OPINION & ORDER This case involves Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests by the Open Society Justice Initiative (“OSJI”) to a variety of federal agencies seeking information regarding the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a U.S. resident, Saudi Arabian national, and Washington Post columnist who was not seen again after entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2, 2018. See Dkt. 11 (“Compl.”) 9. Pending now are cross-motions for summary judgment by plaintiff OSJI and two defendants — the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (“ODNI”) — pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants each motion in part and denies each in part. I. Background2 A. Factual Background On October 2, 2018, Khashoggi entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Pl. Mem. at 3. He never left alive. On October 19, 2018, the Saudi Government acknowledged that Khashoggi had been killed inside the consulate. Id. at 4. In public statements, both the President and Vice President of the United States disclosed that federal government officials had participated in an investigation of the murder. On October 23, 2019, Vice President Pence told reporters that CIA Director Gina Haspel had traveled to Turkey to review evidence. Pl. Mem. at 4, 17; Def. Opp’n at 16. In an interview on November 18, 2018, President Trump stated that “we” have possession of a tape of Khashoggi’s murder, and that he had “been fully briefed on it.” Pl. Mem. at 4-5; Def. Opp’n at 17-20. On November 20, 2018, President Trump publicly stated: “After great independent research, we now know many details of this horrible crime,” and that American “intelligence agencies [would] continue to assess all information.” Pl. Mem. at 5. And, on November 22, 2018, when asked about the CIA’s conclusions regarding the killing, the President responded that the CIA “did not come to a conclusion” as to the Saudi Crown Prince’s potential involvement in the killing. Id. Other U.S. officials later made further public statements regarding the Khashoggi killing and/or U.S. investigations into it. On November 23, 2018, Senator Jack Reed stated that the CIA had concluded that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia had been directly involved in Khashoggi’s assassination. Id. at 6-7. On November 29, 2018, Defense Secretary James Mattis stated that he had read translations of the tape of Khashoggi’s killing and had reviewed intelligence regarding the matter. Id. at 5-6; Def. Opp’n at 17-18. On December 4, 2018, Senator Lindsey Graham stated that the Crown Prince was responsible for Khashoggi’s death. Pl. Mem. at 7; Def. Opp’n at 21. And, on January 29, 2019, CIA Director Haspel testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “during the fall months, [the CIA] spent a significant amount of time briefing and providing written products on our assessment of what happened to Mr. Jamal Khashoggi.” Def. Opp’n at 19. B. Procedural History On December 4, 2018, OSJI filed the FOIA requests at issue. See Compl. 25. OSJI filed such requests with seven federal agencies, including the CIA and ODNI, requesting in each “all records relating to the killing of U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi, including but not limited to the CIA’s findings on and/or assessment of the circumstances under which he was killed and/or the identities of those responsible.” Id. On January 9, 2019, after no agency had released any responsive records, OSJI filed this lawsuit, against all seven agencies, seeking orders directing compliance with its FOIA requests. See Compl. On March 18, 2019, the defendants answered. Dkt. 24. On April 23, 2019, the Court issued a scheduling order governing the agencies’ document production. Dkt. 30. Relevant here,3 by May 10, 2019, the CIA and ODNI had completed their searches for potentially responsive records. Dkts. 30, 43, 49. Between July 1 and August 7, 2019, the CIA produced 217 responsive documents, all from the agency’s press office. Pl. Mem. at 9. By letter, the CIA notified OSJI that other responsive records and any descriptive information about such references were classified and covered by one or more FOIA exemptions. Id. ODNI similarly produced 48 responsive documents between June 28 and August 5, 2019, each from its press office. Id. ODNI sent a similar letter to OSJI stating that any remaining responsive records, and any descriptive information about them, were covered by FOIA exemptions. Id. at 9-10. On December 9, 2019, the agencies filed a joint motion for summary judgment supported by two publicly filed declarations, see Dkts. 111-13, and two classified declarations filed ex parte and under seal. In their accompanying memorandum of law, the CIA and ODNI acknowledged that the law did not permit them to provide a Glomar response to OSJI’s FOIA requests — i.e., a response stating that the agency could neither confirm nor deny the existence of responsive records — because the U.S. government had “acknowledged that the intelligence community has assessed information concerning Mr. Khashoggi’s killing.” Def. Mem. at 1-2. Nevertheless, the agencies argued, the responsive records that each withheld, and descriptions of them, were all properly withheld in full pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. Id. at 3. They also argued that portions of these materials were subject to Exemptions 5 and 6. Id. The agencies argued that, because any further detail regarding the remaining responsive records, including the nature and volume of these records, was classified and protected from disclosure by statute, the agencies could provide only a collective “no number, no list” response to the request for these records. Id. at 2. On January 21, 2020, OSJI filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. It argued that the two agencies’ “no number, no list” response was not permitted under FOIA, in particular, because some of the information the agencies proposed to withhold is already a matter of public record, having been disclosed by U.S. government officials. Pl. Mem. at 2. OSJI asks the Court to order the CIA and ODNI to produce a Vaughn index that enumerates and describes each withheld record, or file a declaration specifying why the information for each record is being withheld. Id. at 3. On March 10, 2020, the agencies filed a brief in opposition to OSJI’s cross-motion and in further support of their own. Def. Opp’n. On March 31, 2020, OSJI filed a reply. Pl. Reply. On October 15, 2020, after a delay prompted by the intervening public health crisis, the Court held argument. II. Applicable Legal Standards A. Standards Governing Summary Judgment Motions To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must “show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a question of material fact. In making this determination, the Court must view all facts “in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant meets its burden, “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). “[A] party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, to survive a summary judgment motion, the opposing party must establish a genuine issue of fact by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, the Court is “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)). B. Summary Judgment Motions Under FOIA FOIA governs public access to information held by the federal government. “The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (citation omitted). However, “Congress realized that legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by release of certain types of information, and therefore provided the specific exemptions under which disclosure could be refused.” Id. (citation omitted). “Recognizing past abuses, Congress sought to reach a workable balance between the right of the public to know and the need of the Government to keep information in confidence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy.” Id. (citation omitted). “FOIA thus mandates that an agency disclose records on request, unless they fall within one of nine exemptions.” Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011). “These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, and must be narrowly construed.” Id. (citations omitted). “The agency asserting the exemption bears the burden of proof, and all doubts as to the applicability of the exemption must be resolved in favor of disclosure.” Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2009). Courts review the adequacy of the agency’s justifications de novo. Id. Even where portions of a responsive record are properly exempt, the agency must “take reasonable steps necessary to segregate and release nonexempt information.” 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(8)(A)(ii)(II); see FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 626 (1982). Summary judgment is the usual means by which a court resolves a challenge to a government agency’s FOIA response. See, e.g., Johnson v. CIA, No. 17 Civ. 1928 (CM), 2018 WL 833940, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018); Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994). “Summary judgment is warranted on the basis of agency affidavits when the affidavits describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.” Wilner, 592 F.3d at 73 (citation omitted). An agency’s affidavits in support of its nondisclosure are “accorded a presumption of good faith.” Carney, 19 F.3d at 812 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “conclusory affidavits that merely recite statutory standards, or are overly vague or sweeping will not…carry the government’s burden.” Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2009). “Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears logical or plausible.” Wilner, 592 F.3d at 73 (citation omitted). Relevant here given the nature of OSJI’s request, courts are to take a more “deferential posture in FOIA cases regarding the uniquely executive purview of national security” and accord “substantial weight” to agencies’ declarations predicting harm to national security. Id. at 73, 76; see also Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (where agency affidavits appear sufficient, “the court is not to conduct a detailed inquiry to decide whether it agrees with the agency’s opinions; to do so would violate the principle of affording substantial weight to the expert opinion of the agency”). 1. Vaughn Indexes, Glomar Responses, and “No Number, No List” Responses “Once a FOIA request has been made for documents, the preparation of a Vaughn index is now an accepted method for the Government to identify responsive documents and discharge its obligation to assert any claimed FOIA exemptions to the various documents withheld.” N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (“N.Y. Times II”), 758 F.3d 436, 438 (2d Cir.), supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014). “A Vaughn index typically lists the titles and descriptions of the responsive documents that the Government contends are exempt from disclosure.” Id. at 438-39; see Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 746 F.3d 1082, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Agency affidavits sometimes take the form of a ‘Vaughn index,’ but there is ‘no fixed rule’ establishing what such an affidavit must look like.”) (citation omitted)). “[T]he index gives the court and the challenging party a measure of access without exposing the withheld information.” N.Y. Times II, 758 F.3d at 439 (alteration in original) (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). And “it enables the adversary system to operate by giving the requester as much information as possible, on the basis of which he can present his case to the trial court.” Id. at 438-39 (citing Keys v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 337 349 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). “[P]reparation of a Vaughn index is not required,” however, if, in response to a FOIA request, an agency issues what is known as a Glomar response. Id. at 438 n.3. In a Glomar response, the agency “refus[es] to confirm or deny the existence of requested records because acknowledging even the existence of certain records would reveal information entitled to be protected.” Id. But an agency “loses its ability to provide a Glomar response when the existence or nonexistence of the particular records covered by the Glomar response has been officially and publicly disclosed.” Wilner, 592 F.3d at 70. An official acknowledgement can occur directly or indirectly, the latter occurring when the “substance of an official statement and the context in which it is made permits the inescapable inference that the requested records in fact exist.” James Madison Project v. Dep’t of Justice, 302 F. Supp. 3d 12, 22 (D.D.C. 2018). A Court can simply infer from an agency’s repeated public statements about a government program that the agency possesses at least some documents related to that program. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. CIA (“ACLU v. CIA”), 710 F.3d 422, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Garland, C.J.). Where an official acknowledgment prevents an agency from providing a Glomar response, agencies in certain recent cases have declined to file a Vaughn index describing the withheld records. They have instead submitted “a ‘no number, no list’ response,” in which the agency “acknowledge[es] that it ha[s] responsive documents, but declin[es] to further describe or even enumerate on the public record the number, types, dates, or other descriptive information about these responsive records.” Id. at 433 (internal citation omitted). Unlike a Glomar response, which “requires the agency to argue, and the court to accept, that the very fact of the existence or nonexistence of responsive records is protected from disclosure,” a “no number, no list” response enables the agency to acknowledge that it possesses some documents, while arguing “that any description of those documents would effectively disclose validly exempt information.” Id. However, “[a]n agency may [only] withhold information on the number of responsive documents and a description of their contents if those facts are protected from disclosure by a FOIA exemption.” N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (“N.Y. Times I”), 756 F.3d 100, 122 (2d Cir.), opinion amended on other grounds, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir.), supplemented on other grounds, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014). And, “[s]uch a response would only be justified in unusual circumstances, and only by a particularly persuasive affidavit.” Id. (quoting ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d at 433). 2. FOIA Exemption One Here, the Government bases its argument that a “no number, no list” response is justified on FOIA Exemption One. FOIA Exemption One “exempts from disclosure records that are ‘specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy,’ and ‘are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.’” Ctr. for Const. Rights v. CIA, 765 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1)). The Court accordingly reviews here the Executive Order setting criteria for classification of such records on which the agencies rely in invoking Exemption One — and an exception that can defeat its invocation. a. Executive Order 13,526 The CIA and ODNI claim that the existence or not of responsive records is classified under Executive Order 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009) (“E.O. 13,526″). Def. Mem. at 11. Section 1.1(a) of E.O. 13,526 states that national security information “may be originally classified under the terms of this order only if all of the following conditions are met”: (1) an original classification authority is classifying the information; (2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; (3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and (4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage. E.O. 13,526 §1.1(a)(1)-(4). Section 1.4 of the order, in turn, permits classification of information that, if disclosed, “could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security…and…pertains to one or more” of the listed categories of activity. Id. §1.1(4). The agencies here claim, in their publicly filed declarations, that the responsive records withheld fall into two categories listed in §1.1(4) of E.O. 13,526: (1) “intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology” and (2) “foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources.” Id. §1.4(c), (d); Def. Mem. at 12. And courts are to give deference “to executive affidavits predicting harm to the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Justice, 681 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). b. Waiver of FOIA Exemption One by an Official Acknowledgment The Government can, however, waive its ability to resist disclosure based on this exemption. “Voluntary disclosures of all or part of a document may waive an otherwise valid FOIA exemption.” N.Y. Times I, 756 F.3d at 114 (quoting Dow Jones & Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 880 F. Supp. 145, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). Accordingly, an agency may not invoke Exemption One “to prevent public disclosure when the government has officially disclosed the specific information being sought.” Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1989). Indeed, an agency cannot withhold “even properly classified information once the Agency itself has officially disclosed it.” Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2009). However, as the Second Circuit has held, “the application of Exemption 1 is generally unaffected by whether the information has entered the realm of public knowledge[,]…[and a] limited exception is permitted only where the government has officially disclosed the specific information the requester seeks.” Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 294 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). “A plaintiff mounting an official acknowledgment argument ‘must bear the initial burden of pointing to specific information in the public domain that appears to duplicate that being withheld.’” ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d at 427 (quoting Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). However, as on the broader issue of determining whether a FOIA exemption applies, “the government retains the burden of persuasion that [the] information [sought] is not subject to disclosure under FOIA.” Inner City Press/Cmty. on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 463 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 2006). In Wilson, 586 F.3d at 186, the Second Circuit set out a test governing the relationship between a FOIA request for classified information and prior official disclosures of that information. Under this test, “[c]lassified information that a party seeks to obtain or publish is deemed to have been officially disclosed only if it (1) [is] as specific as the information previously released,” (2) “match[es] the information previously disclosed,” and (3) was “made public through an official and documented disclosure.” Id. (second two alterations in original) (emphasis added). “Generally, for information to be ‘as specific as’ that which was previously disclosed, there cannot be any ‘substantive differences between the content of the [publicly] released government documents and the withheld information.’” Osen LLC v. U.S. Cent. Command, 969 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (“ACLU v. DoD”), 628 F.3d 612, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 2011)) (alteration in original). Thus, “prior disclosure of ‘general descriptions’ does not waive Exemption 1 for withheld documents that are more ‘specific and particular’ and that ‘would reveal far more…than the previously released records.’” Id. (quoting ACLU v. DoD, 628 F.3d at 621); see also Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Prior disclosure of similar information does not suffice; instead, the specific information sought by the plaintiff must already be in the public domain by official disclosure.”). As to the second, “matching” prong, “there must be enough of an overlap in subject matter between disclosed and withheld records to fairly say that the two records ‘match’ — in other words, that they present the same information about the same subject.” Osen LLC, 969 F.3d at 111-12. The Second Circuit has clarified that “the ‘matching’ aspect of the Wilson test” does not require “absolute identity” between the withheld and previously disclosed information. See N.Y. Times I, 756 F.3d at 120. New York Times I involved a FOIA request for the opinions or memoranda of the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) concerning its basis for approving as legal the targeted killings of U.S. citizens through drone strikes. See id. at 104. The Second Circuit held that the Government had officially acknowledged certain aspects of its purported legal basis by releasing a “white paper” that “virtually parallel[ed]” the legal analysis in the OLC memorandum, even though the memorandum discussed some secondary issues not addressed in the white paper. Id. at 116. Accordingly, given the “ substantial overlap” between the legal analyses in the white paper and the OLC memorandum, id., release of the OLC memorandum “add[ed] nothing to the risk” of damage to national security, id. at 120. However, even where withheld information appears to “match” official acknowledgments, courts are to “take[] care to consider the context of any withheld information, as context itself may convey information that has not been disclosed.” N.Y. Times v. F.B.I., 297 F. Supp. 3d 435, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); see also, e.g., N.Y. Times. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 806 F.3d 682, 686-87 (2d Cir. 2015) (“differences in context” between previously disclosed records and requested records are relevant in determining whether the government has waived exemption under FOIA). And an official acknowledgement does not compel the disclosure of other classified information where the prior disclosure is merely similar to, or only partially overlaps with, the withheld information. See, e.g., Osen LLC, 969 F.3d at 112 (“[E]ven a ‘substantial overlap’ between the requested information and previously disclosed information is not enough to establish waiver.” (quoting N.Y. Times v. CIA, 965 F.3d 109, 116, 119 (2d Cir. 2020))). III. Discussion The issue presented is whether the CIA and ODNI are justified in issuing a “no number, no list” response for the responsive records they have withheld. Each agency “acknowledge[s] the existence of one or more additional records responsive to the request,” but defends the “no number, no list response” on the ground that they “cannot describe the[se records] on the public record — including by providing details such as the volume of records, their dates, titles or subject matter — without revealing exempt information.” Def. Mem. at 8. OSJI counters with the following arguments. First, it argues, FOIA does not permit a blanket “no number, no list” response. Second, even if such a response is permitted in certain situations, the agencies may not forgo a Vaughn index here under Exemption One because the descriptive information requested has, at least in part, been officially acknowledged. Id. at 11-12. Third, the other FOIA exemptions that the defendants generally invoke in their submissions — Exemptions Three, Five, and Six — do not apply to their demand for, or justify the agencies’ withholding of, a Vaughn index here. And fourth, the agencies have not conducted an adequate search for documents. Id. at 12. The Court considers each OSJI argument in turn. A. Propriety of Blanket “No Number, No List” Responses OSJI argues that providing a blanket “no number, no list” response rather than at least a Vaughn index “subverts established FOIA requirements.” Pl. Mem at 11-13. Because the Second Circuit to date has not upheld a grant of summary judgment on this basis and because in discrete cases other circuits have declined to permit such a response, OSJI argues that a blanket “no number, no list” response is never appropriate. See id. at 11-13 & n.23 (citing N.Y. Times I, 756 F.3d at 103, 122-23; ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d at 433). This argument overreaches. Although the Second Circuit has not yet upheld a grant of summary judgment on this basis, it has pointedly refrained from holding that entry of summary judgment could never be warranted for an agency that has made a “no number, no list” response to a FOIA request. N.Y. Times I, 756 F.3d at 121-22. On the contrary, the Circuit has stated that “[a]n agency may withhold information [as to] the number of responsive documents and a description of their contents if those facts are protected from disclosure by a FOIA exemption.” Id. The Circuit has stated that “unusual circumstances” and a “particularly persuasive affidavit” would be required to justify such a response. Id. (quoting ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d at 433). And other courts have upheld “no number, no list” responses. See, e.g., Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 247-48 (7th Cir. 2004); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. FBI (“ACLU v. FBI”), No. 11 Civ. 7562 (WHP), 2015 WL 1566775, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (“[D]isclosure of responsive records or any further information about them (i.e., their nature or number) would reveal classified intelligence activities, sources or methods.”). Accordingly, the parties’ cross-motions cannot be resolved based on OSJI’s argument that a “no number, no list” response can never be appropriate. The issue instead is whether, and to what degree, the agencies have made the showing necessary to justify their claim here that any further elaboration would reveal classified information protected by Exemption One. B. Scope of Official Acknowledgments In response to OSJI’s request for all CIA and ODNI “records relating to the killing of U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi,” including any “CIA[] findings on and/or assessment of the circumstances under which he was killed and/or the identities of those responsible,” Compl. 25, the Government admits that its “official statements [have] acknowledge[d] the government interest in the subject of this FOIA request, and the existence of one or more responsive records,” Def. Opp’n. at 14. But, it argues, these acknowledgments are put in general terms, and as such do not oblige it to disclose the specific nature, date, or volume of any individual responsive records. These, it contends, remain exempt under Exemption One. Id. OSJI, in contrast, argues that these acknowledgments disable the CIA and ODNI from providing a “no number, no list” response at all. In the main, the Government is correct. Exemption One permits the Government to withhold records as to which classification is authorized in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and which have been properly so classified pursuant to an executive order. 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1). The agencies’ public affidavits attest that these records have been properly classified pursuant to E.O. 13,265 and fall within two categories of information protected under §1.4 of that order: “intelligence activities…sources or methods” and “foreign relations.” See E.O. 13,526 §1.4(c), (d); Public Gaviria Decl.
27, 29, 30; Public Shiner Decl.
