By: Ling-Cohan, J.P., Cooper, Edmead, JJ.17-257. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. CELESTE COBB, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Julio Rodriguez III, J.), rendered November 15, 2016, affirmed.The accusatory instrument was not jurisdictionally defective. Giving the allegations “a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” (People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]), and “drawing reasonable inferences from all the facts set forth” therein (People v. Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 747 [2012]), the accusatory instrument contains sufficient facts to demonstrate “reasonable cause” to believe (CPL 100.40[4][b]) that defendant was guilty of menacing in the third degree (see Penal Law §120.15) and harassment in the second degree (see Penal Law §240.26[1]). Allegations that at a specified date, time and place, defendant “approached [the victim] and threw an unknown liquid into [the victim's] face and left eye, causing redness to his eye [and] blurred vision,” supplied defendant with sufficient notice of the charged crimes to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy (see People v. Berrezueta, 31 NY3d 1091 [2018]).The verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis upon which to disturb the trial court’s determinations concerning credibility. The evidence established that after the victim repeatedly warned defendant, his estranged wife, to stay away from his apartment, defendant waited outside of his apartment building, confronted him in a hostile manner and sprayed a strongly scented liquid into his face. The court could rationally infer that defendant’s conduct was intended to place the victim in fear of “imminent serious physical injury or physical injury” (Penal Law §120.15; Matter of Denzel F., 44 AD3d 389, 390 [2007]) and to “harass, annoy or alarm” him (Penal Law §240.26[1]; see People v. Correa, 75 AD3d 478, 479 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 892 [2010]).THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.March 18, 2019
By: Ling-Cohan, J.P., Cooper, Edmead, JJ.18-320/321. I & I JEWELRY CORP., plf-res, v. THOMAS A. FARINELLA, def-app — Order (Jose A. Padilla, Jr., J.), entered on or about January 10, 2018, reversed, without costs, renewal granted and, upon renewal, default judgment vacated and matter remanded for further proceedings. Appeal from order (Jose A. Padilla, Jr., J.), entered on or about November 22, 2017 dismissed, without costs, as academic.Although renewal motions generally should be based on newly discovered facts that could not be offered on the prior motion (see CPLR 2221[e]), courts have discretion to relax this requirement and grant such a motion in the interest of justice (see Kaszar v. Cho, 160 AD3d 501 [2018]). In the circumstances here present, and to achieve substantial fairness (see Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.Y. v. City of New York, 280 AD2d 374, 376-377 [2001]), we favorably exercise our discretion and grant defendant’s renewed motion to vacate the default judgment. The record on renewal establishes that defendant had a reasonable excuse for failing to oppose plaintiff’s motion to restore the case to the calendar and appear at subsequent proceedings, since, at the time, he was suffering from a “mental infirmity which made it impossible for him to defend himself” (Matter of Farinella, 118 AD3d 95, 96 [2014]). Defendant also moved to vacate as soon as he became aware of the judgment, his submissions indicate a possible meritorious defense to plaintiff’s small claim and no legal prejudice to plaintiff is shown. In these circumstances, and in view of the strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits, defendant’s default should be excused (see Hoskie Co., Inc. v. Wu, 112 AD3d 497 [2013]).THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.March 18, 2019
