Georgia Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Building. (Photo: John Disney/ALM) Georgia Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Building. (Photo: John Disney/ALM)

The Supreme Court of Georgia on Monday issued the following attorney discipline opinions.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: December 10, 2018

S18Y1159. IN THE MATTER OF AMBER CECILE SAUNDERS.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Petition for Voluntary Discipline filed by Amber C. Saunders (State Bar No. 827587), filed in March 2018, before the issuance of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2).1 Saunders, who was admitted to the Bar in 2013, admits that her conversion of client funds for her own personal use violated Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 1.15 (II) (b) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), and agrees to a suspension of up to 12 months. Twelve months is the appropriate sanction in the light of mitigating circumstances.

In her petition, Saunders explains the circumstances leading up to her misuse of the client funds. She explained that her boyfriend, with whom she shared an apartment, had an emotional downward spiral and failed to pay his portion of the expenses. Saunders, who had practiced on her own for less than a year, was unable to meet the couple’s shared financial obligations, her credit was destroyed, and her car was repossessed. Her boyfriend then became abusive, causing Saunders to leave the apartment with only the clothes on her back and to give up her office space so that he would be unable to find her. Then in 2015, Saunders obtained $26,283.50 in an arbitration proceeding on behalf of an incarcerated client. She used the portion of the funds to which she was entitled as her fee to purchase a car, but the car broke down. Because Saunders was too embarrassed to seek help, she converted the client’s funds for her own personal use to recover from the financial challenges brought on by her former relationship.

In mitigation, Saunders states that the client has been repaid in full; she has no prior disciplinary history; she cooperated with the disciplinary process by submitting a detailed letter of her misconduct to the Investigative Panel member assigned to the case; her actions were due to extreme emotional distress stemming from domestic violence; she has undergone counseling to rebuild her self-esteem to avoid similar problems in the future; she otherwise has good character and reputation as shown by letters of support from the legal community; and she is remorseful.

In its response, the State Bar does not dispute the facts presented by Saunders and confirms that the client was repaid, although the State Bar notes that the client had to wait a year for the funds. The State Bar argues that Saunders’s conduct would support the aggravating factors of dishonesty and selfish motive, and agrees with the mitigating factors listed by Saunders.2 See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions §§ 9.22 and 9.23; In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996). The State argues that a suspension of 12 to 18 months would best serve the interests of the public and the Bar, and Saunders replied that she would voluntarily accept up to a 12- month suspension. Having reviewed the filings in this case, we find that a 12-month suspension is appropriate and is consistent with the sanctions imposed in similar cases involving the misuse of client funds. See, e.g., In the Matter of Lang, 292 Ga. 894 (741 SE2d 152) (2013) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing 12-month suspension where lawyer mishandled client funds); In the Matter of Carragher, 289 Ga. 826 (716 SE2d 216) (2011) (imposing 12-month suspension where lawyer mishandled client funds). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Amber Cecile Saunders be suspended from the practice of law in the State of Georgia for a period of 12 months, effective as of the date of this opinion. Saunders is reminded of her duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Twelve-month suspension. All the Justices concur.

1 On January 12, 2018, this Court entered an order amending Part IV of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (“Bar Rules”), including Bar Rule 4-102 (d), which contains the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The amendments were effective July 1, 2018, with certain exceptions not relevant here. The order also provided that “the former rules shall continue to apply to disciplinary proceedings commenced before July 1, 2018”—such as this proceeding—“provided that, after July 1, 2018, the State Disciplinary Board shall perform the functions and exercise the powers of the Investigative Panel under the former rules, and the State Disciplinary Review Board shall perform the functions and exercise the powers of the Review Panel under the former rules.”

2 The State Bar also argues that there is an additional mitigating factor—Saunders’s inexperience in the practice of law. But inexperience in the practice of law is not mitigating; even a first-year law student should understand that conversion of client funds for personal use is impermissible. Cf. In the Matter of Jones, 293 Ga. 264, 267 (2) n.8 (744 SE2d 6) (2013) (“Whether a lawyer has been practicing for thirty years, or only for a few days, he ought to know that an attorney should not smuggle contraband to a client in jail. This is not the sort of case in which experience in the practice of law has any relevance to the misconduct.”).


In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: December 10, 2018

S19Y0258. IN THE MATTER OF DAVID P. RACHEL.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report of Special Master Daniel S. Reinhardt, who recommends the disbarment of David P.Rachel (State Bar No. 591601), a member of the State Bar since 2003. This matter arose from Rachel’s conviction, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, for one count of conspiracy and 12 counts of money laundering. In a prior appearance of this matter, this Court accepted Rachel’s earlier petition for voluntary discipline, suspending him until further order of this Court, pending his appeal of his federal convictions. In the Matter of Rachel, 297 Ga. 279 (773 SE2d 246) (2015). As recounted by the special master, that appeal has now concluded, as Rachel’s convictions were affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and as his petition for certiorari review was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. As noted in this Court’s prior opinion in this matter, Rachel acknowledged in his petition for voluntary discipline that his convictions constituted a violation of Bar Rule 8.4 (a) (2), the maximum sanction for a violation of which is disbarment.

Following the conclusion of Rachel’s appellate proceedings, the State Bar moved for the appointment of a special master and for a hearing to be set on the matter. The Bar unsuccessfully attempted personal service on Rachel of a notice regarding the appointment of the special master and the setting of a hearing and then perfected service via publication. Rachel did not appear at the hearing on this matter, but the Bar presented argument and introduced evidence, on the basis of which the special master concluded that, in light of the conclusion of Rachel’s federal criminal appeal, he stood in violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2), such that disbarment was appropriate. See In the Matter of Houser, 299 Ga. 284, 285-286 (787 SE2d 689) (2016).

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in these matters. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of David P. Rachel be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Rachel is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.