Justice Robert McDonald

In a personal injury action, Winley-Dunk sought to recover damages for injuries he allegedly sustained resulting from a motor vehicle accident in which Davis rear-ended Winley-Dunk. Davis was personally served upon a person of suitable age and discretion, his grandmother, at his usual place of residence. Davis moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing he was not properly served, thus the court lacked personal jurisdiction. Davis’ attorney stated Davis was arrested and incarcerated at Riker’s Island at the time of service, claiming service at his residence in Brooklyn was improper. The court in Montes v. Sedas held that when a defendant is incarcerated at the time of service, service on a family member at the defendant’s previous dwelling is reasonably calculated to inform defendant of the pendency of the action. It noted the term “usual place of abode” implied a place where there was a degree of permanence, holding a degree of permanence could not be ascribed to a location where a defendant was placed involuntarily by the state. Thus, in denying the motion, the court found service at Davis’ usual place of abode was sufficient to apprise him of the pendency of this action despite his incarceration.