PER CURIAM

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Skydiver Zarda—now deceased—alleged he was fired from his job as a skydiving instructor because of his sexual orientation. He sued employer Altitude Express and its owner Maynard (collectively Altitude Express) claiming discrimination violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and New York law. Despite finding a triable factual issue whether Zarda faced discrimination because of his sexual orientation in violation of New York law, district court held Altitude Express entitled to summary judgment on his Title VII claim because Second Circuit’s 2000 decision in Simonton v. Runyan, 232 F.3d 33, holds that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. Declining to overturn Simonton—despite concluding that Zarda’s sex discrimination claim was properly before it because district court held Zarda to a higher “but for” standard of causation than the “motivating-factor” causation standard required by Title VII—the circuit rejected Zarda’s argument that he was entitled to a new trial on his state-law claim because of alleged evidentiary errors, unfair discovery practices, and prejudicial arguments to the jury based on gay stereotypes.

PER CURIAM

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Skydiver Zarda—now deceased—alleged he was fired from his job as a skydiving instructor because of his sexual orientation. He sued employer Altitude Express and its owner Maynard (collectively Altitude Express) claiming discrimination violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and New York law. Despite finding a triable factual issue whether Zarda faced discrimination because of his sexual orientation in violation of New York law, district court held Altitude Express entitled to summary judgment on his Title VII claim because Second Circuit’s 2000 decision in Simonton v. Runyan , 232 F.3d 33 , holds that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. Declining to overturn Simonton—despite concluding that Zarda’s sex discrimination claim was properly before it because district court held Zarda to a higher “but for” standard of causation than the “motivating-factor” causation standard required by Title VII—the circuit rejected Zarda’s argument that he was entitled to a new trial on his state-law claim because of alleged evidentiary errors, unfair discovery practices, and prejudicial arguments to the jury based on gay stereotypes.