In last month’s two-part article, “Data Privacy: Why We Are All Over the Place,” I examined caselaw involving cell site location Information (CSLI) to discuss why that caselaw is inconsistent and deeply problematic when it finds a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” as the concept is understood, in CSLI when interpreting the Fourth Amendment under the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In summary, I discussed how cases finding a “privacy” violation when law enforcement gathers, without a warrant, CSLI of a target’s cellphone over a period of time to determine where the target was over that period, make little sense because the CSLI captured is intercepted from public atmospheres in which the target had no reasonable expectation of privacy to track the target’s public movements, in which the target had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

Recently, in Commonwealth v. Mason, J-44-2020 No. 69 MAP 2019 (March 25, 2021), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that audio interceptions, made in the bedroom of toddler-aged victims of a nanny’s physical and verbal abuse, when such interceptions were captured by a camera hidden in a bedroom of the house by the father (and house owner) of the toddler-aged victims, did not violate the rights of the defendant (the nanny) under the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act (Wiretap Act), 18 Pa.C.S. Sections 5701-5782, and so were admissible. The Supreme Court drew a proper and logical conclusion from the facts and the law and, hopefully, brought us closer to a reasonable look at the issue, but we still have a long way to go.

The ‘Mason’ Case