Most New Jersey litigators are, or ought to be, familiar with the “entire controversy doctrine”—a facet of New Jersey practice unique enough that federal courts consistently refer to it as this state’s “specific, and idiosyncratic, application of traditional res judicata principles.” E.g., Fields v. Thompson Printing Co., 363 F.3d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 2004). The doctrine is so imbued in our jurisprudence that it was codified at Rule 4:30A. Indeed, it finds its roots in Article VI, Section 3, Paragraph 4 of the New Jersey Constitution. DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267 (1995). With such a well-established foundation, it may be surprising to learn that there is presently an irreconcilable conflict between the standards of review applied by state and federal appellate courts when reviewing a trial court’s application of the doctrine.
The standard applied by New Jersey state courts is well-settled. State appellate courts consistently hold that a trial court’s decision to apply (or not apply) the entire controversy doctrine is reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard. See, e.g., 700 Highway 33 v. Pollio, 421 N.J. Super. 231, 238 (App. Div. 2011); Unkert by Unkert v. Gen. Motors Corp., 301 N.J. Super. 583, 595 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 10 (1997); Busch v. Biggs, 264 N.J. Super. 385, 397 (App. Div. 1993). This standard is both intuitive and in harmony with the doctrine’s cornerstone purpose. In other words, it flows naturally from the foundational principle that the entire controversy doctrine is an equitable one “whose application is left to judicial discretion based on the factual circumstances of individual cases.” Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, 237 N.J. 91, 114 (2019). It is a simple proposition that discretionary decisions are reviewed for abuse of the afforded discretion; or so one would think.
