OPINION & ORDER Lori Martinetti, as representative of her minor daughter, Jane Doe Martinetti (“Plaintiff”), brings this Action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. §§1681 et seq., and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV, against Kelly Mulvoy Mangan (“Mangan”), in her representative capacity as President of Harrison Central School District Board (the “School Board”), and Kimberly Beukema (“Beukema”), in her representative capacity as Principal of Harrison High School (collectively, “Defendants”). (See generally Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 19).)1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her rights when they failed to “investigate and take corrective and protective action” after learning that Plaintiff was sexually assaulted. (Am. Compl.5.) Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (the “Motion”). (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 33).) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted. I. BackgroundA. Factual BackgroundThe following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, (Am. Compl.), and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the instant Motion.Until relocating to Las Vegas, Nevada in August 2016, Plaintiff resided in the Harrison Central School District (the “School District”) and attended Harrison High School (“HHS”). (Am. Compl.15.) On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff “notified members of the HHS administration that she had been the victim of a sexual assault” by “a person known to her, her school classmates[,] and the school community in general.” (Id.27.) Upon learning of the sexual assault, “the members of HHS, under the direction of the School Board, and therefore [Defendants]…, did ignore their responsibilities, failed to conduct an investigation, create or develop a plan to address the assault, [or] provide a protective environment to the victim, and passed their non-delegable duty under the law[] to the School Resource Officer, a member of the [Harrison Police Department].” (Id.28.) Defendants allegedly “shuffl[ed] [Plaintiff] from service provider to service provider” in order to “prevent any perceivable impediment to the standing of the School, the District, and the Community.” (Id.
5-6.) The School Resource Officer (“SRO”), who was tasked with addressing the incident, “appeared to lack any kn[ow]ledge of how to deal with sexual altercations involving minors”; he “subject[ed] the Plaintiff to Miranda Warning prior to taking a statement, which resulted [in] the exer[c]ise of undue influence over [Plaintiff] and squelched her ability to gain the protections of state and Federal Law within an educational setting.” (Id.7.) Under the “direct oversight and control of the Chief of Police,” Defendants allegedly “conspire[d] to ‘play down’ or otherwise ‘sweep under the rug’ any matters that would negate the value of the local community,” thereby “establish[ing] a general understanding and policy of ‘it doesn’t happen here.’” (Id.8.)As a result of these events, Plaintiff “found it necessary to visit with…a variety of mental health professionals,” including school therapists and private mental health service providers. (Id.30.) Plaintiff alleges that she was “denied the protections of the law, the safety of the law, and was subject to ridicule and persecution by her classmates because of the outcry and disclosure of the assault.” (Id.45.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages “and any other relief that this [C]ourt determines to be just and proper.” (Id. at 11,47.)B. Procedural BackgroundPlaintiff filed her original complaint in state court on June 9, 2017, bringing claims against Mangan and Beukema, as well as against Michael Olsey (“Olsey”), Chief of Police of Harrison, New York, and Defendants removed the Action to this Court on July 19, 2017. (Not. of Removal (Dkt. No. 1).) On July 21, 2017, Olsey filed a letter requesting a pre-motion conference in anticipation of filing a motion to dismiss, and Beukema and Mangan filed a premotion letter similarly seeking to move to dismiss on July 28, 2017. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 10.) The Court held a pre-motion conference on October 10, 2017, during which the Court directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 30 days curing the defects raised by Defendants’ letters. (See Dkt. (minute entry for Oct. 10, 2017).)On November 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed the operative Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl.) On November 13, 2017, Olsey filed a letter seeking a pre-motion conference in anticipation of moving to dismiss the Amended Complaint, and on November 22, 2017, Beukema and Mangan also filed a letter seeking to file a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. Nos. 20, 22.) On November 30, 2017, Olsey was voluntarily dismissed from the Action without prejudice. (See Not. of Voluntary Dismissal (Dkt. No. 25).) The Court then held a pre-motion conference, and set a briefing schedule for Beukema’s and Mangan’s contemplated motion to dismiss. (See Dkt. (minute entry for Feb. 5, 2018).)Defendants filed the instant Motion To Dismiss and accompanying papers on March 12, 2018. (See Not. of Mot.; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 35).) On April 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed a response. (See Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Mot. To Dismiss (“Pl.’s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 37).) On May 21, 2018, Defendants filed a reply. (See Defs.’ Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Mot. (“Defs.’ Reply”) (Dkt. No. 38).)II. DiscussionA. Standard of ReviewThe Supreme Court has held that although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Rather, a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, and a plaintiff need allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his or her] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed,” id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will…be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]‘ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” (citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”).In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In addressing the sufficiency of a complaint we accept as true all factual allegations….” (quotation marks omitted)). Further, “[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] motion to dismiss, the Court…draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). “In adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted).B. AnalysisDefendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint on grounds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. (See Defs.’ Mem 4-13.)1. Title IX2Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title IX because (1) the named Defendants are not recipients of federal funds as is necessary to be liable for violations of Title IX; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants had actual notice of the sexual assault; (3) Plaintiff fails to plead deliberate indifference; (4) Plaintiff fails to plead gender-based discrimination; and (5) Plaintiff fails to plead the deprivation of educational opportunities. (Defs.’ Mem. 4-9.) Defendants also argue that to the extent Plaintiff “seeks to assert that the…[D]efendants’ failure to establish a grievance procedure for sexual assault constitutes discrimination under Title IX, this assertion is false.” (Id. at 12.)a. Applicable Law“Title IX provides in pertinent part: ‘No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.’” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 280 (1998) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §1681(a)). “Title IX allows a student to assert a private cause of action against the recipient of the federal funding for the denial of access to education.” Miotto v. Yonkers Pub. Sch., 534 F. Supp. 2d 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citation omitted).A plaintiff may seek private damages against a school receiving federal funding in cases of student-on-student sexual misconduct where the school “acts with deliberate indifference to known acts” of misconduct that are “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.” Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “For an educational facility to be liable, however, the plaintiff must establish that a school official with ‘authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures’ had ‘actual knowledge’ of the discrimination and failed to adequately respond.” Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 280). Additionally, a federal funding recipient may only be held liable under Title IX “where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of [misconduct] in its programs or activities.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 633; see also McGrath v. Dominican Coll., 672 F. Supp. 2d 477, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A] plaintiff may recover [under Title IX]…if the plaintiff can demonstrate…(1) [the] defendant is a Title IX funding recipient; (2) an appropriate person has actual knowledge of the discrimination or harassment the plaintiff alleges occurred; (3) the funding recipient has acted with deliberate indifference…; and (4) the discrimination is so severe, pervasive[,] and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”). “Courts will find deliberate indifference where a plaintiff demonstrates that the school’s response to the [misconduct] or its lack of response is ‘clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.’” McGrath, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648).b. ApplicationPlaintiff has named as Defendants Mangan, the President of the School Board, and Beukema, the principal of HHS, rather than HHS itself, the School Board, or the District. Plaintiff, citing no caselaw or statute, argues that “[a] school district is an agency that may only be sued through its officers, representatives, managers, etc.” (Pl.’s Mem. 3.) However, the Supreme Court has made clear that “Title IX reaches institutions and programs that receive federal funds” but “has consistently been interpreted as not authorizing suit against school officials, teachers, and other individuals.” Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009). “Numerous district courts in the Second Circuit…have held that there is no individual liability under Title IX.” Miotto, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 426 (collecting cases). The Court can find no case in support of Plaintiff’s contention that a school district cannot be a named defendant in a Title IX action, and, indeed, numerous cases expressly hold that “only the institutional recipient of federal funds can be held liable under Title IX.” Tesoriero v. Syosset Centr. Sch. Dist., 382 F. Supp. 2d 387, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Welcome v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 17-CV-5407, 2018 WL 5817156, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2018) (dismissing Title IX claim brought against school principal “in both her individual and official capacity” because a school principal “ cannot be held individually liable under Title [IX] because Title [IX] does not provide for individual liability” (emphasis added)); Zamora v. N. Salem Cent. Sch. Dist., 414 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing Title IX claims against individual defendants because “[the] [p]laintiffs may state a claim under Title IX only against the District itself, as an institutional recipient of federal funds”); Kraft v. Yeshiva Univ., No. 00-CV-4899, 2001 WL 1191003, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2001) (“The overwhelming weight of authority holds that Title IX causes of action may not be successfully asserted…against individual faculty members or other employees of the recipient.”); Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Davis extended liability for peer-on-peer sexual harassment under Title IX to the institutional aid recipient, not to the employees of the recipient.”). Plaintiff’s Title IX claims against Defendants fail on this basis alone.However, even if Plaintiff had appropriately named the School District as a defendant, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Title IX because Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support an inference that she suffered from discrimination that was so “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” that she was deprived of an educational opportunity, Davis, 526 U.S. at 633, or that the School District acted with “deliberate indifference” upon learning of Plaintiff’s alleged assault, id. First, Plaintiff pleads virtually no facts about the assault in question, including where and when it was perpetrated, the attack’s severity, and whether the alleged perpetrator was a student, teacher, or other member of the school community. The Court is unable to find any case in which a Title IX claim has survived a motion to dismiss without pleading a single fact about the nature of the alleged sexual misconduct. On the contrary, courts analyzing Title IX claims routinely assess the specific circumstances of the alleged sexual harassment or assault in determining whether a funding recipient’s response was clearly unreasonable, and whether the misconduct was sufficiently pervasive and severe to support a claim. See, e.g., Welcome, 2018 WL 5817156, at *7 (finding the assaults endured by the plaintiff “sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” under Title IX where “the facts alleged in [the] [p]laintiff’s amended complaint,” which included detailed allegations about two incidents of sexual violence and harassment, “are sufficiently severe such that they would rise to the level of denying [the plaintiff] equal access to an educational program”); Hernandez v. Baylor Univ., 274 F. Supp. 3d 602, 610 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (denying motion to dismiss Title IX claim where the plaintiff alleged she was sexually assaulted at an off-campus party, identified the assailant as another student, and included extensive allegations about prior instances in which the university improperly responded to similar reports of sexual assault); Tubbs v. Stony Brook Univ., No. 15-CV-0517, 2016 WL 8650463, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss where the plaintiff specifically alleged “violent[] and forced sexual contact” after withdrawing consent to sexual activity, identified the assailant and the date of the attack, alleged that a subsequent examination showed the attack “caused significant bruising,” and cited prior instances of reported sexual assaults that the school failed to properly address); Rex v. W. Va. Sch. of Osteopathic Med., 119 F. Supp. 3d 542, 550-51 (S.D. W.Va. 2015) (denying motion to dismiss Title IX claim of student where the complaint alleged that “a fellow student…drugged and raped her after she had been drinking at an off-campus party” on a specific date). Because Plaintiff asserts no facts about the assault itself, there is no way to determine whether the single alleged assault constitutes plausible misconduct “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. Indeed, a single instance of sexual harassment is typically insufficient to establish liability under Title IX unless “the conduct consists of extreme sexual assault or rape.” Carabello v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 627, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that one incident of inappropriate sexual touching was not sufficiently severe to state a claim under Title IX); see also Brodsky ex rel. S.B. v. Trumbull Bd. of Educ., No. 06-CV-1947, 2009 WL 230708, at *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2009) (finding that one incident of male student touching a female student’s breasts and buttocks, and other incidents of name-calling, insults, and physical harassment, were “not sufficiently pervasive or severe from an objective standpoint”); Soriano ex rel. Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., No. 01-CV-4961, 2004 WL 2397610, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2004) (finding two separate incidents in which two male students inappropriately touched a female student not sufficiently pervasive under Title IX); cf. Kelly v. Yale Univ., No. 01-CV-1591, 2003 WL 1563424, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003) (“There is no question that a rape…constitutes severe and objectively offensive sexual harassment under the standard set forth in Davis.”). Although Plaintiff alleges a sexual assault, she has pled no facts explaining what exactly occurred, preventing the Court from determining whether the alleged assault was the type of attack that is sufficiently serious to state a claim under Title IX.Regarding the School District’s response, Plaintiff alleges that upon learning of the alleged assault, “members of HHS” referred the issue to the SRO, who is an officer of the Harrison Police Department, and that he “failed to fulfill his respective obligations and investigate the matter alleged, and provide any conclusion as to the facts provided by [Plaintiff].” (Am. Compl.28.) However, Plaintiff also makes allegations suggesting that the SRO did perform some form of investigation, including taking a sworn statement from Plaintiff, but that during that investigation Plaintiff was “treat[ed]…as a suspect in the commission of a crime and not as a victim of a crime.” (Id.
