This commercial non-payment proceeding was commenced by the service of a Notice of Petition and Verified Petition for Non-Payment upon the Defendant-Tenant, J & M Children’s World, Inc., on or about December 30, 2002. Issue was joined by service of a Verified Answer on January 21, 2003. Petitioner-Landlord, Park Tysen Associates, LLP, seeks to recover approximately $90,000.00 for additional rent, including late fees and interest, additional security deposit and attorneys fees.A trial convened on June 18, 2003. It is undisputed that the parties entered into a Lease Agreement dated February 8, 2000 for a period of ten years. (Pet. Exh. 3). Article II, Sect. 2.01 of the subject Lease sets forth the monthly rental amount for each Lease Year. Article II, Sect. 2.02 of the Lease clearly states that monies due under the lease:“including but not limited to, Minimum Rent, Real Estate Taxes, CAM (Common Area Maintenance) charges, Utility Charges and all other sums of money or charges required to be paid by the Tenant under this Lease shall be deemed ‘Additional Rent’, whether or not the same be designated Additional Rent. In the event of a tenant default as hereafter set forth, Landlord shall have the same remedies to collect such Additional Rent as if such default was for Minimum Rent.”With regard to interest and late charges, Article II, Sect. 2.03 of the subject Lease sets forth:“should Tenant fail to pay when due any installment of Minimum Rent, Additional Rent or any amounts, charges or other sums payable to Landlord under the terms of this Lease within ten [10] days after the date it is due, then interest shall accrue from and after the date on which any sum shall be due and payable at the rate of twelve percent [12 percent] per annum payable at a rate of 1 percent per month of the outstanding balance due on the first day of such month. In addition, a late fee of 5 percent of any over-due payment will be charged to Tenant . . . If Tenant shall be late in making payments due under this Lease more than three [3] times in any calendar year, Landlord shall be entitled to demand from Tenant and Tenant agrees to tender to Landlord additional security deposit as hereafter set forth in the amount of one [1] month’s then current Minimum Rent . . . “Petitioner submitted invoices (Pet. Exh. 4-6, inclusive) itemizing the amounts due and payments made by the Respondent for the period commencing April 2001 through June 2002. Joe Heiney, principal owner of J & M Children’s World, Inc., testifying on behalf of Respondent, stated that he started paying rent in a lesser amount commencing in April 2001 through June 2002 in reliance on a written, but unexecuted First Amendment to Lease, wherein the base rent was to be decreased by the amount of $2,225.00 per month. (Resp. Exh. A). He further testified that he did not believe that any late charges or interest charges were due and owing since the invoices were devoid of any late or interest charges and that he relied on the invoices as a true and accurate statement of the amount due and owing. Furthermore, Mr. Heiney stated that the rental amounts that he tendered were always accepted by Petitioner without objection, a fact that Petitioner’s witness, Paul Bregman, did not deny at trial. However, Petitioner’s acceptance of late payments did not operate as a waiver of remedies available to Petitioner pursuant to the lease. See, Commercial Lease Funding Corp. v. Lenny’s Little New Yorker, Inc., 204 AD2d 1080, 613 NYS2d 512 (4th Dept. 1994).According to Mr. Heiney, the first notice of late and interest charges was in the form of correspondence from the Petitioner dated June 26, 2002. (Pet. Exh. 8). Mr. Heiney testified that he responded to the notification by letter correspondence and paid $30,450.00 for under payments of the monthly rental amount for the period of April 2001 through June 2002, along with the July 2002 rent in the full amount of $14,500.00. Mr. Heiney testified that subsequent to the two aforementioned payments, Petitioner advised him that there was a discrepancy in the amount paid for May 2001 and that Respondent owed an additional $1,450.00. It is undisputed that Mr. Heiney paid the $1,450.00 as requested. Petitioner then informed Respondent by letter dated July 17, 2002 that there was still an open balance in the amount of $29,114.74 for interest and late fees.Petitioner and Respondent each testified that commencing in August 2002 and for every month through April 2003, Statements of Rent and Additional Rent, reflecting base, additional rent, late charges and interest were sent to the Respondent by Petitioner. (Pet. Exh. 12-14, inclusive). Mr. Heiney further testified that since July 2002, the full amount of the monthly rent pursuant to Article II, Section 2.01 of the subject lease has been paid. Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Bregman testified that as of June 2003, the Respondent owes Petitioner $77,093.47, representing late charges and interest charges, exclusive of the additional security deposit.Respondent has argued that a summary proceeding is improper in the instant matter since the claims are only for late fees and interest. Respondent’s argument that late charges and interest are not “additional rent” flies in the face of the plain language contained in the lease. Respondent’s further argument that a summary proceeding is not an appropriate vehicle in seeking “additional rent” must also fail. The Court in Morningside Studios, Inc. v. Lucille Hotel Corp., 70 Misc2d 760, 334 NYS2d 735 (Civ.Ct. NY Co. 1972) averred:“As a matter of business practice and policy, commercial leases designate certain tenants obligations as ‘additional rent’ to enable the landlord to enforce them effectively and to proceed summarily against a tenant who defaults in the obligation.”Morningside Studios, Inc., supra.The situation here is analogous to the one presented above. Since late charges and interest and attorney’s fees are all defined as “additional rent” in the subject lease, the Court maintains jurisdiction and a summary proceeding is proper.Moreover, in a commercial setting, whether claims for “additional rents” may be maintained in a summary proceeding ” . . . depends upon the character of the claim and the terms of the commercial lease.” Rector, Church Wardens and Vestryman of Trinity Church in the City of New York v. Chung King House of Metal Inc., et al., 193 Misc.2d 44, 747 NYS 3d 292 (Civ.Ct. NY Co. 2002) . Article II, Section 2.02, entitled “ Additional Rent”, of the subject lease reads in pertinent part:” the tenant shall pay all sums of money or charges required to be paid pursuant to this including but not limited to Minimum Rent, Real Estate Taxes, CAM charges, Utility Charges and all other sums of money or charges required to be paid by Tenant under this Lease herein which shall be deemed ‘Additional Rent’, whether or not the same be designated Additional Rent.”By its language, the subject lease clearly manifests the parties’ intent to permit the Landlord to collect any monies due under the lease as additional rent. As stated previously, the Court therefore finds that a summary proceeding is the proper vehicle for adjudicating the matter at bar.The Court further finds that Petitioner’s defense of reliance on the unexecuted First Amendment to Lease as the reason for the payment of decreased rent is without merit. “Where the parties have reduced their agreement to a writing, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of any prior oral or written agreement or of any contemporaneous oral agreement when offered to vary, add to, or subtract form the terms of the writing.” Farrell, Prince-Richardson on Evidence 11th Ed., citing Marine Midland Bank v. Thrulow, 53 NY2d 381, 442 NYS2d 381. Furthermore, although parol proof of a subsequent agreement may be acceptable, this only applies to simple contracts that are not within the Statute of Frauds. General Obligations Law Section 5-703(2) states “a contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any real property, or an interest therein, is void unless the contract or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.” Inasmuch as the subject lease falls within the Statute of Frauds, the Court finds that the subject lease was not and could not have been modified by the unexecuted First Lease to Amendment. (Resp. Exh. A).Moreover, Respondent’s reliance on the invoices sent by Petitioner which were devoid of any late charges or interest did not obviate its responsibility to pay said fees. The lease at Article II, Section 2.03 is unequivocal in delineating late fees and interest and in what circumstances same would be assessed against the Tenant. This defense fails since this is a commercial action wherein both parties were represented by counsel and are deemed to have a higher level of business sophistication than one may find in a purely residential landlord-tenant dispute. See generally, Jender Industries, Inc. v. Harvest Year Seafood Restaurant, Inc., 187 Misc.2d 293, 721 NYS2d 898 (Civ.Ct. NY Co. 2000). Furthermore, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable in the instant matter since the doctrine is not applicable in commercial actions. UBO Realty v. Fulton, NYLJ 9/8/93 p.21 col.1 (App. Term 1993); 501 Seventh Avenue Associates v. 501 Seventh Avenue Bake Corp., 2002 WL 31065240 (N.Y.Co.Ct.).In finding that the Respondent had the responsibility to pay the late fees and interest charges, the Court next must address the issue of how they were calculated. It appears from the many invoices and statements of rent and additional rent submitted to the Court that interest was charged on interest and late fee upon late fee, so that instead of a late fee and interest being assessed against each months’ individual outstanding balance, as stated in the invoices prepared by the Petitioner, the fees were calculated using the aggregate amounts outstanding. The Court finds the calculation method to be in error. The language of Article II, Section 2.03 of the subject lease indicates that interest shall be charged at 1 percent per month for a total of 12 percent per annum. Clearly this indicates the parties’ intention that interest would be charged against any amount over due within the context of one month. Although the language concerning late charges, to wit: ” . . . a late fee of 5 percent of any over-due payment . . . ” (emphasis added), does not as clearly indicate how the charge should be calculated, this Court finds it is unconscionable and against public policy to charge a 5 percent late fee on outstanding balances which already included 5 percent late fee for the previous months. To do so could result in a per annum charge which exceeds the statutory limit of 25 percent per year as mandated in Penal Law Section 190.40. Sandra’s Jewel Box Inc. v. 401 Hotel, L.P. 273 AD2d 1, 708 NYS2d 113 (1st Dept. 2000); 943 Lexington Avenue, Inc. v. Niarchos, 83 Misc.2d 803, 373 NYS2d 787 (App. Term 1st Dept 1975).In re-calculating the late charges, interest and amount of underpaid rent, the Court finds that the Respondent owed, in aggregate, the sum of $32,277.00 for the period of April 2001 through June 2002. This calculation was the result of following the agreed upon lease provisions. For example, the calculation for June of 2001 revealed that Respondent owed $2,305.50 in interest, late charges and underpaid rent. Respondent paid $11,600.00 when the base rent was actually $13,775.00. Therefore, the difference of $2,175 (rent due) plus interest at 1 percent ($21.75) plus late charges of 5 percent of $2,175.00 ($108.75) results in Respondent owing $2,305.50 for the month of June 2001. This calculation was performed for the months of April 2001 through June 2002, inclusive and the sum total equaling $32,277.00. In July 2002, Respondent paid to Petitioner the sum of $31,900.00 ($30,450.00 and $1,450.00) as and for the outstanding balances. (Resp. Exh. B; Pet. Exh. 9). Hence, the Court finds that Respondent owes Petitioner the amount of $377.00 representing late fees and interest for the period of April 2001 through June 2001.Petitioner also seeks to recover an additional security deposit pursuant to Article II, Section 2.03 of the subject lease, which reads in pertinent part “if Tenant shall be late in making any payment due under this Lease more than three [3] times in any calendar year, Landlord shall be entitled to demand from Tenant, and Tenant agrees to tender to Landlord additional security deposit as hereafter set forth in the amount of one [1] month’s then current Minimum Rent . . . ” Inasmuch as the testimony at trial adduced that the last time Respondent was late in making the monthly rent payments was in the calendar year 2002 and since Respondent was late more than three times during that period, the Court finds that the Petitioner is entitled to receive an additional security deposit in the amount of $14,500.00. This amount represents the monthly minimum rent payment for the year 2002 pursuant to Article II, Section 2.01(a)(4) of the subject lease.The last issue for the Court to decide is the amount of attorneys fees, if any, the Petitioner should be awarded. It is well-settled that a court does not have the inherent right to impose attorney’s fees unless an award is authorized by agreement between the parties or by statute or court rule. Matter of A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d 1, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1986). However, Article XXV Section 25.01(A)(3) of the subject lease states that the “Tenant hereby agrees to pay, as Additional Rent, all reasonable attorney’s fees and disbursements [and all other court costs or expenses of legal proceedings] which Landlord may incur or pay out by reason of, or in connection with . . . any default by Tenant in the observance or performance of any obligation under the Lease [including, but not limited to, matters involving payment of rent and additional rent . . . ] whether or not Landlord commences any action or proceeding against the Tenant . . . ” See, Brusco v. Miller, 167 Misc.2d 54 (NY App.Term 1995)(ancillary contract claim, such as attorney’s fees, can be maintained in a summary proceeding); Silber v. Schwartzman 150 Misc2d 1 (NY App.Term 1991) (legal fees defined as “ additional rent”).In determining whether a party should be awarded attorney’s fees, the Court must decide which party should be accorded “prevailing party status.” Excelsior 57th Corp. v. Winters, 227 A.D.2d 146, 641 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1st Dept. 1996). This by necessity requires an analysis of the matters litigated and a subsequent comparison of what was achieved by each party within those parameters. Supra, at 676. After such analysis, this Court holds that Petitioner’s counsel is the prevailing party inasmuch as the Petitioner has proven its case with regard to this proceeding and attorneys’ fees shall be awarded to the Petitioner after a hearing is held regarding the amount of said attorneys fees on July 16, 2003.To reiterate, the Court finds as follows:1. Petitioner is awarded the sum of $377.00 representing late fees and interest charges on unpaid balance of the monthly rent for the period commencing April 2001 through June 2002;2. Petitioner is awarded the sum of $14,500.00, representing the additional security deposit Petitioner is entitled to pursuant to the terms of the subject lease;3. Petitioner is awarded attorney’s fees in an amount to be determined at the hearing scheduled for July 16, 2003.Accordingly, judgment shall be entered in favor of the Petitioner in the amount of $14,877.00.This is the Decision and Order of the Court.Court Attorney to notify all parties.