Pearson v. Fillingim

All property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be community property, and the burden is placed on the party claiming separate property to prove otherwise, which the ex-husband in this divorce decree failed to do in the original proceeding. Because the mineral rights were not divided elsewhere in the decree and were treated as community property, the residuary clauses in the decree clearly and unambiguously included and divided the mineral rights between the couple. Therefore, the deeds were divided by the original decree, and there is no jurisdiction to modify that division. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to alter the original divorce decree, and the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's declaration that the deeds were the ex-husband's separate property. Accordingly, and without hearing oral argument, the court of appeals' judgment is reversed. The ex-husband's claims are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Texas Supreme Court, No. 10-0013, 01-14-2011

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In this dispute over the division of property in a divorce decree, we must decide whether the trial court impermissibly reclassified an asset originally divided in a 1981 divorce decree. For the reasons expressed below, we hold that it did.

Rita Lackey Fillingim Pearson (Rita) and Willis Dan Fillingim (Dan) married on August 1, 1970. During the marriage, Dan’s parents conveyed to Dan four deeds for mineral rights, which Dan and Rita jointly leased to third parties. Dan and Rita divorced on June 9, 1981.

The divorce decree states that “the estate of the parties be divided as follows” and divides property in the community estate into two schedules, one for Rita and one for Dan. The decree does not specifically mention the mineral rights that originally belonged to Dan’s parents in its division, but does include residuary clauses in each schedule awarding both parties a “one-half interest in all other property or assets not otherwise disposed of or divided herein.” Although there is no dispute that Dan was properly served in connection with the divorce proceedings, Dan neither appeared at the final divorce decree hearing nor hired an attorney to represent him at any point in the divorce proceedings. Dan has not made any other collateral attacks on the validity of the 1981 judgment. After the divorce, both Rita and Dan received royalties from the mineral rights.

Pearson v. Fillingim

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