OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING HIGBEE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RM MEDIA LTD.’S SECOND AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS. (Docs. 8 and 15 On May 24, 2019, Plaintiff Lisa Coppola, LLC, doing business as The Coppola Firm (“Plaintiff”), filed a Complaint against Defendants RM Media, Ltd. (“RM”); Nicholas Youngson, a photographer who allegedly owns RM; and RM’s legal counsel, Mathew K. Higbee, Esq.1 and Higbee & Associates (the “Higbee Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff asserts that it is the victim of Defendants’ fraudulent scheme in which they offer images on the internet “free for use” subject to certain licensing requirements and then seek damages for copyright infringement from those who use the images without attribution. Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201 (the “DJA”), and asserts claims pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §1962 (“RICO”), and New York General Business Law §349 (“GBL §349″). In addition to a declaratory judgment, Plaintiff seeks an injunction, statutory remedies under RICO, compensatory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Pending before the court are motions to dismiss filed by the Higbee Defendants (Doc. 8) and RM (Doc. 15). Plaintiff opposes the motions. Plaintiff is represented by Lisa A. Coppola, Esq., and Erin Kathleen Ewell, Esq. The Higbee Defendants are represented by Rayminh L. Ngo, Esq. RM is represented by Jeanne M. Weisneck, Esq. Defendant Nicholas Youngson has not responded to the Complaint or appeared in the case, and it is unclear whether he has been properly served. I. The Complaint’s Allegations. Plaintiff, a law firm based in Buffalo, New York, publishes “educational blog posts” on its website regarding changes in the law. (Doc. 1 at 5, 25.) These blog posts are sometimes accompanied by a “relevant image[,]” id., 26, and Plaintiff alleges it has a policy that all images it uses must be owned, created, or licensed for use by the firm unless they are “royalty-free.” Id., 28. Plaintiff asserts that it “generally does not generate revenue” from its blog posts. Id., 27. It was Plaintiff’s understanding that images labeled “free to use, share or modify, even commercially” could be used free of charge without attribution. Id., 30. Plaintiff posted five images (the “Images”) on its website that were allegedly made available online by Defendants free of charge, but the Complaint does not specify when or from what website Plaintiff obtained the Images. In March 2019, Plaintiff received a letter from an unspecified Defendant or Defendants demanding payment of $9,200 for use of the Images. Plaintiff alleges that it removed the Images from its website after it received the March 2019 letter. Counsel for Plaintiff attempted to negotiate a settlement with a “Claims Resolution Specialist” employed by defendant Higbee & Associates, id. at 7, 39, but no settlement was reached. Defendants allegedly threatened litigation, seeking up to $150,000 in damages, and mailed Plaintiff a draft complaint which they represented they would file if Plaintiff did not resolve the matter within fifteen days. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants do not have a valid copyright claim for the Images and that Defendants “intentionally lure[]” consumers to use their images with the claim that they are free to use, “ then extort[] the deceived consumers to make a profit.” (Doc. 1 at 8, 51.) The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff has identified “many victims” of Defendants’ purported scheme. Id. at 7, 44. The Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff’s use of the Images was not copyright infringement. It further alleges violations of RICO predicated on mail fraud and seeks a court order requiring Mathew Higbee to “divest himself of any direct or indirect interest in defendants Higbee & Associates [or] RM Media,” id. at 12, 80, requiring Nicholas Youngson to divest himself of any interest in RM, “impos[ing] reasonable restrictions on defendants Higbee and Youngson[,]” id., 82, and dissolving Higbee & Associates and RM. Based upon the same allegations, the Complaint also asserts Defendants knowingly and willfully violated GBL §349 for unfair and deceptive business practices for which Plaintiff seeks treble damages along with its attorney’s fees and costs. II. Conclusions of Law and Analysis. The Higbee Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to plausibly allege claims for which relief can be granted. They also request dismissal of Plaintiff’s RICO claim based on Plaintiff’s failure to timely file a RICO case statement (“RCS”) as required by the Western District of New York’s Local Rules of Civil Procedure. RM moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on three grounds: under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. RM also asks the court to dismiss Plaintiff’s RICO claim due to Plaintiff’s failure to timely file an RCS. A. Whether RM Received Adequate Service of Process. In RM’s motion to dismiss and accompanying papers, counsel for RM represents that the date on which RM was served with the Summons and Complaint is unknown. RM therefore asks the court to accept its motion to dismiss nunc pro tunc if it is untimely or, in the alternative, to dismiss the Complaint for insufficient service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). Plaintiff has not responded to RM’s arguments concerning the sufficiency of service. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) governs service of a party outside of the United States and provides that such service may be effected “by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial Documents[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1). Rule 4(f) recognizes alternative methods of acceptable service where no internationally agreed method applies. See Fed. R. Civ. P. (4)(f)(2). When a defendant seeks dismissal for insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5), “ the plaintiff bears the burden of proving adequate service.” Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 752 (2d Cir. 2010). RM concedes that it eventually received a copy of the Summons and Complaint. As no valid return of service has been filed, the court is unable to ascertain when RM was served through its accountant. Because there is no dispute that RM received the Complaint and corresponding notice of Plaintiff’s claims against it, the court accepts RM’s motion to dismiss as timely filed. The court therefore need not and does not determine whether Plaintiff has established that it obtained adequate service of RM. B. Whether RM Is Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in This Court. RM seeks dismissal on the basis that the court does not have personal jurisdiction over it because it is a corporation created and existing under the laws of the United Kingdom, where its principal place of business is located. “In the absence of a federal statute specifically directing otherwise, and subject to limitations imposed by the United States Constitution,” a federal district court’s personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation depends on the law of the forum state. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 624 (2d Cir. 2016). “On a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 1996). Because RM has moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), Plaintiff bears the burden of making a “prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists.” Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In opposing RM’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues that the court has specific personal jurisdiction over RM pursuant to New York’s Long Arm Statute, N.Y.C.P.L.R. §302 (“CPLR §302″) because RM’s efforts to enforce its copyrights in New York constitute the transaction of business in the state. To determine whether specific personal jurisdiction exists, the court considers first whether “the individual or entity has purposefully directed his activities at the forum and the litigation arises out of or relates to those activities[,]” and second “ whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.” In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 529 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal alterations, quotation marks, and citations omitted). CPLR §302 provides that “[a]s to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary…who in person or through an agent” “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state[.]” CPLR §302(a)(1). To assess whether jurisdiction is proper, courts ask “ (1) whether a defendant has transacted business in such a way that it constitutes purposeful activity; and (2) whether there is an articulable nexus, or a substantial relationship, between the claim asserted and the actions that occurred in New York.” Megna v. Biocomp Labs. Inc., 166 F. Supp. 3d 493, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting DNT Enters., Inc. v. Tech. Sys., 333 F. App’x 611, 613 (2d Cir. 2009)). Where a party’s website is cited as evidence that it transacts business in New York, a court may consider the website’s level of interactivity, ranging from a passive website that “primarily make[s] information available to viewers but do[es] not permit an exchange of information” to a website through which “the defendant clearly does business over the [i]nternet[.]” Levans v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 330, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). “ [I]nteractive” websites “permit the exchange of information and may subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction, depending on the level and nature of the exchange.” Brown v. Web.com Grp., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 3d 345, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted). However, a website’s interactivity is merely one factor in determining whether the defendant “through the website, purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Best Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 252 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made the Images available online “for free, even for commercial re-use.” (Doc. 1 at 7, 46.) To the extent that this allegation describes a “passive” website where consumers can find images but not exchange information with RM, operating the site would not alone qualify as “transacting business” pursuant to CPLR §302. Plaintiff cites no evidence that RM targeted New York State or its residents, and, indeed, concedes RM’s websites are accessible by internet users nationwide. See Best Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 253 (observing that online content that was not “purposefully directed to New Yorkers rather than a nationwide audience” was not evidence of purposeful activity in New York sufficient to support personal jurisdiction); see also Girl Scouts of U.S. v. Steir, 102 F. App’x 217, 219 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (noting that under New York law “the mere solicitation of business within the state does not constitute the transaction of business within the state” and holding website did not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over defendant under CPLR §302(a)(1)). RM acknowledges that it has a commercial interest in offering images online because doing so drives business to RM’s websites. It also acknowledges that it requires a user of its images to agree to certain licensing conditions. Plaintiff’s use of the images was subject to a license that permits “[s]haring, copying[,] and redistributing in any medium or format…even commercially” conditioned on the requirement that “attribution is required to obtain and maintain a license.” (Doc. 1-4 at 3.) RM also posted an additional notice with each Image stating: RM Media Ltd[.] offers a small percentage of [its] stock for free under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike license which allows publishers access to high quality images at no cost in return for a link to one of RM Media’s web sites. Please do not abuse this service. *Images are free of monetary charges. However, licenses are conditioned on attribution and other Creative Commons requirements being met and maintained. Licenses are automatically revoked if attribution requirements are not maintained. Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of its access to the Images posted on RM’s website, its failure to comply with the license requirement of attribution, and RM’s efforts to enforce its copyright for the Images in New York state.2 “A single transaction of business is sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction under CPLR §302(a)(1), even where the defendant never enters the state, if the claim arises out of the transaction.” Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). On this basis, although a close question, Plaintiff has satisfied its burden of establishing that RM transacted business in New York sufficient to support specific personal jurisdiction. See DiStefano v. Carozzi N.A., Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that in deciding pre-discovery whether personal jurisdiction exists, the trial court must “construe the pleadings…in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], resolving all doubts in [its] favor.”). Having determined that there is a basis for personal jurisdiction over RM under CPLR §302, the court analyzes whether its exercise of jurisdiction over RM “comports with due process protections established under the Constitution.” Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law Offices, 799 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2015). In the context of personal jurisdiction, “[c]onstitutional due process assures that…the maintenance of a lawsuit” against a defendant in a given forum “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 328 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). If the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with the relevant forum” such that it has “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum and could foresee being haled into court there[,]” the defendant must “ present a compelling case that…other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable” to defeat jurisdiction on due process grounds. Eades, 799 F.3d at 168-69 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Those considerations include “the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant[,]” the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the case, “ the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief[,]” the judicial system’s interest in efficient resolution of the case, and the “ shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.” Id. at 169 (quoting Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2010)). Although the constitutional due process inquiry and specific personal jurisdiction under CPLR §302 are “not coextensive,” the Second Circuit has noted that only in “rare” cases would due process concerns override specific jurisdiction under the statute. Id. at 168 (citation omitted). Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that RM had sufficient minimum contacts with New York for RM to anticipate that it might be haled into court there for a claim arising out of those contacts. RM, in turn, has not presented a “compelling case” that jurisdiction in New York would infringe its right to due process. While the inconvenience of defending against an action in an overseas court is clear, RM has not identified any specific burden it would face if required to do so. See Chloe, 616 F.3d at 173 (finding due process requirement for personal jurisdiction was satisfied notwithstanding any inconvenience to an individual defendant). New York has an interest in protecting consumers from allegedly deceptive commercial practices, and Plaintiff, a resident of New York, has an interest in seeking relief in a convenient forum. There is also a judicial interest in the adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims based on New York law in a forum that is familiar with it. Because the court has preliminarily determined that it has personal jurisdiction over RM under CPLR §302, RM’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is DENIED. The court declines to address Plaintiff’s alternative argument that Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) provides an independent basis for personal jurisdiction. C. Whether Plaintiff’s RICO Claim Should be Dismissed For Failure to Comply With the Local Rules. RICO makes it unlawful for “any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity[.]” 18 U.S.C. §1962(c). 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) creates a private cause of action for a RICO violation provided the person bringing the claim is “ injured in his business or property by reason of” that violation. To plead a civil RICO claim, the plaintiff must plausibly allege: “(1) a violation of [RICO]; (2) an injury to business or property; and (3) that the injury was caused by the [RICO] violation[.]” Kim v. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC, 720 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2013)). This district’s Local Rules require a party asserting a RICO claim to file contemporaneously and serve an RCS “under separate cover” stating “in detail and with specificity” the information required by the Local Rule. L.R. Civ. P. 9. While the court may grant an extension of time, failure to file the RCS is grounds for dismissal. See id. (“A party’s failure to file a RICO Case Statement may result in dismissal of the party’s RICO claim[.]“). Although the Complaint alleges a RICO violation, Plaintiff did not file an RCS pursuant to Local Rule 9 contemporaneously with its Complaint and did not seek an extension of time to do so. After the Higbee Defendants asked the court to dismiss Plaintiff’s RICO claim for failure to comply with Local Rule 9, Plaintiff subsequently filed an RCS on August 27, 2019, the same date on which it opposed the Higbee Defendants’ motion. In its Complaint, Plaintiff makes certain key allegations based only “upon information and belief:” Upon information and belief, defendants Youngson and RM[] either commanded or aided and abetted the violations [of] 18 U.S.C. §1341 by making Higbee & Associates their power of attorney. Upon information and belief, defendants conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. §1341[.] … Upon information and belief, defendants have derived substantial income, either directly or indirectly, through their pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962. (Doc. 1 at 10-11,
