Nahmias, Presiding Justice.This case involves a variety of constitutional challenges to Georgia’s Child Abuse Registry that a group of high school teachers and administrators filed directly in superior court after their names were put on the Registry. We cannot properly reach the merits of those challenges, however – and neither could the trial court – because some of the claims are barred by sovereign immunity and the remaining ones should have been raised in the then-pending administrative proceeding also initiated by the teachers and administrators. Accordingly, we reverse the part of the trial court’s order concluding that the court could decide the merits of the challenges, vacate the part of the order declaring the Registry statutes and rules to be unconstitutional and granting injunctive relief, and remand with direction to dismiss the case.1. The plaintiffs (now appellees) – Loy Addison, Archie Chatmon,Lucinda Cooper, Erical Hall, and Kerrie Miller – are teachers and administrators who work with special education students at Albany High School in Dougherty County. After two alleged incidents of sexual abuse by some students against others, the plaintiffs were accused of child neglect for failing to provide adequate supervision to various numbers of students in the classroom and lunchroom. The accusations were investigated by Tammy Frazier, an investigator for DFCS – the Division of Family and Children Services of the Georgia Department of Human Services. She found the allegations to be “substantiated,” and DFCS therefore added the plaintiffs’ names to the Child Abuse Registry.[1]DFCS then mailed to each of the plaintiffs two to four separate notices “regarding the substantiated case” as to individual children, informing the plaintiff of his or her right to a hearing to appeal the determination and the procedure for obtaining a hearing. OCGA § 49-5-183 (a).[2] The notices identified each allegedly neglected child only by initials and a number in parentheses that might indicate age. In most of the notices, the alleged neglect was said to have occurred during the broad time frame of October 2016 through February 2017; two notices said nothing at all about when the alleged neglect occurred.Following the procedure to initiate administrative review set forth in OCGA § 49-5-183 (c), each appellee filed a written request for a hearing within ten days of receipt of his or her notices.[3] The administrative law judge (ALJ)consolidated the cases and scheduled them for a single hearing on September 29, 2017. In their brief to this Court, the plaintiffs represent that Cooper, Hall, and Miller challenged the constitutionality of the Registry statutes and rules in their filings in their administrative proceedings, and Cooper received an order on July 28, 2017, explaining that the ALJ is not authorized to resolve constitutionalchallenges.[4]On August 16, 2017, while their administrative proceedings were still pending, the plaintiffs filed in the superior court of Dougherty County a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the defendants (now appellants) – the State of Georgia acting through DFCS, along with Robyn Crittenden, the Director of the Georgia Department of Human Services; Bobby Cagle, who was at the time the Director of DFCS; and Frazier, all in their individual as well as official capacities.[5] The plaintiffs asked the court to declare unconstitutional all of the Registry statutes (OCGA § § 49-5-180 through 49-5-187) along with all of the rules implementing those statutes (Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 290-2-30-.01 through 290-2-30-.10). The plaintiffs also asked for a temporary restraining order and an injunction preventing the State from permanently including their names on the Registry.On September 14, 2017, the superior court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. The plaintiffs all testified, and while they each said that they had not yet been adversely affected by their names being put on the Registry, they were worried that they would be fired and have their teaching certificates revoked or not renewed if their names were not removed. They explained that they must apply to renew their teaching certificates every five years and the renewal application includes questions about whether the teacher has been investigated for child abuse. Frazier also testified, and it became clear that her investigation was far from thorough and did not include even basic measures like determining if any of the plaintiffs were responsible for the students at the time of the incidents or what the school’s supervision requirements were for the students involved.The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ petition,arguing that the claims were improper as a matter of administrative law andprocedure. The defendants also argued that the suit was barred by sovereignimmunity, that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring their claims, and thatthe Registry statutes and rules were constitutional. On October 4, 2017, thesuperior court issued an order rejecting all of those arguments and holding thatthe Registry statutes violate due process because alleged child abusers are notgiven an opportunity to be heard before being added to the Registry; the noticessent to the plaintiffs were insufficient because they did not give the names of thechildren or specific dates for the alleged abuse; and the definition of“substantiated case” in OCGA § 49-5-180 is vague. The court also held that theRegistry statutes violate equal protection because they treat alleged abusers whoare minors differently than adults, and violate the constitutional separation ofpowers because Frazier performed both executive and judicial branch functions.The court therefore declared OCGA §§ 49-5-180 through 49-5-187 and theimplementing rules to be unconstitutional “on their face and as applied to” theplaintiffs and permanently enjoined the defendants from classifying theplaintiffs as substantiated child abusers on the Registry. According to thedefendants’ brief, the ALJ dismissed the plaintiffs’ administrative cases after the superior court issued its order.The defendants filed an application for discretionary appeal, which this Court granted. The defendants then filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s April 2018 term and orally argued on May 9, 2018.2. We first address the defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit is barred by sovereign immunity. See McConnell v. Dept. of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 19 (805 SE2d 79) (2017). Under the Georgia Constitution, sovereign immunity bars suits against the State and state employees in their official capacities unless a statute or the Constitution itself specifically waives that immunity. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (e); Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 424-425 (801 SE2d 867) (2017). The plaintiffs contend that the waiver required for their suit is provided by OCGA § 50-13-10, which establishes a cause of action for declaratory judgment to challenge the validity of an agency rule and requires that the pertinent agency be made a party to the action.[6]This Court has held, however, that OCGA § 50-13-10 does not apply in cases where a plaintiff’s “contention is that [a statute] is unconstitutional and hence the rules promulgated thereunder are unconstitutional.” George v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 250 Ga. 491, 493 (299 SE2d 556) (1983). See also Ledford v. Dept. of Transp., 253 Ga. 717, 717 (324 SE2d 470) (1985) (“OCGA § 50-13-10 is inapplicable here, as in George, because in their complaint the plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of the statute pursuant to which the [agency] rule was promulgated, as well as the rule itself.”). As in George and Ledford, the plaintiffs here argue only that the rules implementing the Registry statutes are unconstitutional because the Registry statutes themselves are unconstitutional, so § 50-13-10 does not apply. The plaintiffs have identified no other source of a waiver of sovereign immunity, and none comes to mind.Accordingly, the State and its employees in their official capacities should have been dismissed from this case based on sovereign immunity.The plaintiffs’ suit against the employees in their individual capacities is not barred by sovereign immunity, however. “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity usually poses no bar to suits in which state officers are sued in their individual capacities for official acts that are alleged to be unconstitutional.” Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 434. See also Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 188 Ga. 358, 363 (3 SE2d 705) (1939) (“Where an act is attacked as unconstitutional, . . . the suit against such officer [enforcing the act] can not be considered as one against the State, but the court will take jurisdiction of it as a suit against the officer as an individual acting without constitutional authority, and determine the question of the validity of the act.”). Thus, only the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims against Crittenden and Frazier in their individual capacities remain for us to address.[7]3. The defendants also argue that the plaintiffs’ case should have been dismissed by the superior court because the plaintiffs did not exhaust their available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of their claims. See Georgia Dept. of Behavioral Health & Developmental Disabilities v. United Cerebral Palsy of Ga., Inc., 298 Ga. 779, 786 (784 SE2d 781) (2016) (“Under long-standing Georgia law, the failure of plaintiffs to exhaust their available administrative remedies ordinarily precludes judicial relief.”). See also OCGA § 50-13-19 (a) (in cases subject to the APA, “[a]ny person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review . . . .”). Each of the plaintiffs initiated the administrative review process made available by OCGA § 49-5-183 by requesting a hearing before an ALJ, and at least some of them apparently raised their constitutional challenges to the Registry statutes and rules in their administrative filings. But the plaintiffs then truncated that process by filing suit in superior court before the ALJ – or a superior or appellate court later in the process provided by § 49-5-183 and the APA – had the chance to consider their arguments to decide whether relief should be granted.The plaintiffs contend that they were not required to exhaust theiravailable administrative remedies because their constitutional challenges to the Registry statutes are entirely facial rather than as-applied. To the extent their challenges are facial, the plaintiffs are correct. See Women’s Surgical Ctr., LLC v. Berry, 302 Ga. 349, 351 (806 SE2d 606) (2017) (“‘There is . . . no exhaustion requirement when . . . the [plaintiff] challenges the constitutionality of [a statute] on its face.’” (quoting King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427, 428 (531 SE2d 350) (2000)). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ facial constitutional challenges survive the administrative exhaustion requirement. We note, however, that the trial court’s order, which was prepared by one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs, expressly and broadly ruled that the Registry statutes and rules are unconstitutional “as applied to [the plaintiffs]” and addressed at least some as- applied constitutional questions, including the insufficiency of the specific notices sent to the plaintiffs and the lack of diligence exhibited by Frazier in her investigation. Those as-applied challenges should instead have been dismissed by the superior court due to the plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their availableadministrative remedies. See United Cerebral Palsy, 298 Ga. at 786-787.[8]4. The only claims left for our consideration are the plaintiffs’ facial constitutional challenges to the Registry statutes as enforced by Crittendon and Frazier, and these claims too cannot be properly addressed on the merits. Related to the doctrine that those seeking judicial review must first exhaust their available administrative remedies is the doctrine that a superior court must not usurp an ongoing administrative proceeding by issuing declaratory or injunctive relief. Simply put, “Georgia courts will not enjoin administrative proceedings in progress or grant declaratory relief concerning a constitutional question which could be raised on appeal from the administrative decision.” Ledford, 253 Ga. at 717.This doctrine reflects the “‘grave concern [about] the possible disruption of administrative procedures if courts, including this court on appeal, commence exercising jurisdiction to enjoin administrative proceedings already in progress and to issue declaratory judgments as to decisions about to be made by administrative tribunals.’” George, 250 Ga. at 492 (quoting Flint River Mills v. Henry, 234 Ga. 385, 386-387 (216 SE2d 895) (1975)). [A]n action for declaratory judgment will not be entertained where the rights of the parties have already accrued and the plaintiff faces no risk of taking future undirected action. This rule is particularly applicable where the rights of the parties have accrued and those rights are actually in the process of being adjudicated by another tribunal. . . . [And] [w]here a statute provides a party with a means of review by an administrative agency, such procedure is generally an adequate remedy at law so as to preclude the grant of equitable relief.Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also State Health PlanningAgency v. Coastal Empire Rehab. Hosp., 261 Ga. 832, 833 (412 SE2d 532)(1992) (explaining that a declaratory judgment made while an administrativeproceeding is pending addressing the same claim “would be, in effect, anadvisory opinion”).Unlike the exhaustion requirement, the prohibition on interfering with orcircumventing a pending administrative proceeding by taking the case tosuperior court applies to all claims that would disrupt the ongoingadministrative process, including facial constitutional challenges to statutes andrules like the ones the plaintiffs assert. Although an administrative agencycannot declare laws to be unconstitutional, the agency may take account ofconstitutional considerations in deciding whether and how to enforce challengedstatutes and rules and what the parties’ rights are under them, and if thechallenger remains aggrieved after the agency renders its final decision, judicial review is then normally available. See, e.g., George, 250 Ga. at 492. Allowing the challenger to obtain a judicial decision on the constitutionality of the law outside of the ongoing administrative process would improperly intrude upon that process. See id. at 491-492.In this case, the plaintiffs had each requested a hearing before the ALJ to challenge their listing on the Registry, and they had been given a hearing date, so their administrative proceedings were in progress. See Ledford, 253 Ga. at 717 (“[T]he administrative hearing came to be ‘in progress’ within the meaning of George . . . , when the plaintiffs were served with a notice of the hearing.”). Consequently, the plaintiffs were not permitted to circumvent their pending administrative proceedings by raising their facial constitutional challenges in an independent superior court proceeding.[9]5. Having reviewed the record, we can understand why the plaintiffs were so upset about the way in which their names came to be put on the Child Abuse Registry and why they wanted to seek prompt relief in the superior court. But having initiated the administrative process available to challenge their listings – the process they were required to use to assert any as-applied constitutional challenges – it is clear under this Court’s precedents that they could not jump off that path and head straight to court, even with facial constitutional challenges, nor could they sue the State or its officials as officials. Because every component of the plaintiffs’ case should have been dismissed by the superior court on at least one of the grounds discussed above, we reverse that court’s judgment to the contrary and vacate the judgment to the extent it addressed the merits, granted the plaintiffs injunctive relief, and declared the Registry statutes and rules to be unconstitutional. The trial court should not have addressed the constitutionality of the Registry statutes and rules, and we express no opinion on those questions in this case.[10] The case is remanded withdirection to the superior court to dismiss it.[11]Judgment reversed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. Melton, C.J., Benham, Hunstein, Blackwell, Boggs, and Peterson, JJ., concur.
