Flynn v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service

Section 7476 of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) allows certain qualified employees to bring an action in the Tax Court for a declaratory judgment to challenge a determination that their employers’ retirement plan qualifies for favorable tax treatment. I.R.C. s 7476 (1994). Pursuant to the statute’s express delegation of authority, the Secretary of the Treasury promulgated regulations determining which employees would be permitted to utilize the declaratory judgment remedy. See Treas. Reg. s 1.7476-1(b) (as amended in 1988). Appellants sought to use s 7476 to challenge the Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) determination that the amended retirement plan of their former employer continued to qualify for favorable tax treatment. The regulations, however, grant standing to use the declaratory judgment remedy only to current employees, not former employees like appellants. See id. The United States Tax Court therefore dismissed appellants’ action for a declaratory judgment and upheld the regulations denying standing to former employees. See Flynn v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 91 (2000).

On appeal, appellants make three arguments. First, they argue that s 7476 impermissibly delegates authority to the Secretary to determine which employees may use the declaratory judgment remedy, without giving the Secretary guidelines for making that determination, in violation of the constitutional non-delegation doctrine. Because appellants did not raise this argument at the Tax Court, we decline to address it now. Second, appellants renew their challenge to the validity of Treas. Reg. s 1.7476-1(b). We find that the Tax Court correctly upheld the regulation as a reasonable construction of the statutory language. Finally, appellants argue that their employer somehow conferred standing on them by mailing them a “notice to interested parties” informing them that it was seeking a determination that the amended plan would continue to receive favorable tax treatment. It is clear, however, that the rules governing the content of notices to interested parties do not operate to confer standing on appellants. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Tax Court.