The U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari, vacated a judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, and remanded the action for further proceedings. The court held that the Court of Appeals erred in finding it a bar to federal habeas review that a state court declined to review the merits of a petitioner’s claim on the ground that it had done so already. The court held further that, under the unusual facts of the petitioner’s case, remand was warranted for the Eleventh Circuit to address the denial of the petitioner’s motions for discovery and an evidentiary hearing on the fairness and propriety of his capital trial.
As amended by §203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), federal law prohibits corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is an “electioneering communication” or for speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441b. An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made within 30 days of a primary election, §434(f)(3)(A), and that is “publicly distributed,” 11 CFR §100.29(a)(2), which in “the case of a candidate for nomination for President… means” that the communication “[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons in a State where a primary election… is being held within 30 days,” §100.29(b)(3)(ii). Corporations and unions may establish a political action committee (PAC) for express advocacy or electioneering communications purposes. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2). In McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 203–209, this Court upheld limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge, relying on the holding in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, that political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.
