OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff David Rosenberg, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brings this action against Client Services, Inc. (“CSI”), and John Does 1-25, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C §§1692 et seq. Now pending is CSI’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. #6).1 For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 15 U.S.C. §1692k(d). BACKGROUND In deciding the pending motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. According to the complaint, CSI sent plaintiff a debt collection letter (the “letter”) dated January 28, 2019.2 The letter stated plaintiff owed $1,304.85 to Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., CSI’s client. The front side of the letter contains the notice required by 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a) (the “Validation Notice”). The Validation Notice states: Unless you notify our office within thirty (30) days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing within thirty (30) days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification. If you request of this office in writing within thirty (30) days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. (Doc. #7-1 at ECF 2).3 The paragraph immediately below the Validation Notice states: Please note, we have many payment options that may meet your individual needs. If we are unable to arrange repayment, Capital One will send your account to an attorney in your state for possible legal action. Please note, no decision has been made to take legal action against you at this time. I want to help you avoid any possible legal action. Please call me at 877- 665-3303 for more information. I look forward to working with you to resolve this balance. (the “Legal Action Notice”). (Id.). Plaintiff claims the language of the letter violates Sections 1692e(10), 1692e(2)(A), and 1692f because the Legal Action Notice inappropriately threatens imminent legal action if plaintiff does not immediately pay the outstanding debt. Plaintiff further claims the language of the letter violates Section 1692g because the Legal Action Notice overshadows and contradicts the language of the Validation Notice. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the operative complaint under the “two-pronged approach” articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).4 First, a plaintiff’s legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in the complaint must meet a standard of “plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). II. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act CSI argues Sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), 1692f, and 1692g were not violated because the debt collection letter did not threaten imminent or immediate litigation. The Court agrees. A. Legal Standard The purpose of the FDCPA is to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. §1692(e). The Second Circuit has “consistently interpreted the statute with these congressional objects in mind.” Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, 817 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2016). Claims of FDCPA violations are evaluated under “an objective standard, measured by how the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ would interpret the notice received from the debt collector.” Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1996). “[T]he test is how the least sophisticated consumer — one not having the astuteness of a ‘Philadelphia lawyer’ or even the sophistication of the average, everyday, common consumer — understands the notice he or she receives.” Id. Still, the least sophisticated consumer is “presumed to possess a rudimentary amount of information about the world and a willingness to read a collection notice with some care.” Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993). “[C]ollection notices can be deceptive if they are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate.” Id. Under this standard, a collection notice may violate the FDCPA when it is sufficiently ambiguous to give rise to a reasonable, but inaccurate, interpretation. For purposes of assessing the validity of an FDCPA claim, a court should review a debt collection letter in its entirety. McStay v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 2002). “[C]ourts have found collection notices misleading where they employ formats or typefaces which tend to obscure important information that appears in the notice.” Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d at 1319. Accordingly, courts analyze collection letters “from the perspective of a debtor who is uninformed, naive, or trusting, but is making basic, reasonable and logical deductions and inferences.” Dewees v. Legal Servicing, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). The Second Circuit has “made clear that in crafting a norm that protects the naive and the credulous the courts have carefully preserved the concept of reasonableness.” McStay v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d at 190-91. The least sophisticated consumer standard reflects the important balance between the need to protect consumers from deceptive and abusive collection practices and the need to protect debt collectors from liability based on unreasonable interpretations of collection letters. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d at 1319-20. “Accordingly, FDCPA protection does not extend to every bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretation of a collection notice and courts should apply the standard in a manner that protects debt collectors against liability for unreasonable misinterpretations of collection notices.” Easterling v. Collecto, Inc., 692 F.3d 229, 233-34 (2d Cir. 2012). When “an FDCPA claim is based solely on the language of a letter to a consumer, the action may properly be disposed of at the pleadings stage.” De La Cruz v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc., 2019 WL 4727817, at *3 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019). B. Section 1692e Claims CSI argues plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the debt collection letter falsely threatens imminent or immediate legal action such that Section 1692e has been violated The Court agrees. 1. Applicable Law Section 1692e prohibits the use of “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” and contains a non-exhaustive list of sixteen proscribed acts. As relevant to this case, subsections (2)(A) and (10) prohibit, respectively, “[t]he false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt,” and “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” “However, not every technically false representation by a debt collector amounts to a violation of the FDCPA.” Bryan v. Credit Control, LLC, 954 F.3d 576, 582 (2d Cir. 2020). Instead, “as a natural corollary to the least sophisticated consumer test, only material errors violate Section 1692e.” Id. That is, “a false statement is only actionable under the FDCPA if it has the potential to affect the decision-making process of the least sophisticated consumer.” Id. “Falsely suggesting that legal action was immediate, imminent, or urgent is actionable under Section[]…1692e(10).” Dewees v. Legal Servicing, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 134. “[D]ebt collectors make no threat of imminent, immediate, or otherwise urgent action as a matter of law where the debt collector states that legal action may follow and does nothing more to suggest that the legal action would be immediate.” Id. at 135 (emphasis in original). Threat of imminent, immediate, or urgent legal action can be found when “the collection letter include[s] some language suggesting that legal action was imminent other than the mere statement that legal action ‘may’ be taken and that the debt is currently due or past due.” Id. Accordingly, to plausibly state a claim under the theory that defendant made a false threat of imminent legal action, plaintiff must plausibly allege that (i) CSI made a threat of immediate or imminent action, and (ii) CSI made such threat falsely. See Dewees v. Legal Services, 506 F. Supp. 2d 128, 135. 2. Application The crux of plaintiff’s argument is that certain selectively read portions of the Legal Action Notice threaten plaintiff with immediate legal action. Thus, plaintiff claims two lines of the letter — “Please call me at 877-665-3303 for more information. I want to help you avoid any possible legal action” — imply to the least sophisticated consumer that legal action is imminent. (Compl.
