DECISION AND ORDERINTRODUCTION Facing 105 years in mandatory minimum sentences if convicted on all charges in this racketeering case involving a violent motorcycle club, defendant Gregory Willson a/k/a Flip (“Defendant” or “Mr. Willson”) elected to enter into a plea agreement providing for an agreed-upon 15-year prison sentence pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). Then, after his co-defendants’ trial commenced, Defendant began expressing misgivings about his decision. The Court held repeated conferences with Defendant to address his concerns, after which Defendant consistently retracted any expressed intent to withdraw his guilty plea. Then, on the same date that the jury returned guilty verdicts in the trial of his co-defendants, Defendant told the Court that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, and over a month later, with new counsel appointed for the purpose of pursuing a motion, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea-some seven months after pleading guilty. (Dkt. 1319). Because Defendant has failed to establish any genuine basis-much less a fair and just reason-for withdrawing his plea, the motion is denied.BACKGROUNDDefendant was charged in 18 counts of a 46-count Second Superseding Indictment with various crimes, including a RICO1 conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d), firearm offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c), various narcotics offenses, crimes in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §1951(a), and various VICAR2 counts, pertaining to the operation of the Kingsmen Motorcycle Club (hereinafter “KMC”). (Dkt. 33). Defendant was one of 16 defendants3 named in the Second Superseding Indictment, but he was the only defendant charged in the original Indictment and Superseding Indictment. (Dkt. 1; Dkt. 11).By Order entered January 17, 2017, a trial date of January 16, 2018, was set in this case. (Dkt. 445). A Pretrial Order was entered on August 21, 2017, setting December 1, 2017, as the deadline for various pretrial submissions. (Dkt. 739). In accordance with the schedule set by the Court, Defendant filed a motion for severance on September 15, 2017 (Dkt. 782), and at an appearance on October 24, 2017, the Court denied that motion and announced that Defendant would be tried as part of the main trial (see Dkt. 998).On November 30, 2017, with his trial date approaching, Defendant elected to enter into a plea agreement with the Government. (See Dkt. 893 (Plea Agreement); Dkt. 1302 (Transcript of Plea Hearing)). Defendant agreed to plead guilty to Counts 1, 8, and 9 of the Second Superseding Indictment, which charged violations of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d) (Count 1) and 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) (Counts 8 and 9). (Dkt. 893 at1). The plea agreement was made pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), with the understanding that if the Court rejected the agreed-upon prison sentence of 180 months (calculated in the plea agreement as a below-guideline sentence), then Defendant could withdraw his plea. (Id. at18).On November 30, 2017, the Court placed Defendant under oath and questioned him concerning his understanding of the terms of the plea agreement and his decision to enter into the plea. (See Dkt. 1302). Defendant confirmed that he was capable of understanding the proceedings (id. at 4-5), that he reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney, that his attorney had answered any questions to his satisfaction, that he had read the plea agreement, that he had sufficient time to discuss the plea agreement with his attorney, and that he was satisfied with his attorney’s advice and representation (id. at 5-6). Defendant confirmed his understanding about various provisions in the plea agreement, including the maximum potential penalties for the counts of conviction, the operation of the Sentencing Guidelines, the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), and the operation of Rule 11(c)(1)(C). (Id. at 6-14). Defendant also confirmed his understanding that the only basis for withdrawing his guilty plea would be if the Court rejected the agreed-upon sentence of 180 months:THE COURT: Now, I’m not going to tell you right now, Mr. Willson, as to whether or not I’ll go along with this. I don’t know if I will. Among other things, I’ll have to look at the Presentence Investigation Report that I referred to earlier. But here is the deal, if, in fact, I go along with this, if, in fact, at the time of sentencing, I tell you, yes, I will impose 180 months in prison, that is fifteen years in prison, then you cannot withdraw your guilty plea. Do you understand that?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: However, if I don’t go along with this, if I tell you at the time of sentencing that I’m not going to accept this, then you would be able to withdraw your guilty plea. Do you understand that?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: Do you have any questions for me or Mr. Eoannou up to this point?THE DEFENDANT: No.(Id. at 14; see also id. at 17-18).Defendant also confirmed his understanding of the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, including the right to continue with his plea of not guilty and proceed to a jury trial; the right to various trial rights including the right to counsel and the right to testify or not testify; the right to appeal or collaterally attack any sentence within or below a specified range; and the right to contest the forfeiture of certain firearms and ammunition. (Id. at 14-22).In addition, the following exchange occurred during the plea hearing:THE COURT: Have any other promises been made to you, Mr. Willson, to get you to plead guilty, other than those that are contained in this plea agreement?THE DEFENDANT: No.THE COURT: Has anyone coerced you or threatened you in any way to get you to plead guilty?THE DEFENDANT: No.THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because, based on your discussions with your attorney, you believe it’s in your best interest to do so?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty.THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: Have you answered my questions truthfully?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: Do you have any question for me or Mr. Eoannou?THE DEFENDANT: No.(Id. at 23-24). Then, before Defendant signed the plea agreement, the Court asked him whether the two concluding paragraphs of the plea agreement were accurate, and whether he was entering into the plea agreement in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent manner, and Defendant responded in the affirmative:THE COURT: Okay. What I want to do is turn to the last numbered paragraph of the plea agreement. It’s paragraph 31. Do you have it there?MR. EOANNOU: We do.THE COURT: I’ll read this into the record, Mr. Willson. You can follow along on your copy, but after I read it, I’m going to ask you whether or not it’s true. I want you to listen to me as well. It states as follows: This plea agreement represents the total agreement between the defendant, Gregory Willson, and the government. There are no promises made by anyone other than those contained in this agreement, this agreement supersedes any other prior agreements, written or oral, entered into between the government and the defendant. Is that true?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: I’m going to do the same thing with the paragraph underneath Mr. Tripi’s signature block there. It states as follows: I have read this agreement which consists of sixteen pages. I have had a full opportunity to discuss this agreement with my attorney, Thomas J. Eoannou, Esq. I agree that it represents the total agreement reached between myself and the government, no promises or representations have been made to me other than what is contained in this agreement. I understand all of the consequences of my pleas of guilty. I fully agree with the contents of this agreement. I am signing this agreement voluntarily and of my own free will. Is that true, Mr. Willson?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: All right. The next step then is for you to sign the plea agreement. Understand before you sign it understand when you sign this you’re telling me in writing that you fully understand all of the terms and conditions and that you’re entering into it in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent manner; is that true?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: Then I ask you to sign the plea agreement now.(Id. at 24-25).In addition, Defendant’s attorney explained during the plea hearing that they had received the plea agreement about 10 days before the plea hearing; that he had reviewed it with Defendant at Defendant’s place of incarceration; that Defendant objected to some of the language in the factual basis of the plea agreement that was later revised by the Government; and then Defendant’s attorney reviewed the plea agreement with Defendant again on two additional occasions. (Id). Defendant acknowledged that his attorney’s explanation was correct, and that the factual information contained in paragraphs 5A through M of the plea agreement was correct. (Id. at 26). The Government summarized the factual information that served as the basis for the plea, and Defendant agreed that the information was true and accurate. (Id. at 27-34). The Court followed up with Defendant after the factual basis of the plea was summarized in open court:THE COURT: Let me confirm again, Mr. Willson, you have read, had input on and agreed to the final recitation of the facts that are contained in paragraphs 5 A through M, is that true?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.THE COURT: And the information that is in there is correct?THE DEFENDANT: Yes.(Id. at 34).The Court found that Defendant was entering into the plea agreement in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner; that there was a factual basis for the plea; and therefore, the Court accepted Defendant’s plea. (Id. at 25, 35). Sentencing was scheduled for February 27, 2018. (Dkt. 892).Then, by letter to the Court dated January 4, 2018, Defendant acknowledged that he had agreed to the terms of the plea agreement but expressed concerns about certain DNA tests. (Dkt. 1362). The Government responded on January 29, 2018. (Dkt. 1026; Dkt. 1028). To address the issues raised by Defendant’s letter, a status conference was held before the undersigned on February 1, 2018. (Dkt. 1035). At that status conference, Defendant’s counsel explained that he wrote a memorandum to Defendant about the DNA reports; he had spent almost 30 hours since November 6, 2017, with Defendant discussing the reports and the plea agreement; and Defendant’s concerns had been resolved. Defendant agreed, acknowledging that he was not asking the Court for any relief; that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation and his communications to address his concerns; and that he had no further questions for the Court or his attorney.4In the meantime, on January 16, 2018, jury selection commenced in the main trial (in which Defendant would have been tried). (Dkt. 1004). Ultimately, three defendants elected to proceed to trial (David Pirk, Andre Jenkins and Timothy Enix).At the request of the Probation Department, and with no objection from defense counsel, Defendant’s sentencing was rescheduled to March 27, 2018. (Dkt. 1038). The initial presentence investigation report was filed on February 20, 2018. (Dkt. 1095). One week later, Defendant wrote another letter to the Court. (See Dkt. 1332-6). At this point, proof was well underway in the main trial.In his February 27, 2018, letter, Defendant indicated that he wanted to “reject the plea offer completely and proceed to trial” and that he pleaded guilty because he feared being convicted at trial and facing a significant penalty. (Dkt. 1332-6). The Government responded to that letter by email dated March 6, 2017 (Dkt. 1332-7), outlining the discovery provided to the defense and the lack of merit to Defendant’s claims.A status conference was held on March 12, 2018, at which time Defendant expressed concerns about his name and alleged conduct being mentioned during the trial of Mr. Pirk, Mr. Enix, and Mr. Jenkins. Defendant’s attorney asked for more time to discuss the matter with his client. A further status conference was held on March 20, 2018, at which time Defendant stated that he wanted to go forward with sentencing and was not seeking to withdraw his plea.5 Defendant’s sentencing was rescheduled to April 10, 2018. (Dkt. 1142).Defendant was not prepared to go forward with sentencing on April 10, 2018 (Dkt. 1192), and it was rescheduled to May 18, 2018 (Dkt. 1225), at which time Defendant said that he wanted to withdraw his plea. The Court set a deadline for Defendant to do so. (See Dkt. 1267). Defendant’s attorney confirmed that the decision was against his advice, but Defendant was instructing him to file a motion to withdraw the plea. (Id. at 2-3, 5-6). At that appearance, Defendant’s attorney confirmed that he spent almost 30 hours with Defendant discussing the plea agreement, and for security reasons, he did not the leave the plea agreement at the jail. (Id. at 9). He also confirmed, as he had during the plea hearing, that language in the factual basis of the plea agreement was changed at Defendant’s request. (Id. at 10).At an appearance on June 15, 2018, it was agreed that other counsel should be appointed to represent Defendant in connection with his motion to withdraw his plea because of the allegations he was making concerning his attorney. With Defendant’s consent, new counsel accepted a limited assignment related to the attempted plea withdrawal, and by motion filed on June 25, 2018, an application was made by Defendant to withdraw his plea. (Dkt. 1319).Defendant does not contend that the Court did not comply with Rule 11. (See Dkt. 1320 at 2). Rather, Defendant contends that his plea was not entered knowingly, explaining as follows:The Defendant maintains that he was never provided with a copy of the Plea Agreement prior to the entry of his guilty plea. Moreover, the Defendant maintains he never read the Plea Agreement prior to signing it and pleading guilty. The Defendant maintains that he is innocent of the portions of the factual basis contained in the Plea Agreement which alleged that he engaged in drug dealing, gun running or that he punched a woman. (DKT#893 at 3-9).The Defendant maintains that he signed the Plea Agreement and affirmatively answered the court’s questions during the plea colloquy on the advice of his attorney and without being aware of the allegations contained in the factual basis set forth above.(Dkt. 1319 at
