For the last several years, distressed multinational glass maker Vitro, acting through its holding company’s Mexican insolvency proceeding, has sought to implement a reorganization plan purporting to severely restrict, if not eliminate, U.S. bondholder claims against both the debtor and its non-debtor subsidiary guarantors. Bondholders and their indenture trustees have relentlessly battled against aspects of the Mexican plan, which preserved value for Vitro’s equity holders, but (i) failed to respect the provisions of the indenture, especially with respect to the non-debtor subsidiary guarantees; and (ii) relied upon the votes of such non-debtor guarantors, which were based on intercompany debt, to support the release of the bondholders’ guaranties.
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