DECISION AND ORDER Defendant is charged with one count of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree (Penal Law §220.03) and Criminally Using Drug Paraphernalia in the Second Degree (Penal Law §220.50(3)). By written motion, Defendant moves to controvert search warrant no. 103-2019 and suppress all physical evidence obtained thereunder. Defendant asserts that the search warrant was not based on probable cause; and the search warrant is based on unreliable and stale information. In the alternative, Defendant requests that a Darden hearing be ordered. Defendant also moves to compel production of the unredacted search warrant application and to reveal the identity of the confidential informant and produce him/her for trial. The People oppose all branches of the defendant’s motion by written opposition. Motion to Controvert Search Warrant and Suppress Evidence The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are based upon the Court’s review of the search warrant and unredacted affidavit filed in support of the warrant application. On February 19, 2019, Detective Cameel Quallis, shield no. 825, obtained a no-knock warrant to search the residence of 1484 Sutter Avenue and the persons of a specifically described black female and black male. On that date, Detective Quallis appeared before Hon. Alex Calabrese and swore to the facts contained within her affidavit. Detective Quallis’s application for the warrant was based upon information provided by a registered confidential informant who had visited the target location on at least two occasions where he or she purchased crack cocaine. The informant did not appear before the issuing judge nor did he or she provide a sworn statement. Per the affidavit submitted by Detective Quallis, crack cocaine is being stored and sold inside of the target location. It further states that the informant made two “controlled buys” at the target residence. The affidavit indicates the specific dates and times when the buys were conducted. During each of these buys, the informant went to the subject residence and purchased crack cocaine from one of the persons described in the warrant with money provided by Detective Quallis. Before each buy, Detective Quallis searched the informant for money and contraband and found neither. However, upon his or her return from the subject residence, the informant handed Detective Quallis a quantity of crack cocaine and was searched again with negative results. After each buy, the substance was field tested with a positive result for crack cocaine. The informant then informed Detective Quallis of what transpired at the threshold of 1484 Sutter Avenue. Detective Quallis’s affidavit describes the subject location as a “one story stucco house.” It is further noted that one can gain access to the subject residence from the street by entering through a white fence and walking up a few wooden steps. An unredacted copy of the search warrant and a redacted copy of the affidavit were provided to the defendant on May 20, 2019. A. Standing As a preliminary mater, the Court must determine whether the defendant has standing to challenge the legality of the search (see People v. Tejada, 81 NY2d 861, 864 [1993], citing People v. Wesley, 73 NY2d 351, 355 [1989]). Defendant bears the burden of establishing standing by demonstrating a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched (People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 108 [1996]). Defendant is permitted to rely on the People’s factual allegations and evidence to establish standing (see People v. Burton, 6 NY3d 584, 588-589 [2006] ["we have repeatedly observed that, in assessing the adequacy of a motion to suppress tangible evidence, a defendant is entitled to rely on the People's proof to demonstrate standing"]). Here, the defendant asserts that he was an overnight guest at 1484 Sutter Avenue; thus, he has standing. Defendant notes that the sworn allegations contained within the complaint and search warrant materials indicate that he was residing there. Furthermore, the People do not contend that the defendant lacks standing to bring this motion. As an overnight guest of the subject residence, Defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched. Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant has established standing to challenge the search. B. Probable Cause The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the state. A search warrant cannot be issued unless there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed or that the place to be searched contains the fruits of illegal activity (US Const Amend IV and XIV; NY Const art I, §12; see People v. Londono, 148 AD2d 753 [2d Dept 1989]). A warrant is presumed valid, and there is a strong preference in favor of upholding warrants (see People v. Hanlon, 36 NY2d 549 [1975]). This presumption attaches since a judicial review of the warrant’s justification has already been conducted (see People v. Castillo, 80 NY2d 578, 585 [1992]), cert denied 507 US 1033 [1993] ["a presumption of validity attached to the warrant given that a Magistrate had already reviewed the purported basis for the search and determined it to be valid"]). Therefore, this Court is left only with the task of deciding whether, based on the warrant application and supporting affidavit along with any sworn testimony of the confidential informant, the issuing magistrate reasonably could have concluded that probable cause existed (see Castillo, 80 NY2d at 585, citing People v. Hendricks, 25 NY2d 129, 138 [1969] and People v. Rainey, 14 NY2d 35, 38-39 [1964]). Here, the information obtained by the police provided probable cause to believe that drugs were being sold in 1484 Sutter Avenue. Detective Quallis, who applied for the warrant, attested that she arranged two controlled buys using a registered confidential informant with whom she worked with in the past and who had previously provided reliable information leading to arrests (see People v. Williams, 220 AD2d 711 [2d Dept 1995]; People v. Walters, 187 AD2d 472 [2d Dept 1992]). Additionally, Detective Quallis was able to observe each controlled buy from her position near the subject location. Thus, the informant’s information concerning the residence was corroborated by the detective’s independent observations (see People v. Cortina, 183 AD2d 841 [2d Dept 1992]). The warrant application contains a sufficient showing that the informant was reliable (see People v. Griminger, 71 NY2d 635, 639 [1988] [warrant application must demonstrate "(i) the veracity or reliability of the source of the information, and (ii) the basis of the informant's knowledge"]). The informant’s personal interactions with occupants of the target location coupled with the detective’s corroboration of said interactions are enough to establish the informant’s basis of knowledge (id.). This Court has reviewed the information supplied to the issuing judge in support of the warrant application and finds that it was not stale, and it legally supports the issuance of a search warrant. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to controvert the search warrant and suppress evidence is denied. Motion for Darden Hearing In People v. Edwards, 95 NY2d 486 (2000), the Court of Appeals held that where the confidential informant’s information is necessary to establish probable cause, the court must grant the defendant’s request for a Darden hearing. The issue before the Court was whether People v. Darden, 34 NY2d 177 (1974), established a required procedure or one to be allowed in the discretion of the trial court. It concluded that its precedent made clear that such a hearing is mandatory where there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause apart from the officer’s sworn statements as to communications received from an informant (id. at 493-494). Thus, it follows that a Darden hearing is unnecessary when probable cause can be found independently of information provided by the informant. In People v. Crooks, 27 NY3d 609 (2016), it was held that a Darden hearing was not required because probable cause was established by the detectives’ independent observations. By live audio, the detectives monitored the informant and the defendant throughout the entirety of each controlled buy (id.). As the subject residence is described in the affidavit, it is reasonable to presume that the front entrance is visible from the street since it is a private house rather than an apartment located inside of a multi-unit building. As part of both controlled buys, Detective Quallis confirmed that the informant had no drugs or money, provided buy money and observed the informant walk up to the target location without interacting with anyone else, knock on the door, and leave from the house with a quantity of crack cocaine. The detective watched during the entirety of each buy. Probable cause for the instant search warrant was established through Detective Quallis’s independent observations, even without the informant’s statements concerning how he or she obtained the drugs (see Crooks, 27 NY3d at 614-615). Accordingly, a Darden hearing is not required, and the motion is hereby denied. Motion to Disclose Redacted Portions of the Search Warrant Application The defendant is not entitled to disclosure of the redacted portions of the search warrant application, including the informant’s identity, to controvert the search warrant or challenge the legality of his arrest (see People v. Castillo, 80 NY2d 578 [1992]; People v. Battista, 197 AD2d 486 [1st Dept 1993]). The confidentiality of the informant was deemed necessary by this Court; thus, limited redactions of the search warrant affidavit were made. “Although a defendant who does not have access to the information purporting to establish probable cause will be unable to suggest reasons why probable cause was lacking, this fact does not deprive the defendant of due process…” (Castillo, 80 NY2d at 585). Defendant was provided with a redacted copy of the search warrant affidavit which revealed enough of the information resulting in his arrest while still protecting the informant’s confidentiality. Accordingly, this branch of Defendant’s motion is denied. Motion to Produce the Confidential Informant for Trial The Court declines to reach the merits of this branch of the defendant’s motion. A determination on the issue of disclosure of the informant’s identity and his/her production at trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Accordingly, this branch of Defendant’s motion is reserved for decision by the trial judge. Motion to Invalidate No-Knock Warrant CPL 690.35(4)(b) sets forth the legal standard for issuance of a search warrant permitting the executing officers to enter the premises without giving prior notice to the occupants; these warrants are also known as “no-knock” warrants. CPL 690.35(4)(b) provides, in relevant part: “A request that the search warrant authorize the executing police officer to enter premises to be searched without giving notice of his authority and purpose, upon the ground that there is reasonable cause to believe that (i) the property sought may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or (ii) the giving of such notice may endanger the life or safety of the executing officer or another person[.]“ Defendant’s argument that there was no basis for a no-knock search warrant is meritless. Where, as here, there is probable cause to believe that a location contains quantities of a controlled substance, which could be quickly destroyed or disposed of, a no-knock search warrant is justified (see People v. Garzia, 56 AD2d 635 [2d Dept 1977] [upholding a no-knock warrant where the items to be seized were drugs]). The application as a whole sets forth sufficient facts to justify the issuance of a no-knock warrant. Accordingly, this branch of Defendant’s motion is hereby denied. The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. Dated: September 17, 2019 Kings County, New York
