a 9th Circuit decision and ruled that the Lanham Act-which prohibits the giving of a false designation of origin for goods and services-allows the copying of public domain material without giving credit to its source. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. Inc., No. 02-428. The case concerned the rights of a company to market a set of World War II videotapes incorporating Twentieth Century Fox’s 1949 television series titled Crusade in Europe without giving credit to Fox for the underlying work. While the copyright on the Fox work expired in 1977, Fox sued the repackager, Dastar Corp., alleging that the failure to give credit constituted “reverse passing off,” which was in violation of the act. According to the court, the meaning of the phrase “origin of goods” in the act applied only to tangible goods, and not to the author of an idea or concept or communication embedded in that good. “To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that [the act] created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.” Scalia wrote the court’s opinion Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 1505 in a 7-2 ruling, the justices affirmed a D.C. Circuit decision that the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, which enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years, applied retroactively to existing copyrights. The court held that the act did not violate the First Amendment and was a rational exercise of Congress’ power under the copyright clause. Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618. Ginsburg’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas. Stevens and Breyer dissented. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 123 S. Ct. 1115 in a unanimous decision, the justices overturned a 6th Circuit ruling that “dilution” of a mark will occur if a mark is distinctive, even if no actual harm had been proved. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue Inc., No. 01-1015. The case involved a suit filed by Victoria’s Secret against a store selling sex merchandise named Victor’s Little Secret. According to the court, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires proof that a junior mark has been used that is sufficiently similar to the famous mark to evoke in consumers a mental association of the two, and that such confusion has caused actual economic harm to the owner of the famous mark by lessening its former selling power. According to the justices, the statute requires proof of actual harm, rather than mere “likelihood” of harm. There is no evidence of any lessening of the Victoria’s Secret mark’s capacity to identify and distinguish goods or services sold in Victoria’s Secret stores. Stevens delivered the court’s opinion. INTERNATIONAL LAW American v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374 in a 5-4 decision, the justices reversed a 9th Circuit ruling that held that California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999-which requires any insurer doing business in the state to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 upon penalty of loss of its state business license-interferes with the president’s conduct of foreign policy and is thus pre-empted. American Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, No. 02-722. Germany and the U.S. have signed an agreement, according to which the U.S. would seek to ensure that local governments respect a German government-established foundation as the exclusive forum for the settlement of Holocaust-era claims. According to the court, California could not pre-empt presidential foreign policy powers. “The issue of restitution for Nazi crimes has in fact been . . . formalized in treaties and executive agreements over the last half century, and although resolution of private claims was postponed by the Cold War . . . the consistent Presidential foreign policy has been to encourage European governments and companies to volunteer settlement funds in preference to litigation,” the court said. Souter’s opinion was joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy and Breyer. Ginsburg’s dissent was joined by Stevens, Scalia and Thomas. Dole Food v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655 in a unanimous opinion, the justices affirmed a 9th Circuit decision holding that two Israel-based chemical companies that were impleaded into a suit with a food company were not instrumentalities of a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, No. 01-593. The justices held that the foreign companies did not meet the act’s instrumentality definition because the State of Israel had no direct ownership in the companies and they were separated from the government by one or more intermediate corporate tiers. Kennedy delivered the court’s opinion. LEGAL PROFESSION Brown v. Legal Found’n of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406 in a 5-4 decision, the justices rejected a property rights challenge to state IOLTA programs-the second-largest source of funds for legal services for the poor. Interest on lawyers’ trust accounts programs, authorized by statute, require lawyers to pool client funds, which are incapable of earning net interest on their own, in IOLTA accounts. Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, No. 01-1325. The programs generate approximately $160 million a year for legal services. The court concluded that the IOLTA program does not violate the Fifth Amendment prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. According to the justices, the Fifth Amendment imposes two conditions on the state’s authority to confiscate private property: The taking must be for a “public use” and “just compensation” must be paid to the owner. IOLTA programs, in serving the compelling interest of providing legal services to the poor, qualify as “public use.” As for the “just compensation” required by the Fifth Amendment, this is measured by the property owner’s loss rather than the government’s gain. Any monetary compensation must be meas-ured by net losses rather than the value of the public’s gain. Consequently, if the net loss is zero, the compensation that is due is also zero. Stevens delivered the court’s opinion, in which O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, Kennedy and Thomas joined. NATIVE AMERICAN LAW Inyo County v. Paiute Indians, 123 S. Ct. 1887 in a unanimous opinion, the court vacated a 9th Circuit ruling that a Native American tribe could maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because the tribe sought protection from an unlawful search and seizure, a Fourth Amendment right covered by the statute. Inyo County, Calif. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony, No. 02-281. The court held that � 1983 permits citizens to seek relief if they are being deprived of their federally protected rights. It was not designed to facilitate the withholding of evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. A tribal member has no immunity from a properly executed search warrant. Remanding the case, the court said, “The Tribe has not explained . . . what prescription of federal common law . . . enables the Tribe to maintain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes.” Ginsburg delivered the court’s opinion. SOCIAL SERVICES LAW Wash. v. Guardianship, 123 S. Ct. 1017 in a unanimous opinion, the justices reversed a Washington Supreme Court decision that the state’s use of children’s Social Security and Supplemental Security Income benefits to pay for foster care violated the Social Security Act’s anti-attachment provision. Wash. State Dep’t of Social and Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, No. 01-1420. The court remanded the case on the ground that the state’s use of the funds came within the act’s requirement that the benefits be used for current maintenance of the beneficiary. Souter delivered the court’s opinion. TAXATION Boeing v. U.S.,123 S. Ct. 2641 in a 7-2 decision, the justices affirmed the 9th Circuit’s reversal of a district court’s grant of summary judgment for Boeing Co. in a tax-refund suit. Boeing Co. v. U.S., No. 01-1209. The court held that a Treasury Department regulation governing the allocation of research and development expenses between a company and its foreign sales subsidiary was not invalid. Stevens’ opinion was joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Scalia and Thomas dissented. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n, 123 S. Ct. 2156 in a unanimous decision, the justices reversed an Iowa Supreme Court ruling and held that Iowa’s graduated tax rate of 20% on racetrack slot machine adjusted revenues with an automatic rise over time to 36%, and a 20% tax on riverboat slot machine adjusted revenues with no rise in the tax, didn’t violate the equal protection clause because there was a rational basis for the difference in the tax rates. Fitzgerald v. Racing Association of Central Iowa, No. 02-695. Breyer wrote the opinion. Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. 1683 in a unanimous opinion, the justices ruled that the state of Nevada is not required to give full faith and credit to a California law that would immunize that state’s Franchise Tax Board from intentional torts it may have committed in the course of its pursuit of a former California taxpayer. Franchise Tax Board of Calif. v. Hyatt, No. 02-42. After the taxpayer had moved from California to Nevada, the board initiated audit proceedings, then issued notices of proposed assessments and imposed civil fraud penalties against the taxpayer. When the taxpayer sued in Nevada state court, alleging that the board had committed intentional torts, the board moved for dismissal, arguing that under California law it was immune from suit. Affirming a Nevada Supreme Court ruling that the intentional tort claims should stand, the justices held that full faith and credit is only “exacting” with respect to enforcement of judgments. and that Nevada was not compelled to substitute another state’s statute concerning subject matter over which it is competent to legislate. O’Connor delivered the court’s opinion. TELECOMMUNICATIONS FCC v. NextWave, 123 S. Ct. 832 in an 8-1 opinion, the justices affirmed a D.C. Circuit decision that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) erred in canceling spectrum licenses that were awarded to a company that failed to make its first payment and then filed for bankruptcy. Federal Communications Comm’n v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., No. 01-653. The court held that the U.S. Bankruptcy Code bars the FCC from revoking the licenses solely because the debtor had not made the payment. Scalia delivered the court’s opinion, in which Rehnquist, Kennedy, O’Connor, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Stevens joined. Breyer dissented. TRANSPORTATION Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 123 S. Ct. 518 in a unanimous opinion, the justices reversed and remanded a judgment by the Illinois Supreme Court holding that the Federal Boat Safety Act pre-empted a state common law tort action against a boat manufacturer for making an allegedly dangerous motor. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, No. 01-706. The court said that the act’s legislative history indicated that broad exemptions for state common law remedies were intended. The suit was filed by the estate of a woman who was killed by an outboard motor propeller in a boating accident. The estate claimed that the motor, which had no propeller guard, was unreasonably dangerous. Stevens delivered the court’s opinion.

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