More than a century ago, Judge Benjamin Cardozo wrote, "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30 (1914). Since that time, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that "Due Process protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990). More recently, the Court of Appeals observed, "[t]he right to refuse medical intervention is at least partially rooted in notions of bodily integrity, as the right to refuse treatment is a consequence of a person's right to resist unwanted bodily invasions." Myers v. Schneiderman, 30 N.Y.3d 1, 14 (2017).

Based upon this well recognized right, the Court of Appeals, in Matter of Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981), held that a surrogate may refuse to consent to provide life-sustaining medical treatment to an incompetent patient, where the patient's personal wishes and the incompetence are established by clear and convincing evidence. Relying upon the same right, the court held in Matter of Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218 (1990), that a competent patient has "a personal common-law and statutory right to decline" necessary blood transfusions. Both Matter of Storar and Matter of Fosmire cited Public Health Law §2504, which prescribes who may give consent to medical procedures, and Public Health Law §2805-d, which pertains to claims for lack of informed consent. In 1988, the Legislature passed Article 29-B of the Public Health Law, which addresses multiple issues concerning resuscitation of residents in mental hygiene facilities.

Notably, after citing the "right of a competent adult to determine the course of his or her own medical treatment," the court in Matter of Fosmire, 75 N.Y.2d at 226, observed: "Although this rule was originally recognized in personal injury actions brought by patients against doctors for performing unauthorized acts, it has been held equally applicable in cases where doctors or hospitals seek a court order authorizing essential treatment" (citations omitted).