It’s tough enough dealing with a class action or whistleblower suit targeting your company. The situation gets much more complex when a shareholder simultaneously pursues a copycat derivative action. These derivative suits repeat the allegations from another direct suit against the company, but assert them on behalf of the company against its officers and directors, claiming that they breached their fiduciary duties by participating in or failing to prevent the wrongdoing alleged in the initial suit. Although the shareholder plaintiffs who bring these copycat derivative suits purport to be acting in the corporation’s best interest, they presume that the corporation is culpable for the wrongdoing alleged in the underlying litigation, even while the corporation is still contesting that claim.

These copycat derivative suits can be a huge headache for corporate counsel. They can multiply litigation costs, distract the company’s leaders, and subject the company to duplicative discovery from different plaintiffs and inconsistent rulings from different courts. Worse still, they can potentially jeopardize the company’s defense in the underlying direct suit. But there are tools to stop or stay these copycat derivative suits early in the litigation process and prevent them from interfering with the company’s defense in the underlying proceedings.

1. Responding to a Shareholder Demand Letter

To bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation, a shareholder must first make a demand on the board, calling upon it to prosecute claims on behalf of the company against the alleged wrongdoers, or (where the applicable law permits it) show why this demand requirement should be excused. If the board refuses a demand and the shareholder still files a derivative complaint, the board’s decision is typically entitled to deference under the business judgment rule, and the court will dismiss the “demand-refused” suit unless the shareholder can demonstrate that the refusal was wrongful.

While the pre-suit demand requirement protects the board’s prerogative to manage the corporation’s affairs, it puts directors in a difficult position when a shareholder asks the board to pursue claims concerning alleged corporate wrongdoing that is already the subject of pending litigation or government inquiry. If the board fails to investigate and respond to the demand, a court may permit the shareholder to proceed with the derivative action. But if the board investigates, uncovers misconduct, and files suit against company insiders, that will likely be treated as an admission of liability in the underlying litigation and compromise the company’s defense.

Fortunately, courts have acknowledged that where a company is already defending itself against litigation or a government investigation, it is a reasonable exercise of business judgment for the board to reject a shareholder’s demand on the ground that concurrently pursuing related claims against directors or officers could adversely affect the company’s position in the pending proceedings.

For example, courts have dismissed derivative suits concerning Merrill Lynch’s losses on subprime mortgage securities and the nationwide sex discrimination class action against Wal-Mart, based upon the boards’ determinations in those cases that further action on the shareholders’ demands would not be in the companies’ best interests while the underlying litigation was continuing. See In re Merrill Lynch, 773 F.Supp.2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), appeal docketed, (2d Cir. April 1, 2011); and Furman v. Walton, 2007 WL 1455904 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2007), aff’d, 320 Fed.Appx. 638 (9th Cir. 2009).

Where a shareholder makes a demand—and the board decides that bringing suit is not in the company’s best interest due to potential conflicts with other pending litigation against the company—the board should respond promptly in a letter that explains its reasoning. The letter should describe the pending litigation and how the company’s defense of that litigation would be harmed by the pursuit of related claims against its officers and/or directors. The letter should analyze any weaknesses in the shareholder’s proposed claims and consider whether any possible recovery against directors and officers may be far outweighed by the company’s potential exposure in the underlying litigation. Where a good faith review of these issues supports the board’s decision not to pursue litigation, that decision is more likely to be respected by the court if the shareholder subsequently files a derivative action.

2. Moving to Dismiss the Demand-Excused Derivative Suit