Judge Curtis Farber

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Prosecutors moved for leave to reargue the court’s prior decision granting Jones dismissal of the accusatory instrument for violating his statutory right to a speedy trial as 215 days were found chargeable to prosecutors. The court noted prosecutors were justified in raising new facts to support exclusion of portions of time periods the court ruled were pre-readiness, rather than post-readiness. Prosecutors’ motion to renew and reargue addressed three adjournment periods they claimed should not have been charged to them in whole or in part. The court agreed as to two of the three contested periods, finding when in a pre-readiness context, defense counsel consented when he actively participated in setting an adjourn date beyond time requested by prosecutors. Thus the portion of the adjournment attributable to defense counsel was excluded. The court ruled defense counsel actively participated in setting the adjourn date, in two contested periods, thus consenting to the adjournment, and days beyond the 14 and 19 days, respectively, prosecutors requested were excluded. The court stated 35 days previously charged to prosecutors were excluded, charging them with 180 of 182 days in which they were required to be ready, thus vacating the prior order, and denying Jones dismissal.

Judge Curtis Farber

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Prosecutors moved for leave to reargue the court’s prior decision granting Jones dismissal of the accusatory instrument for violating his statutory right to a speedy trial as 215 days were found chargeable to prosecutors. The court noted prosecutors were justified in raising new facts to support exclusion of portions of time periods the court ruled were pre-readiness, rather than post-readiness. Prosecutors’ motion to renew and reargue addressed three adjournment periods they claimed should not have been charged to them in whole or in part. The court agreed as to two of the three contested periods, finding when in a pre-readiness context, defense counsel consented when he actively participated in setting an adjourn date beyond time requested by prosecutors. Thus the portion of the adjournment attributable to defense counsel was excluded. The court ruled defense counsel actively participated in setting the adjourn date, in two contested periods, thus consenting to the adjournment, and days beyond the 14 and 19 days, respectively, prosecutors requested were excluded. The court stated 35 days previously charged to prosecutors were excluded, charging them with 180 of 182 days in which they were required to be ready, thus vacating the prior order, and denying Jones dismissal.