This is the first article in the final part of a series about developments in rent overcharge litigation that have taken place since 2009, when the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the Appellate Division, First Department, in Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 62 A.D.3d 71 (1st Dep’t 2009), aff’d 13 N.Y.3d 270 (2009). Its goal is to offer modest suggestions about efficient ways to pursue rent overcharge litigation.

The first practice suggestion is drawn from the observation that the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) reviews rent overcharge complaints under Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) §2526.1, while Supreme Court actions are governed by Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) §26-516. What is significant is that both venues recognize “rent overcharge” as a purely statutory claim, albeit one that they accord different procedural treatment. The DHCR’s exacting rules of administrative practice are clearly spelled out in the RSC. By contrast, judicial actions are governed by the CPLR, which contains no special provisions regarding rent overcharge litigation. In lieu of any such rules, it is suggested that any complaint raising a cause of action for rent overcharge should plead it as a purely statutory claim; specifically, a violation of RSL §26-516. Many rent overcharge complaints now filed in Supreme Court feature an inchoate, disjointed jumble of barely related common-law claims for some unspecified quantum of money damages and/or declaratory and/or injunctive relief. This is clearly poor practice. Instead, a plaintiff should allege a violation of RSL 26-516 and be prepared to submit successive summary judgment motions on the issues of liability and damages. The statute itself presupposes this. First, it defines a “rent overcharge” as a payment “above the rent authorized for a housing accommodation”—i.e., its “legal regulated rent,” which the statute defines as “the rent charged on the date four years prior to the date of the initial registration of the housing accommodation … plus in each case, any lawful increases and adjustments.” Establishing figures to correspond to these terms of art would necessarily require a fact finder to perform several sets of calculations. Second, RSL §26-516 separately sets forth a list of permissible damages, including: (1) monetary compensation; (2) treble damages (if the overcharge was “willful”); (3) costs and attorney fees; and (4) injunctive relief. These items of relief plainly depend on the fact of an overcharge first being established. These require another set of calculations. Thus, RSL §26-516 plainly contemplates a two-step process. Note that the inclusion of the foregoing items of relief in the statute also makes it improper for plaintiffs to assert separate causes of action for injunctive relief and legal fees, as many insist on doing.