46-2-3725 Pace v. Twp. of Nutley, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (17 pp.) Plaintiffs, husband and wife, appealed the dismissal of their complaint alleging excessive force in husband’s and son’s arrest for obstructing the administration of law and resisting arrest. When police responded to the 911 call for domestic violence, wife was outside the house and told police she wanted the husband out of the house and wanted to file a complaint against him. Father and son were screaming at each other inside the house and when officer attempted to enter the house to discuss the situation, son pushed officer, husband moved forward in a menacing manner, officer pepper-sprayed both men and officers arrested them after a struggle. The trial judge found that based on the totality of the circumstances, the police were justified in arresting husband, in using force to do so, that the use of pepper spray was not excessive and that defendants were entitle to qualified and specific immunity under the PDVA. The court agreed that the police had probable cause to arrest husband and to enter the home to effectuate his arrest. Plaintiffs’ contention that defendants were not entitled to specific immunity because the incident was not a domestic violence incident lacked merit. Additionally, in light of the circumstances confronting the officer, the use of pepper spray was objectively reasonable.
10-2-3692 Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape Tribal Nation v. Hoffman, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (19 pp.) In its five-count complaint, appellant alleged respondent, the New Jersey Attorney General, violated its rights under the New Jersey Constitution and breached duties imposed under the common law by denying and repudiating the State’s prior recognition of appellant as an American Indian Tribe. Appellant argued respondent’s actions had and will deprive it of benefits under various federal statutes and programs that were conditioned upon the State’s recognition of it as an American Indian Tribe. The trial court dismissed the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), finding appellant’s claims were barred because the State never enacted a statute expressly recognizing appellant as an American Indian Tribe. On appeal, the court reversed finding the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and incorrectly failed to accept appellant’s factual allegations in the complaint as true. The court concluded that the trial court’s determination that a statute was required to extend the recognition was incorrect as a matter of fact based on the allegations in the complaint. Moreover, the trial court erred by failing to consider or apply the federal standard for determining whether appellant was a state recognized American Indian Tribe entitled to receive the benefits cited in the complaint. Because the trial court failed to accept as true the facts alleged or the federal standards for state recognition, the matter was reversed and remanded.
