Half a century ago the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona noted with distaste the tricks and psychological manipulation perpetrated on suspects by police interrogators. Quoting from the 1962 edition of Inbau & Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, the court described a recommended ruse where the interrogator pretends to have definite proof of the suspect’s guilt, but invites him to adopt a story that minimizes the legal consequences.
“Joe,” says the interrogator, “you probably didn’t go out looking for this fellow with the purpose of shooting him. My guess is, however, that you expected something from him and that’s why you carried a gun—for your own protection. You knew him for what he was, no good. Then when you met him he probably started using foul, abusive language and he gave some indication that he was about to pull a gun on you, and that’s when you had to act to save your own life. That’s about it, isn’t it, Joe?” If Joe agrees to this fiction, the interrogator “is advised to refer to circumstantial evidence which negates the self-defense explanation.”1 Thus, Joe has been cleverly tricked into admitting to the shooting.
