Declaratory judgments present particularly vexing issues of appellate procedure. In part, these problems arise from their peculiar nature—seeking a “declaration” of rights in advance of an actual controversy—which can verge on improper advisory opinions. See Gulnac v. South Butler County School District, 587 A.2d 699, 701 (Pa. 1991) (vacating declaratory judgment as advisory; must not be used “in anticipation of events which may never occur,” “moot cases,” or “purely academic” issues). But when the declaration is the end in itself, it becomes difficult to determine when the action should start, and when it should end. The problem is particularly acute when declaratory judgment actions are decided by preliminary motion.

Declaratory judgment actions are, of course, a statutory creation. The legislature provided that declaratory judgments “shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree,” 42 Pa. C.S.A. Section 7532. Section 7532 confers this “force and effect” without regard to the finality, as commonly understood, of any particular declaratory judgment. Thus, until 2016, the appealability of declaratory judgments was governed by Pa. R.A.P. 342(b)(2), which defined “final order” to include “any order that is expressly defined as a final order by statute.” That created what has been described as a “waiver trap,” since declaratory judgments: were procedurally interlocutory but nonetheless designated as appealable as of right. Failure to appeal immediately an interlocutory order deemed final by statute waived the right to challenge the order on appeal from the final judgment.