OPINION & ORDER b efore me is pro se Plaintiff Hepzibah Allen’s second motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from my September 28, 2018 Opinion & Order (the “9/28/18 O&O,” Doc. 29), dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. (Doc. 31.) Because I find that there is no basis for me to reconsider my 9/28/18 O&O, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. I. Background and Procedural History1 Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants Navient Solutions, LLC (“NSL”), Navient,2 Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. (“Pioneer,” and collectively with NSL and Navient, the “Navient Defendants”), and United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (“USAF”) on October 24, 2017, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §1692, et seq. (See generally Compl.)3 Plaintiff’s claims relate to a student loan (the “Loan”) that Plaintiff obtained under the Federal Family Education Loan Program on January 21, 2003. (Compl. Ex. B.) From the time of origination, NSL serviced Plaintiff’s Loan and USAF acted as guarantor. (See id. Exs. A, B, D.) After Plaintiff defaulted on the Loan on October 14, 2016, USAF purchased the Loan and began to undertake collection efforts. (See id. Exs. A, C, D.) Plaintiff then filed suit, alleging, among other things, that Defendants improperly assigned her debt, misrepresented the amount owed, and engaged in improper wage garnishment. On September 28, 2018, I granted the motions to dismiss filed by the Navient Defendants, (Doc. 15), and USAF, (Doc. 16). (See 9/28/18 O&O.) In the 9/28/18 O&O, I determined that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Defendants did not qualify as “debt collectors” within the meaning of the FDCPA. With respect to the Navient Defendants, I concluded that the Complaint contained only conclusory allegations that Navient or Pioneer was a debt collector or had engaged in any debt collection activity. (See 9/28/18 O&O 9-10.) With regard to NSL, I determined that because it had serviced Plaintiff’s Loan since origination, it also did not qualify as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. (See id.); see also Vallecastro v. Tobin, Melien & Marohn, No. 3:13-cv-1441 (SRU), 2014 WL 7185513, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 16, 2014) (“When a loan servicer obtains an account prior to its default, that loan servicer operates as a creditor, not a debt collector, for the purposes of the FDCPA.”). I also concluded that USAF did not qualify as a “debt collector” because, as a guarantor, USAF had a bona fide fiduciary obligation to the United States Department of Education, and its collection activity was incidental to that fiduciary obligation. (See 9/28/18 O&O 10-11); see also 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6)(F) (exempting “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity…is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation”). On October 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, along with an affidavit and exhibits in support (“First Motion for Reconsideration”). (Doc. 31.) On December 10, 2018, the Navient Defendants and USAF submitted oppositions to Plaintiff’s motion. (Docs. 34, 35.) Plaintiff did not file a reply. On September 26, 2019, I denied Plaintiff’s First Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to present the “exceptional circumstances” required to meet her burden on her motion for reconsideration; instead, she rehashed arguments set forth in her original motion papers. (Doc. 36 at 4.) I observed that although Plaintiff submitted certain letters, several of them were already considered in conjunction with my ruling on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Id. at 4-5.) On March 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration, along with an affidavit and exhibit in support. (Doc. 37.) The Navient Defendants submitted an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion on March 19, 2020. (Doc. 38.) USAF did not submit an opposition, and Plaintiff did not file a reply. II. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 allow reconsideration or reargument of a court’s order in certain limited circumstances. “Rule 60(b) provides ‘extraordinary judicial relief’ and can be granted ‘only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.’” Kubicek v. Westchester Cty., No. 08 Civ. 372(ER), 2014 WL 4898479, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)). This necessarily means that the standard for reconsideration “is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). A motion for reconsideration is “neither an occasion for repeating old arguments previously rejected nor an opportunity for making new arguments that could have been previously advanced.” Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 395 F. Supp. 2d 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Nor is a motion for reconsideration a time to “advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court.” Polsby v. St. Martin’s Press, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 690(MBM), 2000 WL 98057, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is “within ‘the sound discretion of the district court.’” Premium Sports Inc. v. Connell, No. 10 Civ. 3753(KBF), 2012 WL 2878085, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (quoting Aczel v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2009)). Generally, a party seeking reconsideration must show either “an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” In re Beacon Assocs. Litig., 818 F. Supp. 2d 697, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 154 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).4 III. Discussion First, I note that Plaintiff’s motion was filed more than one year after I entered judgment in this case. (See 9/28/18 O&O; Doc. 27 (Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Reconsideration, filed March 11, 2020)). Plaintiff premises her motion Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1)(6), (Pl. Notice of Motion 1),5 which permits relief for “any other reason that justifies relief.” A motion for reconsideration on this ground “must be made within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Given that I find that Plaintiff again fails to meet her burden for reconsideration, I do not resolve whether her 17-month delay is reasonable, but note that Plaintiff does not explain the reason for this delay.6 Second, Plaintiff fails to present the “exceptional circumstances” required to meet her burden on her motion for reconsideration. Instead, Plaintiff rehashes arguments set forth in both her original motion papers and her First Motion for Reconsideration in support of her contention that Defendants qualify as “debt collectors” under the FDCPA. Plaintiff’s only support for this proposition is found in a letter attached to Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. (See Allen Aff., Attachment A.)7 Plaintiff avers that based on this letter, the Defendants admitted to having a fiduciary obligation, that “Navient [is] in collusion with an entity known as Ascendium Education Solutions, Inc.”, and “that the collection activities of Navient Corp in collusion with Ascendium Education Solutions, Inc…. were incidental to its declared fiduciary obligation.” (Allen. Aff.
