Justice Richard Lee Price
Lofton was convicted, upon a guilty plea, of operating a motor vehicle under the influence, and sentenced to a conditional discharge. He was later re-arrested and charged with three counts of operating a motor vehicle under the influence. Lofton now moved to vacate the initial judgment of conviction claiming it was obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause as he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily enter his guilty plea. He claimed the plea/sentencing court failed to advise him that pleading guilty could subject him to a felony prosecution and potential sentencing enhancements in the event he was charged with a second intoxication driving offense. The court noted Lofton was entitled to an explanation by the court of a plea’s direct consequencesthose having a definite, immediate and automatic effect on his punishment. Yet, it ruled Lofton was not entitled to an explanation of potential collateral consequences of a conviction as they were peculiar to each defendant, and resulted from actions the court did not control. Thus, the court’s failure to disclose that Lofton may be subject to a felony prosecution and sentence enhancements for a second DWI offense did not render his plea involuntary, or entitle him to vacatur of his conviction.
