gavel-Article-201710131541-Article-201711162405In Rodriguez v. City of New York, 2018 WL 1595658 (N.Y. 2018), the Court of Appeals addressed an issue that had long divided the Appellate Departments: Does a personal injury plaintiff need to show freedom from comparative fault in order to obtain summary judgment on the issue of the defendant’s liability? The court held that a “plaintiff does not bear that burden.” Id. at *1. In doing so, it displaced what had previously been the majority approach to that question among the lower courts. This column discusses the state of the law before Rodriguez, the rationale for the decision, and how the rule it announced will function in practice.

State of the Law Before ‘Rodriguez’

Before Rodriguez, the Appellate Division departments had largely, but not exclusively, found that a plaintiff moving for summary judgment bore the prima facie burden of demonstrating freedom from comparative fault. See, e.g., Roman v. A1 Limousine, 76 A.D.3d 552 (2d Dept. 2010); Maniscalco v. New York City Tr. Auth., 95 A.D.3d 510, 514 (1st Dept. 2012); Piscitello v. Fortress Trucking, 118 A.D.3d 1441, 1442 (4th Dept. 2014); Rigney v. Ichabod Crane Cent. School Dist., 59 A.D.3d 842, 843 (3d Dept. 2009). Indeed, in Rodriguez itself, the First Department had followed that approach, in a 3-2 decision. See Rodriguez, 142 A.D.3d 778 (1st Dept. 2016). As a practical matter, this meant that summary judgment was an all-or-nothing proposition for a plaintiff. If he could show that the defendant was wholly responsible for the accident, he would be granted summary judgment, leaving only the valuation of his injuries for trial. But if he could not make such a showing, his motion would be denied in its entirety, and the trial would involve all issues, including the defendant’s liability.