OPINION & ORDER Before the Court are Petitioner Sergi Hernandez Grano’s Objections, dated March 19, 2021, (Doc. 93), and Respondent Katherine Patricia Martin’s Objections, (Doc. 92), also dated March 19, 2021, to the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul E. Davison, dated March 5, 2021, (Doc. 91), recommending that Petitioner’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with prosecuting this case be granted in part and denied in part, (Doc. 81). Petitioner requested a total of $467,944.46 ($359,799.05 in fees and $108,145.41 in costs).1 (Doc. 81 5.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the R&R in part and awards Petitioner fees and costs in the amount of $34,296.19. I. BACKGROUND Familiarity with the prior proceedings, the R&R, and the issues presented is presumed, but I will provide a brief summary for context. This case was commenced on July 25, 2019, when Sergi Hernandez Grano filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (the “Hague Convention” or “Convention”), for the return of his child to Spain from the United States. (Doc. 1.) Respondent Katherine Patricia Martin opposed the petition. (Doc. 7.) I held a bench trial in December 2019 and January 2020, after which I granted the Petition, (Docs. 48-49). Respondent appealed my decision, and the Second Circuit affirmed by summary order on July 20, 2020. Grano v. Martin, 821 Fed. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order). Respondent’s petition for rehearing en banc was rejected, and on July 31, 2020 Petitioner’s motion for issuance of the mandate forthwith was granted. (Doc. 58.) I ordered Respondent to return the child to Spain by August 13, 2020, (see Minute Entry dated Aug. 4, 2020), and after some complications, (see Minute Entry dated Aug. 13, 2020), the child was returned, accompanied by Respondent, on August 19, 2020, (see Docs. 72-73). Petitioner filed the instant motion for attorney’s fees and costs on September 4, 2020. (Doc. 81.) Respondent argued that an award would be inappropriate, and that the motion should be denied, because of the abuse she suffered from Petitioner and her indigent financial condition. (Doc. 86.) In the alternative, Respondent argued that Petitioner’s requested amount should be reduced because Petitioner’s counsel’s hours were not necessary or reasonable, and the records were insufficient to evaluate the necessity of the work performed. (Id.) Judge Davison recommended that the Court adopt a 5 percent reduction in the hours billed by Petitioner’s counsel Barry Abbot and his staff due to vague time entries. (R&R at 7.) He further recommended reductions in the hourly billing rates of Petitioner’s attorneys, finding $425/hour for Mr. Abbott, $500/hour for Jeremy Morley, $375/hour each for Neil Saltzman, Alexis Cirel, and Daniella Schneider, and $200/hour for paralegals Brenda Mileo and Fritz Capria to be reasonable. (Id. at 8-10.) Additionally, Judge Davison found that the time entries relating to collateral state proceedings in Family Court were not necessary to the instant Hague Convention proceeding, and thus not compensable. (Id. at 10.) Because many of the time entries Petitioner submitted were either unclear as to which proceeding they concerned or were commingled between the two, Judge Davison recommended a 50 percent reduction in all commingled or unclear entries. (Id. at 11-12.) Similarly, because the provided documentation of costs paid by Petitioner’s counsel did not distinguish between costs associated with the state and federal proceedings, Judge Davison recommended reducing all such costs by 50 percent. (Id. at 15.) He further recommended disallowing certain travel expenses paid by Petitioner that were explicitly associated with the state court proceedings or were insufficiently supported by receipts, and reducing the costs of translation/transcription services, which did not distinguish between the state and federal proceedings, by 30 percent. (Id. at 14-16.) Finally, Judge Davison found that Respondent had not met her burden to demonstrate that her removal of the child from Spain was related to Petitioner’s psychological abuse, but recommended an 85 percent equitable reduction in the fee award due to Respondent’s inability to pay. (Id. at 17-18.) Petitioner objects to the R&R, arguing that the fees and costs associated with the state court proceeding are in fact recoverable because they “were necessarily incurred in order to bring about the return of his son to Spain.” (Doc. 93 at 7; see id. at 3-8.) He also argues that the 85 percent equitable reduction was unreasonable and contrary to the legislative intent behind the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”). (Id. at 8-11.) Conversely, Respondent objects to the R&R on the basis that it was unnecessary and unreasonable for Petitioner to retain multiple law firms, (Doc. 92 at 5-6), that Petitioner’s request for fees is supported by inadequate documentation, (id. at 6-7), that the reduced hourly rates recommended by Judge Davison are too high, (id. at 7-9), that any fees and costs not clearly associated with the federal case should be disregarded entirely, (id. at 9-11), that Petitioner’s request for costs is untimely and procedurally defective, (id. at 11-13), that Petitioner’s status as an abuser merits a further reduction or elimination of the fee award in its entirety, (id. at 13-17), and that any award against Respondent is inappropriate considering her financial condition, (id. at 17-19). Respondent argues that the totality of these factors suggests that any award of fees and costs for Petitioner would be “clearly inappropriate” under ICARA. (Id. at 19-21.) II. LEGAL STANDARD In reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, a district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C). A party may object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, but the objections must be “specific,” “written,” and submitted “[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); accord 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C). A district court must review de novo those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which timely objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C). “The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see Marji v. Rock, No. 09-CV-2420, 2011 WL 4888829, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2011). The district court may adopt those portions of a report and recommendation to which no objections have been made, provided no clear error is apparent from the face of the record. See White v. Fischer, No. 04-CV-5358, 2008 WL 4210478, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2008); Nelson v. Smith, 618 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee note (b). III. DISCUSSION A. Attorney’s Fees The Hague Convention treaty, to which the United States and Spain are both signatories, provides in relevant part: Upon ordering the return of a child or issuing an order concerning rights of access under this Convention, the judicial or administrative authorities may, where appropriate, direct the person who removed…the child,…to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the applicant, including travel expenses, any costs incurred or payments made for locating the child, the costs of legal representation of the applicant, and those of returning the child. Hague Convention, art. 26. This language differs from ICARA, 22 U.S.C. §9001 et seq., which contains procedures for the “implementation of the Hague Convention in the United States.” In re S.E.O., No. 12-CV-2390, 2013 WL 4564746, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013). ICARA provides that any court ordering the return of a child “shall order the respondent to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner, including court costs, legal fees,…and transportation costs related to the return of the child, unless the respondent establishes that such order would be clearly inappropriate.” 22 U.S.C. §9007(b)(3) (emphasis added). Under ICARA, “a prevailing petitioner in a return action is presumptively entitled to necessary costs, subject to the application of equitable principles by the district court.” Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 375 (2d Cir. 2013); see Souratgar v. Lee Jen Fair, 818 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2016) (“A prevailing petitioner’s presumptive entitlement to an award of expenses is subject to the application of equitable principles by the district court.”) (cleaned up). “[T]he appropriateness of such costs depends on the same general standards that apply when attorney’s fees are…awarded…only as a matter of the court’s discretion.” Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 375 (cleaned up). Once it is determined that a party is entitled to fees, “[i]t remains for the district court to determine what fee is ‘reasonable.’” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The Supreme Court and Second Circuit have held that “the lodestar — the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case — creates a presumptively reasonable fee.” Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (cleaned up); see Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551-52 (2010). In assessing the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, the Court must: “(1) determine the reasonable hourly rate; (2) determine the number of hours reasonably expended; (3) multiply the reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended to determine the presumptively reasonable fee; and (4) make an appropriate adjustment to arrive at the final fee award.” Creighton v. Dominican Coll., No. 09-CV-3983, 2011 WL 4914724, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2011). “The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay…bear[ing] in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008). “[T]here is no precise rule or formula for determining a proper attorney’s fees award; rather, the district court should exercise its equitable discretion in light of all relevant factors.” Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 112 F. Supp. 3d 31, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (cleaned up). 1. Reasonable Hourly Rates Respondent objects to Judge Davison’s recommended hourly rates for Petitioner’s attorneys, arguing that even these reduced rates are in excess of those held to be reasonable in other similar cases. (Doc. 92 at 7-9.) The reasonable hourly rate is the “prevailing market rate, i.e., the rate prevailing in the relevant community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Farbotko v. Clinton County, 433 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Petitioner provided the following qualifications for his attorneys. Mr. Abbott is a partner at Schwartz Sladkus Reich Greenberg Atlas LLP (“SSRGA LLP”) and has 40 years of litigation experience in family and matrimonial law. (See Doc. 81
47-49, 51.) His only experience with international family law appears to be with the ABA Project Against International Child Abduction. (Id. 51.) Mr. Abbott billed at a rate of $675 when representing Petitioner. (Id. 47.) Mr. Morley is “one of leading experts on the Hague Convention,” and has been practicing law in New York for over forty years. (Id. 53.) He has handled “hundreds” of international child abduction and Hague Convention cases, and has lectured, written and testified as an expert on the Hague Convention and international family law. (Id.
