By Acosta, P.J., Richter, Manzanet-Daniels, Webber, Kern, JJ.9345. PEOPLE, res, v. Andrew Scott, def-ap — Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Allison N. Kahl of counsel), for ap — Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Emily Anne Aldridge counsel), for res — Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Margaret L. Clancy, J.), rendered April 9, 2015, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of four counts of murder in the second degree and two counts of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 50 years to life, unanimously affirmed.There was no violation of defendant’s right to be present at a hearing on the admissibility of uncharged crimes evidence (see People v. Spotford, 85 NY2d 593, 596-597 [1995]). After a hearing in defendant’s presence, where he had an opportunity for meaningful input, there was an exchange of emails among counsel and the court that essentially constituted posthearing written submissions, and did not require defendant’s personal involvement (see People v. Liggins, 19 AD3d 324 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 853 [2005]). The proposed evidence set forth in the emails did not differ in any material way from what the People had proffered at the initial proceeding, so as to require defendant’s presence. Any differences either involved minor details, or evidence that was never actually introduced at trial.Defendant’s challenge to the prosecutor’s summation comment regarding purported concessions by defense counsel is unpreserved, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find that the comment was improper (see People v. Levy, 202 AD2d 242, 245 [1st Dept 1994]), but harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt (see People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]). We have considered and rejected defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims relating to the lack of preservation (see People v. Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]).The court’s summary denial of the branch of defendant’s suppression motion seeking to suppress his statements as the fruit of an allegedly unlawful arrest (see Dunaway v. New York, 442 US 200 [1979]) was not error. Defendant made only a conclusory claim that there was no probable cause for his arrest, and failed to set forth any allegations to raise a factual dispute on that subject (see CPL 710.60[1]; People v. Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 425-429 [1993]). Contrary to his contention, this is not a case where a “complete lack of information” (People v. Wynn, 117 AD3d 487, 488 [1st Dept 2014]) prohibited him from setting forth specific allegations. At the time of his motion, defendant was aware of some of the bases of his arrest, and defendant had the “burden to supply the motion court with any relevant facts he did possess” (People v. Jones, 95 NY2d 721, 729 [2001]). Before trial, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s request for new counsel after conducting a sufficient inquiry. Defendant did not demonstrate good cause for a substitution (see generally People v. Linares, 2 NY3d 507, 510 [2004]), and, in any event, defendant effectively withdrew his request and voluntarily agreed to continue with the same counsel.The court providently exercised its discretion when it declined to consider defendant’s pro se CPL 330.30 motion to set aside the verdict. Defendant was represented by counsel, and had no right to hybrid representation (People v. Rodriguez, 95 NY2d 497, 501-503 [2000]). The court did not reject the motion based on a blanket policy of not considering pro se motions, but on the ground that defense counsel declined to adopt this motion. Defendant argues that because the motion alleged, in pertinent part, ineffective assistance of counsel, it would normally be made pro se, it was natural for counsel to decline to adopt it, and there was a conflict of interest requiring assignment of new counsel. However, in this case, the pertinent claims referred to the pretrial request for new counsel, which, as noted, was meritless and withdrawn, and certain other claims of ineffectiveness that were not cognizable in a record-based CPL 330.30(1) motion and are not pursued on appeal. Accordingly, under these circumstances, we find no denial of defendant’s right to conflict-free representation.The loss of certain videotapes received in evidence at trial did not deprive defendant of effective appellate review. Nothing in the videos would shed light on the appellate arguments he is now raising. In any event, the contents of the videos could be gleaned from the record (see People v. Yavru-Sakuk, 98 NY2d 56, 59-60 [2002]), and the videos themselves are not necessary to our above-stated holding that the summation comment at issue was harmless error.We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.This constitutes the decision and order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
By Acosta, P.J., Richter, Manzanet-Daniels, Webber, Kern, JJ.9346. Gail Frederick, plf-ap, v. New York City Housing Authority, def-res — Belovin Franzblau & Associates, P.C., Bronx (David A. Karlin of counsel), for ap — Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., New York (Linda M. Brown of counsel), for res — Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Llinet Rosado, J.), entered January 9, 2018, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.Plaintiff was injured when, while descending the lobby stairs in defendant’s building, she slipped and fell on urine. Defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence showing that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition. Regarding actual notice, the superintendent of the building testified that tenants were given a phone number to notify defendant about any problems with the building, he was unaware of any ongoing issue with urine being on the lobby’s steps, no complaints were made about the condition of the stairs before plaintiff fell, and there were no accidents in that area before the accident. The building’s caretaker also testified that she received no complaints about the lobby before the accident (see Gomez v. J.C. Penny Corp., Inc., 113 AD3d 571 [1st Dept 2014]).As for constructive notice, the caretaker stated that the janitorial schedule required that the lobby’s steps be inspected once in the morning and again between 4:00 and 4:15 p.m., and she would promptly remove anything found during her inspections (see Rodriguez v. New York City Hous. Auth., 102 AD3d 407 [1st Dept 2013]).In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Viewing the record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, defendant had less than 30 minutes to find the urine before the caretaker left work for the night. This is an insufficient period of time to charge defendant with having constructive notice (see Pagan v. New York City Hous. Auth., 121 AD3d 622, 623 [1st Dept 2014]).Furthermore, defendant demonstrated that urine on the lobby stairs was not an ongoing condition that was routinely left unaddressed. The building’s caretaker testified that she inspected the accident location twice and cleaned the area at least once on the day that plaintiff fell (see Pfeuffer v. New York City Hous. Auth., 93 AD3d 470, 472 [1st Dept 2012]). The fact that the caretaker stated that she saw urine on the floor about “once every two weeks” does not establish that defendant routinely left the condition unaddressed (see Raposo v. New York City Hous. Auth., 94 AD3d 533, 534 [1st Dept 2012]).This constitutes the decision and order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
