The Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures, and compelled self-incrimination. The Supreme Court’s holdings in Miranda v. Arizona and Terry v. Ohio have left circuit courts at a crossroads in determining what conduct is appropriate to ensure that both the public, and a criminal suspect’s constitutional rights, are protected.

The use of handcuffs on a suspect during a Terry stop further complicates the analysis required to determine whether an individual is deemed to be in custody for purposes of Miranda. Decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits endorse the view that the use of handcuffs does not constitute custody, while the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that handcuffing a suspect can create a custodial environment thereby requiring that the suspect be informed of his Miranda rights. The Second Circuit has generally taken the position that the use of handcuffs during Terry stops converts the stop into an arrest, thereby triggering Miranda rights. That is, until it’s recent decision in U.S. v. Fiseku.

Supreme Court Precedent