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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Action No. 1:00CV01457 TPJ Complaint – Class Action RAHN D. JACKSON, and TANYA D. BARBOUR, and JOZETTE JOYNER, and DERRICK WASHINGTON, and JAMES PIPKINS, and PAMELA ODOM, and CHIMA ECHERUO Individually and as Class Representatives, Plaintiffs, v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 5335 Wisconsin Ave., NW Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20015 (202) 895-2000 Defendant ________________/
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINTFOR MONETARY DAMAGES AND OTHER RELIEFCLASS ACTION (DISCRIMINATION)
[TABLE OF CONTENTS OMITTED FOR WEB REPUBLICATION]
1. NATURE OF THE CLAIM
1. Comes now the Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, the original Plaintiff in the above styled action, and files this Second Amended Complaint and shows the Court as follows: 2. This is a class action, brought by Plaintiffs Rahn D. Jackson, Tanya D. Barbour, Jozette Joyner, Derrick Washington, James Pipkins, Pamela Odom, and Chima Echeruo (collectively, “the named Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals against the Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft,” “the Corporation,” or “Defendant”). Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief, and compensatory and punitive damages, based on Defendant’s continuing deprivation of rights accorded to the named Plaintiffs and members of a class of Black African-American employees (as defined herein in paragraph 17) under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. � 1981 (“Section 1981″). Additionally, Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages based on Defendant’s discrimination against Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U. S. C. � 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) 3. As evidence of Defendant’s pattern and practice of race and color discrimination, Plaintiffs allege the following specific examples of disparate treatment: a. Discrimination in Evaluations: The performance evaluation system is implemented by managers exercising undue authority to make biased and inconsistent determinations with little or no oversight. This system permits discrimination on the basis of race and color in evaluations, where raises, bonuses and stock options, as well as further advancement within the Corporation, are based on evaluation scores, pursuant to Microsoft’s written policies on compensation. Because of the undue discretion of managers, Black African-Americans receive more low evaluation scores than Caucasians and fewer high scores. There is no factor (such as job grade, experience, or similar factors) that could explain this race-based or color-based difference in scores. b. Discrimination in Compensation: A review of salaries, wages, merit increases,bonuses, stock option grants, and sales incentives paid by Microsoft to Black African-Americans compared with the same paid to Caucasian employees reveals dramatic differences in pay in Microsoft’s Washington D.C. corporate office and Redmond, Washington corporate office. Upon information and belief, this pattern exists throughout the Corporation. c. Discrimination in Promotions: Microsoft’s policies are not applied uniformly or fairly. The Corporation’s written and unwritten policies and practices regarding promotions do not require posting of all positions, but allow “management nomination” or “management discretion” which amounts to little more than word of mouth recommendations, and other closed procedures, including the use of a high-potential list. Jobs are filled without being posted, candidates are handpicked in advance, and supervisors who make hiring decisions disregard the results of panel interviews and manipulate circumstances in order to ensure that their favorites are chosen. As a result of this kind of discrimination, Black African-Americans are denied the opportunity to advance to the same level and at the same rate as equally qualified Caucasian employees. d. “Glass Ceiling.” At Microsoft, Black African-American employees experience a “glass ceiling” or a barrier to equal opportunity advancement. Few Black African-Americans advance to senior levels in the Corporation, especially when compared to the percent representation of Black African-Americans among all employees. Black African-Americans make up roughly 2.6 percent of the employees in the corporation, however, they are even more under-represented at higher pay grades. In 1999, only 1.2 percent of managers were Black African-Americans, company wide. e. “Glasswalls.” Not only do barriers exist for Black African-American employees seeking upward advancement within the Corporation, but similar barriers virtually segregate the Corporation into divisions or areas where Black African-American leadership is acceptable, and divisions where it is not. Terminations. Upon information and belief, Black African-American employees at Microsoft are involuntarily terminated, suffer retaliation, or placed in situations of intolerable discrimination where they are reasonably forced to resign at a much higher rate than Caucasian employees. This discrimination represents a Corporation-wide pattern and practice, rather than a series of isolated incidents. Defendant’s written and unwritten policies and practices regarding evaluation, compensation, and promotion subject the named Plaintiffs and the Class to ongoing disparate treatment. Microsoft’s actions constitute a continuing violation of the rights of the named Plaintiffs and the Class, and have been ongoing.
II. JURISDICTION
4. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. � 1343(a)(4), which confers original jurisdiction upon this Court in a civil action to recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. � 1331, which confers original jurisdiction upon this Court in a civil action arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. 5. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. � 1391(b) and � 1391(c),because Defendant has a corporate office, and can be found and conducts business in the District Of Columbia, and because a substantial amount of the relevant and subject acts complained of occurred in the District Of Columbia.
III. THE PARTIES
A. The Plaintiffs
6. Plaintiff Rahn D. Jackson is a Black African-American male adult citizen who resides in the State of Maryland. He is a former employee of Microsoft in the Washington D.C. office. 7. Plaintiff Tanya D. Barbour is a Black African-American female adult citizen who resides in Washington D.C. She is a former employee of Microsoft in the Washington D. C. Office. 8. Plaintiff Jozette Joyner is a Black African-American female adult citizen who resides in Washington D.C. She is a former employee of Microsoft in the Washington D.C. office. 9. Plaintiff Derrick Washington is a Black African-American male adult citizen who resides in Germantown, Maryland. He is a former employee of Microsoft in the Washington D.C. office. 10. Plaintiff James Pipkins is a Black African-American male adult citizen who resides in Bellevve, Washington. He is a current employee of Microsoft in the Redmond, Washington office. 11. Plaintiff Pamela Odom is a Black African-American female adult citizen who resides in Bellevve, Washington. She is a former employee of Microsoft in the Redmond, Washington office. 12. Plaintiff Chima Echeruo is a Black African-American male adult citizen who resides in Belleview, Washington. He is an employee of Microsoft in the Redmond, Washington office.
B. The Defendant
13. Defendant Microsoft is a Washington State corporation and licensed to transact business in Washington D.C., in which Washington D.C. office, Plaintiffs, Rahn D. Jackson, Tanya D. Barbour, Jozette Joyner, and Derrick Washington were employed. Defendant’s headquarters is located in Redmond, Washington, at which office Plaintiffs James Pipkins, Pamela Odom, and Chima Echeruo were employed. Unless stated otherwise, Defendant Microsoft includes all entities within the Microsoft Corporation, including all wholly-owned subsidiaries. 14. Microsoft’s corporate headquarters (“Microsoft Corporate” or “the Corporate Office”) oversees and supports the Corporation’s operations including disseminating and enforcing common employment and human resources policies and practices with respect to evaluations, compensation, promotions, equal employment opportunity, and terminations. 15. Microsoft engages in interstate and foreign commerce by distributing andmarketing computer software.
IV. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
16. Paragraphs 1 through 15 above are incorporated herein by reference. 17. The named Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf, and on behalf of a class of persons under Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 18. The named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of:
all Black African-American persons employed by Defendant Microsoft in the United States at any time from April 27, 1992, to the present, who are subject to Microsoft’s employment and human resources policies and practices, including, but not limited to, current or former employees of Microsoft Corporation and its subsidiaries, and who have been, continue to be, or may in the future be, adversely affected by Microsoft’s racially discriminatory employment policies and practices (“the Class”).

Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the definition of the Class following discovery. 19. The individuals in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all membersis impracticable. Plaintiffs estimate that there are at least 400 members of the Class. 20. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individuals. Among these common questions are: a. Whether Microsoft’s actions violated federal civil rights laws, in particular42 U.S.C. � 1981and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000(e) et seq.; b. Whether Microsoft maintains written and unwritten policies and/orpractices for performing evaluations that discriminate against the Class on the basis of race and color; c. Whether there are statistically significant disparities between the evaluation scores of Black African-American employees and the evaluation scores of Caucasian employees, sufficient to permit a finding or an inference of intentional discrimination; d. Whether Microsoft maintains written and unwritten policies and/or practices for determining compensation that discriminate against the Class on the basis of race and color; e. Whether there are statistically significant disparities between the compensation awarded to Black African-American employees and the compensation awarded to similarly situated Caucasian employees, sufficient to permit an inference of intentional discrimination; f. Whether Microsoft maintains a practice of filling positions without following its written policies on posting for positions; g. If discrimination is found, whether injunctive relief, including changes toCorporation-wide written and unwritten policies and practices, is needed to adequately remedy past and present discrimination against the Class and prevent future discrimination against the Class; h. Whether Microsoft’s conduct constitutes a pattern and practice ofdiscrimination against the Class justifying an award of lost wages, benefits or other similar relief to individual members of the Class; i. Whether Microsoft’s conduct constitutes a pattern and practice ofdiscrimination against the Class justifying an award of compensatory and punitive damages to individual members of the Class; 21. The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class. 22. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. The named Plaintiffs have retained skilled and experienced counsel to represent them in class litigation. 23. Microsoft has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, as described below, making final injunctive or declaratory relief appropriate. 24. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 25. Issues common to the Class predominate over individual issues.

V. ALLEGATIONS OF CLASSWIDE DISCRIMINATION
26. Paragraphs 1 through 25 are incorporated herein by reference. 27. Defendant Microsoft has engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of racial discrimination against Black African-American employees since at least 1992, and prior to that date. Microsoft discriminates against Black African-American employees by (1) maintaining written and unwritten policies and practices for performing evaluations of employees that allow biased and inconsistent determinations to the detriment of Black African-American employees; (2) maintaining written and unwritten policies and practices that utilize the inherently unreliable results of the evaluation system to make decisions on compensation, including raises, bonuses and the allocation of stock options, and to make decisions on promotions; (3) maintaining written and unwritten policies and practices for determining compensation that rely on unduly discretionary decisions, resulting in unequal compensation of Black African-American employees throughout the Corporation; (4) maintaining written and unwritten policies and practices regarding promotions, transfers and other internal hiring practices that allow supervisors to handpick Caucasian candidates over qualified Black African-American candidates and to manipulate the interview and hiring process, including using an improperly subjective basis for decisions; (5) erecting an artificial “glass ceiling” and artificial “glass walls” that prevent the advancement of qualified Black African-American employees and channel them to less influential roles within the Corporation; (6) denying Black African-American employees equal training, mentoring, and work assignments, preventing them from advancing within the Corporation, and otherwise discriminating against Black African-American employees in the terms and conditions of their employment; and (7) failing to monitor and oversee employment and human resources practices and failing to provide adequate training and oversight of supervisors to ensure that Corporation policies are applied consistently and in a nondiscriminatory manner. 28. Officials at the highest levels of the Corporation are aware of Microsoft’sdiscrimination against Black African-Americans, yet fail to take adequate measures to prevent or remedy it. Defendant’s 1998 EEO-1 Report shows as follows, which figures were essentially correct for 1998: a. Defendant employed 18,387 people, of whom 82% are White, and only 2.6% are Black African-American. b. Of said 18,387 employees, Defendant employed 3,869 managers, of whom 87% are White, and only 1.210% are Black African-American. c. Of said 18,387 employees, Defendant employed 12,267 professionals, of whom 80% are White, and only 2.7% are Black African-American. 29. Defendant’s 1999 EEO-1 Report shows as follows, which figures are essentially correct to date: a. Defendant employs 21,429 people, of whom 80% are White, and only 2.6% are Black African-American. b. Of said 21,429 employees, Defendant employs 5,155 managers, of whom 85% are White, and only 1.610% are Black African-American. c. Of said 21,429 employees, Defendant employs 14,001 professionals, of whom 77% are White, and only 2.6% are Black African-American.
A. Discrimination In Terms and Conditions of Employment
30. A key factor for successful advancement within Microsoft is an individual’s compatibility with other employees, a factor that significantly disadvantages Black African-Americans because of Microsoft’s history of having Caucasians in positions of power. Black African-Americans, who may be viewed as unacceptable to other employees who harbor racially discriminatory views, do not advance to senior-level positions at Microsoft at the same rate as their Caucasian counterparts. As a result, Black African-Americans do not have the same options for promotion afforded to their Caucasian counterparts. 31. Despite Microsoft’s effort to market to Black African-American consumers and portray compliance with national policy of equal employment opportunity, a substantial part of Microsoft’s employment practices reflect condescending or stereotypical attitudes toward Black African-Americans. Black African-American employees who have tried to assist the largely Caucasian group in its employment and promotion practices, as hereinafter described, which have been sometimes ill-conceived or inappropriate, often found that their contributions were belittled or ignored.
B. Discrimination in The Performance Evaluation System
32. Microsoft centrally develops and oversees its performance evaluationsystem. Under this system, performance evaluations are conducted by managers exercising undue discretion with little or no oversight of their determinations. This system permits discrimination on the basis of race and color in evaluations. Evaluations significantly influence decisions on raises, bonuses and stock options, as well as further advancement within the Corporation.
1. The Performance Evaluation System At Microsoft
33. All employees of Microsoft receive periodic performance evaluations. An employee’s rating on an evaluation can have an important effect on that employee’s compensation. The predominant evaluation system utilized at Microsoft since at least 1992 is based on ratings from a high of 5 (Clearly Exceeds), down to 4 (Meets and Exceeds), down to 3 (Meets Requirements) and to 2 (Meets Minimum). There is also a 1 (Fails to Meet Minimum) rating that is very rarely utilized. 34. Upon information and belief, an employee’s raise is determined in large part by the employee’s score on a performance evaluation, because a particular score relates to a percentage range of increased compensation or worth to the Corporation. 35. Choosing the discretionary nature of this system, the Corporation has deliberately failed to standardize evaluation and compensation practices or to provide meaningful oversight and review of individual managerial decisions. 36. The criteria used in the performance evaluation system include criteria that permit biased and inconsistent application, like evaluating “work relationships,” “communication,” or “problem-solving.” 37. It appears upon information and belief, that Microsoft has written a policy requiring all managers to be trained to properly conduct performance evaluations including training managers to perform performance reviews, to provide coaching and feedback, and to create development plans for the employees they supervise. However, in practice, Microsoft does not follow its policy and this training is offered only haphazardly. 38. Although an employee’s evaluation should undergo multiple levels of review, in practice this is commonly a “rubber stamp” rather than effective oversight.
2. Racial Disparities in Performance Evaluations
39. As a result of the lack of clearly objective criteria, standardized practices, ormeaningful oversight, Black African-Americans disproportionately receive lower scores on evaluations. There is no objective factor other than race or color that can explain this disparity, since performance is not linked to job title or education. 40. As a result, under the Corporation’s evaluation system, many more Black African-Americans are characterized as lower-level performers and many more Caucasians are stellar performers. These disparities are evidence of the discriminatory criteria being used to evaluate employees. This results in significant adverse financial and career development consequences for Black African-Americans because of the critical role evaluations play in advancement, and in determining compensation, including raises, bonuses and stock options.
3. This Discriminatory System Penalizes the Named Plaintiffs
41. Rahn D. Jackson suffered retaliation in response to making a race discrimination complaint and/or allegations as explained hereinafter. The other named Plaintiffs suffered adverse affects of Defendant’s discriminatory system as explained hereinafter. 42. Thus, Microsoft’s evaluation system is an inherently unreliable tool that Defendant inappropriately used and continues to use to determine compensation and promotions, to the detriment of Black African-American employees.
C. Discrimination in Compensation
43. Microsoft determines compensation of employees, including salaries, raises, bonuses, and stock option awards, employing a variety of factors, including the employee’s pay grade, the employee’s position within the pay range of that grade, and the employee’s score on an annual performance evaluation. However, under this system, managers and supervisors are given ranges and targets corresponding to these factors, leaving the final numerical amounts within their discretion. 44. The Corporation’s current compensation system, in effect since at least 1992, allows particularly excessive managerial discretion and assigns significant weight to its unreliable and discriminatory evaluation system, leading to discrimination on the basis of race and color.
1. Racial Disparities in Compensation
45. Upon information and belief, Microsoft maintains a pattern and practice of paying Black African-American employees less than similarly-situated Caucasian employees, including discrimination in compensation. This discrimination results in dramatic differences between Black African-American and Caucasian compensation.
2. The Job Grade System Allows Significant Pay Disparities
46. The current compensation system has broad and overlapping pay ranges that allow significant pay disparities among employees at the same job grade. In addition, upon information and belief, the written guidelines permit employees at lower job grades to be paid more than employees at higher grades. In the absence of adequate monitoring and oversight, the broad discretion of the current compensation system fuels discriminatory compensation decisions and allows them to stand unchecked. 47. The Human Resources Division, directly or indirectly, assigns the job grade foreach position at Microsoft. Job grade determines the pay range for the position, as well as eligibility for bonuses and stock options. 48. Job grade, which determines the compensation range, is subject to manipulation. Upon information and belief, Job grades are supposed to be determined by reviewing the job qualifications and requirements and by assigning points that correspond to job grade and compensation.
3. This Discriminatory System Penalizes the Named Plaintiffs
49. Named Plaintiffs were grossly underpaid for their work at Microsoft, earning thousands less in total compensation than Caucasian employees in comparable positions. 50. Named Plaintiffs were routinely placed at the mid to lower end of the pay scale for a given pay grade. 51. Named Plaintiffs were routinely restricted in the amount of stock options they were entitled to, significantly affecting their total compensation. 52. In summary, Microsoft discriminates against Black African-Americans by allowing supervisors to subjectively determine job grade as well as pay, raises, bonuses, stock option grants, and other forms of compensation.
D. Discrimination in Promotions
53. The Corporation’s written and unwritten policies and practices allow supervisors to essentially handpick candidates through word of mouth, and other informal devises, for available positions and make promotion decisions on the basis of subjective criteria. This system prevents qualified Black African-Americans from competing equally for positions or even knowing that they are available.
1. “Glass Ceiling” and “Glass Walls’
54. Microsoft’s promotion practices perpetuate a glass ceiling at the Corporation. Defendant’s 1999 EEO-1 Report shows the Defendant employs 21,429 people, of whom 80% are White, and only 2.6% are Black African-American. Of said 21,429 employees, Defendant employs 5,155 managers, of whom 85% are White, and only 1.610% are Black African-American. Of said 21,429 employees, Defendant employs 14,001 professionals, of whom 77% are White, and only 2.6% are Black African-American. 55. The Corporation’s promotion practices not only prevent the advancement of Black African-Americans to senior positions, they also erect artificial barriers, preventing qualified Black African-American employees from holding positions of power in departments or divisions carrying out significant activities at Microsoft.
2. Job Posting and Targeted Selection Are Not Objective
56. The Corporation’s policy and practice is to use a job posting system and a “subjective selection” process to fill some positions, but, upon information and belief, allows pre-identification of candidates for posted positions as well as to allow such closed procedures as management nomination for conducting internal hires. The selection procedure includes multiple one-on-one interviews between supervisors and the candidate, featuring scripted questions and specific “core competencies” to be evaluated and a scoring procedure for candidates. 57. Even in cases where the Corporation posts positions, managers essentially are allowed to pre-select candidates before positions are posted. 58. Even when positions are posted and the formal selection interview process is utilized, managers can, and do, manipulate the selection process to pre-select candidates. Upon information and belief, managers may conduct interviews and score candidates based on the objective criteria, and then disregard the scores if the pre-selected candidate is not the highest scorer. In discussion after interviews, the scores might be adjusted or the high scorer thrown out because the hiring manager doesn’t like the candidate who places first under the objective standards. 59. On occasion, Human Resources is represented during selection by temporary employees or contract personnel, rather than by permanent employees with the clout and experience to prevent subversion of the policy.
3. Microsoft Uses Closed Procedures to Fill Positions
60. Frequently, hiring managers place hand-picked candidates into jobs informally, without any posting or selection interviews. 61. This alternate mechanism, as well as others, are closed procedures where positions essentially are filled by word-of-mouth recommendations. 62. A manager can block an employee from receiving a promotion and can prevent an individual from advancing in the Corporation. For example, if a manager makes a decision to hire a particular candidate already employed by the Corporation, the manager first gains concurrence from the employee’s current supervisor before hiring the individual. Thus, the employee’s current supervisor has the power to block the employee’s promotion or transfer. Therefore, managers seeking to fill positions from candidates already employed by the Corporation frequently notify current supervisors prior to interviewing a candidate, thereby allowing the current supervisors to discuss the candidates even before the hiring manager meets the candidates in person. 63. There is inadequate training on the targeted selection procedures.
This Discriminatory System Penalizes the Named Plaintiffs
64. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, applied for promotions, was qualified, was not selected, and the promotions were awarded to persons not in his protected class of Black African-Americans. 65. Plaintiff Tanya D. Barbour was denied the opportunity to apply for any promotions by her supervisor when positions were available. These positions were filled by Caucasians with less seniority and less previous experience. This foreclosed Tanya D. Barbour’s chance to advance since she needed her supervisor’s consent to apply or interview for a promotion. 66. Plaintiff Jozette Joyner was repeatedly denied promotions she was qualified for, and the promotions were given to Caucasian males who were routinely promoted to a job grade above hers. 67. Plaintiff Derrick Washington was denied opportunity for promotion in a manner not applied to Caucasians at his job level. 68. Plaintiff James Pipkins repeatedly requested that he be promoted to a higher job grade. Instead of being promoted, less experienced Caucasians were promoted instead. 69. Plaintiff Pamela Odom was demoted after filing a complaint of discrimination with the company. 70. Plaintiff Chima Echeruo repeatedly requested that he be promoted to a higher job grade. Instead of being promoted, less experienced Caucasians were promoted instead. 71. In summary, the promotion and internal hiring process at Microsoft gives a false hope of fair treatment. Caucasian candidates are handpicked for positions and a formal interview process effectively is a sham to disguise the fact that a candidate has been pre-selected. Black African-Americans are unable to apply for promotions because they do not even know a position is open or they believe it does not matter whether they apply because of the history of discriminatory selection. Microsoft’s practices, including Defendant’s perpetuation of a “glass ceiling” and “glass walls,” significantly harm the opportunities for advancement of Black African-Americans at the Corporation.
E. Defendant’s Failure to Prevent and Remedy Discrimination
72. Upon information and belief, Microsoft has failed to monitor its compensation, promotion, and evaluation systems for racially discriminatory practices. Defendant Microsoft maintains a pattern and practice of allowing supervisors to discriminate against Black African-American employees in the terms and conditions of employment, and the Corporation fails to adequately respond to complaints of unequal treatment, and fails to provide sufficient oversight or training of supervisors. Microsoft has not taken appropriate steps to ensure the effective and consistent implementation of nondiscriminatory employment and human resources practices. 73. Microsoft has failed to place a premium on compliance with federal Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) requirements. Although the Corporation has a policy requiring managers to be evaluated on their EEO performance, in practice, upon information and belief, Microsoft frequently fails to perform this critical evaluation. There is inadequate EEO training for supervisors, thus the current discriminatory practices will continue indefinitely. 74. Microsoft’s practices and procedures for handling complaints of discrimination do not adequately ensure that complaints are investigated fairly, that prompt remedial action is taken in response to discrimination, that incidents of discrimination are prevented, and that all managers and supervisors are aware that race or color discrimination is taken seriously at all levels of the Corporation. 75. Microsoft fails to provide sufficient monitoring, training, oversight or accountability to ensure that employees are treated in a nondiscriminatory manner in terms of compensation, evaluations, promotions and other conditions of employment.
VI. ALLEGATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED PLAINTIFFS
A. Rahn D. Jackson’s Individual Claims
76. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, was hired by Defendant on or about April 27, 1992, as a Government Account Representative, level 1, to work in Defendant’s Washington D.C. office. 77. Plaintiff was assigned since 1992 to the Army Team which sells products to the U.S. Army. 78. Plaintiff consistently received above average performance ratings, scoring 3 to 4 on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). 79. In 1996, Plaintiff began carrying out many managerial responsibilities and since March of 1999, Plaintiff was a Team Leader. 80. Defendant’s Federal District Office, Washington, D.C., was founded in 1985. The first Black African-American Account Representative, Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, herein, was not hired until 1992. In 1996, Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, became the first Black African-American Account Executive. A Black African-American Account Executive, David Bennett, transferred from Defendant’s Seattle office to Washington, D.C., in 1994 but transferred out of Washington, D.C., in 1996, leaving Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, again as the only Black African-American Account Executive. In 1999, Defendant hired Byron Lewis, a Black African-American, as a second Account Executive. 81. Defendant’s Federal District Office has approximately 170 employees, 17 of whom are Black African-Americans, of whom 5 were hired after Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, informed Defendant, in October 1999, of discrimination on the basis of race and color, and of whom 7 are in administrative or clerical positions. 82. In October 1999, when Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, informed Defendant of racial discrimination, the sales support group in Defendant’s Federal District Office had hired only 6 Black African-Americans, 2 in “front line sales” positions and 4 in the technical position of Systems Engineer. 83. Since 1985, Defendant’s Federal District Office has awarded a total of only 6 full promotions to a total of 5 Black African-Americans, including 2 promotions since Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson’s October 1999 complaint. 84. Defendant’s employee compensation plan includes base pay, merit increases, bonuses and stock option grants. Defendant considers all such information to be “personnel information.” Defendant’s managers have subjective discretion with regard to base pay, merit increases, and stock option grants. Employees are prohibited from discussing such “personnel information” with each other and anyone else, subject to termination of employment. 85. Defendant requires an employee to have the approval of his or her manager to apply for another position. With the exception of one technical manager, who is Indian, and one Black African-American managing consultant, all managers are Caucasian. 86. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, applied for promotions, was qualified, was not selected, and the promotions were awarded to persons not in his protected class of Black African-Americans. 87. In each promotion, Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, was not promoted because of intentional discrimination based on race and color. 88. On or about September 7, 1995, Defendant announced two positions of Business Development Manager in Defendant’s Microsoft Network Business (MSN). Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, applied through his supervisor, Alison Nelson, a Caucasian.. Plaintiff was qualified for the position. Defendant refused to select Plaintiff, did not fill the positions for an extended period, and rather than promote Plaintiff, cancelled the announcements. 89. On or about December 7, 1995, Defendant’s Federal District Office announced the position of Managing Consultant. When Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, inquired about the position, Antoine Jenkins, in Human Resources, and Defendant’s agent, told Plaintiff he could not apply. Later, Defendant’s agent, Mr. Jenkins, told Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, “I guess we have to let you interview.” Plaintiff was interviewed by Alan Horowitz, a Caucasian Managing Consultant, and Paul Nasto, a Caucasian Managing Consultant. Defendant’s agents gave Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, no feedback or decision. No selection was announced, and the position was announced again on or about May 5, 1996. Defendant’s agent, Mr. Jenkins, told Plaintiff there was no need for him to interview. Defendant awarded the position to Julie Wiseman, a Caucasian. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, was better qualified than Ms. Wiseman. 90. On or about June 25, 1998, Defendant’s Federal District Office announced the position of Army Team Leader. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, applied, was qualified, was not selected, and the position was awarded to Ralph Gevinson, a Caucasian, in September 1998. Plaintiff was better qualified than Mr. Gevinson. 91. The reasons Defendant stated to Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, in an attempt to justify not selecting him for Army Team Leader, were not true and were a pretext for discrimination. a. Defendant’s agent Peter Hayes, a Caucasian, told Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, that Defendant rewards employees who are going to be there for the long term. It was known that Mr. Gevinson planned to retire at least by 2000. However, Mr. Gevinson was relieved of Team Leader duties in April 1999, and retired in June 1999. b. Alison Nelson, a Caucasian and former supervisor of Mr. Gevinson, knew that Mr. Gevinson had mismanaged e-mail and v-mail in the past. Alison Nelson approved Mr. Gevinson’s application, despite previously assigning management responsibilities to Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, instead of Mr. Gevinson while Ms. Nelson was on maternity leave. c. In or about June 1995, Lori Moore, a Caucasian and District Manager, had removed Mr. Gevinson from the position of Army Manager. d. Defendant’s agent, Mary Ellen O’Brien, a Caucasian, told Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, that Mr. Gevinson was selected over him because Mr. Gevinson submitted a “better thought-out business plan” and had a “better vision.” Defendant’s agent, Mary Ellen O’Brien, later admitted to Plaintiff, that Mr. Gevinson did not submit a “business plan,” and had virtually no “vision,” being removed from the position four and a half months after his selection, and retiring within two months thereafter. e. Defendant’s agents, who were Caucasian, told Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, that seniority and tenure is important in promotions, to justify selecting Mr. Gevinson. Contrary to said statement, Defendant selected Barry Ridgeway, a Caucasian, as Air Force Team Leader with only three years experience with Defendant, and selected Wes Anderson, a Caucasian, as Navy Team Leader, with less than one year experience with Defendant. 92. On or about June 25, 1998, Defendant announced the position of Department of Defense Health Care Account Executive. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, applied for this lateral position, was qualified but not selected. Defendant awarded the position to Geary Brummell, a Caucasian and a person not in Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson’s protected class, and who was not a Microsoft employee, and lacked experience and knowledge of Microsoft, its products, and the way they are sold. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, was better qualified than Mr. Brummell. Plaintiff’s experience included working on two of the four accounts at the Department of Defense; Army, Navy, Air Force and Health Affairs. Plaintiff therefore lost valuable experience and rank which would have enhanced his career. 93. On or about July 25, 1999, Defendant announced the position of Army/Navy Manager. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, applied, was qualified but was not selected. Defendant awarded the position to John Martin, a Caucasian not in Plaintiff’s protected class of Black African-Americans, on or about April 17, 2000. This selectee lacked experience and knowledge of Microsoft, its products and the way they are sold, as well as software industry experience.Plaintiff was better qualified than Mr. Martin, and was consistently asked to “train” Mr. Martin. 94. On or about September 24, 1999, approximately seven months before the selection of Mr. Martin as Army/Navy Manager, Defendant’s agent, Mary Ellen O’Brien, a Caucasian, told Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, that he was no longer being considered for the promotion. Plaintiff was the only internal candidate. 95. After Defendant rejected Plaintiff, Defendant continued to seek applicants with Plaintiff’s qualifications or less. 96. The reasons subsequently given by Defendant’s agent, Ms. O’Brien, for rejecting Plaintiff for Army/Navy Manager, were false and a pretext for discrimination, including, but not limited to: a. After Ms. O’Brien told Plaintiff he was no longer considered for the promotion to Army/Navy Manager, Plaintiff, was faced with insubordination by a team member, Eric Kramer, a Caucasian. Ms. O’Brien later told Plaintiff the reason he was not considered for promotion was the incident with Mr. Kramer. However, this occurred after Ms. O’Brien told Plaintiff he was no longer being considered. b. Defendant’s agent, Ms. O’Brien, said Plaintiff’s comments regarding Shelly Kuenning, a Caucasian, were “selfish,” despite Plaintiff correctly and accurately saying Ms. Kuenning lacked experience and bypassed Plaintiff, the Team Leader, to deal directly with Ms. O’Brien, and Ms. O’Brien allowed Ms. Kuenning to do this despite Ms. O’Brien’s long-established policy of following the chain of command. c. Defendant’s agent, Ms. O’Brien, falsely said Plaintiff did not resolve the following matter: Lance Horne, an Engineer, wrongfully said he would not go on a scheduled,approved, and booked business trip. Plaintiff told Mr. Horne that he was needed and had to go. Mr. Horne twice stated the carse vulgarity a second time, Plaintiff reported it to Ms. O’Brien and to Mr. Horne’s Manager, Sean Murphy, a Caucasian. Plaintiff later reported to Ms. O’Brien that he resolved the matter with Mr. Horne and Mr. Horne was going on the subject business trip. Mr. Hornes was promoted yet this incident was hold against Plaintiff. 97. After Defendant hired Mr. Martin On or about April 17, 2000 as Army/Navy Manager, Defendant promoted Mr. Martin to serve only as the Manager of one of two groups because Mr. Martin was not qualified to serve as the Manager of both groups. 98. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson did a great deal of the work and leadership for Mr. Martin. On or about September 29, 2000, Plaintiff Rahn D. Jackson resigned from Microsoft Corporation due to the pervasive and intolerable intentional discrimination against him on the basis of race and color, and reprisals against him for having engaged in protected equal employment activity. 99. On or about November 29, 2000, Defendant terminated Mr. Martin’s employment for poor performance. 100. In 1999, Defendant’s agent, Mary Ellen O’Brien, a Caucasian, hired Shelly Kuenning, a Caucasian, as a Government Account Executive, level 1. Ms. Kuenning had less than five years experience. In 1992, Defendant hired Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, as a Government Account Representative, two levels below Ms. Kuenning’s entry-level position, despite Plaintiff’s nine years experience. When Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, was finally promoted to Government Account Executive, level 1, in 1996, he had more than twelve years of experience. 101. In October 1999, Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, informed Defendant that he was filing a discrimination complaint. Defendant took intentional reprisal actions against Plaintiff for engaging in protected EEO activity. Defendant’s agents, including but not limited to Mary Ellen O’Brien and Peter Hayes, a Caucasian, took reprisals against Plaintiff to demean and degrade him and reduce his authority and impair his working conditions. a. Ms. O’Brien and Mr. Hayes failed to support Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, as Team Leader when Eric Kramer, a Caucasian member of the Team, refused to work as part of the Team. On October 25, 1999, Ms. O’Brien asked Plaintiff to speak to Mr. Kramer about accounts and communication because Ms. O’Brien was concerned about Mr. Kramer’s performance and actions. Plaintiff met the same day with Mr. Kramer with Ms. O’Brien present. Mr. Kramer lost his temper, and told Ms. O’Brien “I don’t have to justify my actions to him,” and he “can’t take it in here anymore.’ Mr. Kramer stood up and pointed his finger at Plaintiff saying, “I stood on the parade grounds of West Point.” Mr. Kramer then told Ms. O’Brien he needed a cooling off period and stormed out of the room. b. The next day, Mr. Hayes sent Plaintiff a voice-mail stating Mr. Kramer came into his office very upset, and Mr. Hayes wanted to speak to Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s Caucasian managers treated Plaintiff as if he was at fault. The managers refused to support Plaintiff in dealing with Mr. Kramer’s insubordination. c. Ms. O’Brien eliminated Plaintiff’s role in the interview and hiring process. On Nqvember 9, 1999, Ms. O’Brien sent Plaintiff a v-mail stating she extended an offer to James Justice, a Caucasian and a candidate for the Army Representative position, and she wanted Plaintiff to mentor him. Management did not involve Plaintiff in this appointment despite his position as Team Leader. Without Plaintiff having input as to who would work under him, Ms. O’Brien hired Mr. Justice, a Caucasian associate of Eric Kramer. This action poisoned the work atmosphere. d. On November 12, 1999, Charles Cephas, an AfricanAmerican, told Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, that on November 5, 1999, Mr. Cephas’s new Manager, Cheryl Battan, a Caucasian, asked Mr. Cephas, “What’s the deal with Rahn?” because “several managers have stated that he’s an [expletive deleted] but management is working on it….” e. Ms. O’Brien needlessly scrutinized Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson’s work as demonstrated in an e-mail on December 18, 1999. Plaintiff sent an e-mail invitation to Army’s customers, previously sent by his predecessor, Ralph Gevinson, a Caucasian, which was previously approved by the Army’s Chief Information Office. Ms. O’Brien questioned the content when it came from Plaintiff, albeit the only changes Plaintiff made to the document were date, time, and topic revisions. Ms. O’Brien did not challenge the invitation when it was sent out nine months earlier by Mr. Gevinson, a Caucasian. f. Ms. O’Brien failed to support Plaintiff as Team Leader by allowing Ms. Kuenning, a Caucasian junior employee and new hire, to repeatedly challenge and defy Plaintiff and bypass Plaintiff in the chain of command, allowing Ms. Kuenning to communicate directly with Ms. O’Brien. 102. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson’s Caucasian managers consistently required himto fulfill duties of a manager but would not give him the title, rank, status, or pay. 103. All the actions complained of herein were intentional adverse, disparate treatment taken on the basis of Plaintiff’s race and color. In each such action, Defendant gave preferential treatment to a similarly situated employee distinguished by race and color and lack of engagement in protected equal employment activity. 104. Defendant required all persons in management to attend training which included education on Federal anti-discrimination laws. 105. Defendant’s actions against Plaintiff were done with malice, evil motive, reckless and callous indifference to the federally protected rights of Plaintiff. In each instance, Defendant’s acts were intentional and knowing and wilful, and Defendant knew or should have known such acts were in violation of law. 106. In each action complained of herein, Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents took the action in the face of a perceived risk that the decision would violate Federal law. 107. Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents knew that taking race and color into account in making significant employment decisions, including but not limited to promotions and working conditions, violated Federal law. 108. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s decision-maker agents served Defendant in a managerial capacity, with authority and discretion to make the subject decisions adversely affecting Plaintiff. 109. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s agents acted within the scope of employment in refusing to promote Plaintiff and in other actions. Each action is the kind that Defendant’s agents were employed to perform, occurred within work hours and on work premises, and was actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve Defendant. 110. Defendant did not act in good faith to comply with Federal anti-discrimination statutes in numerous ways, including but not necessarily limited to the following: a. Black, African-American employees fear retaliation by Defendant for discrimination complaints; b. Defendant’s promotion procedures are deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provide Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; c. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in each element of an employee’s base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; d. Defendant prohibits all employees from discussing with any other employee or non-employee the facts of his or her compensation, which includes base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, on pain of termination of employment, with such secrecy used to mask discrimination; e. Defendant’s compensation plan is deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; f. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in approving an employee’s being able to apply for a promotion, without which approval the employee cannot apply; g. Defendant’s policies, jointly and severally, provide deliberately subjective methods to mask discrimination in hiring, promotions, compensation, and working conditions; h. Defendant routinely, since it created its Washington, D.C., office in 1985, has not hired or promoted a proportionate number of Black, African-Americans, despite the fact that the labor force of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area has a high percentage of qualified Black, African-Americans; i. Defendant has deliberately limited its recruiting to methods known to reduce and exclude applications by Black, AfricanAmericans; j. Defendant’s non-objective procedures which mask discrimination are consistent with Defendant not hiring or promoting Black, African-Americans. k. Defendant consistently has and does impose adverse disparate treatment against its Black, African-American employees. 111. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff has been denied the correct number and value of stock option grants because of intentional discrimination based on his race and color. 112. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered loss of promotions, pay, stock option grants and stock option splits, merit increases, bonuses, less than true value of stock options exercised, loss of professional status, and damage to his career. 113. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, feelings of paranoia, feelings of distrust, depression, sleep deprivation, nightmares when able to sleep, loss of consortium, sexual dysfunction, personality disorder, anxiety attacks, interference with life’s daily activities, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of his positive reputation he has worked his whole life to build, negative changes in his relationships with family and friends, inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary damage. 114. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered pecuniary damage, including out of pocket expenses, medical bills, attorney’s fees, court costs and incidental financial losses. 115. On June 20, 2000, Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, filed and served this lawsuit. 116. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, continued to perform at a very high level for Defendant. Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson’s most recent performance appraisal is 3.5 out of a maximum of 5.0. Plaintiff continued to perform well as the Team Leader of the Army Team. 117. On July 8, 2000, Defendant’s Microsoft Federal District Website contained a posting last updated July 6, 2000, for a U.S. Army Sales Representative, Washington D.C. 118. Since 1997, with Mr. Jackson being the dominant person on Defendant’s Army team, the U.S. Army Team was the top revenue producing sales team in Defendant’s Federal District and in Defendant’s entire corporation. 119. Defendant and Defendant’s agents had not told Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, of an opening on the Army Team. 120. There was no posting or announcement in Defendant’s office of an opening on the Army Team. 121. Defendant’s website posting for a U.S. Army Sales Representative, Washington, D.C., stated duties which were the duties of Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson. 122. Defendant’s website posting for a U.S. Army Sales Representative states “Moderate international travel required.” Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, was the person on the Army Team, who for several years has covered an international territory. 123. On July 10, 2000, Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, asked Defendant’s agents, Peter Hayes, Mary Ellen O’Brien, and Jacqueline Stern, while they were meeting together, if Defendant was planning on terminating Plaintiff’s employment. Defendant’s agent, Peter Hayes, did not say “yes” or “no”, and said that such job posting required his authorization, and he did not approve it, and it was a mistake. 124. Defendant was planning to terminate Plaintiff’s employment because Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, filed this lawsuit. Defendant would not have advertised for a person to be hired for Plaintiff’s position, and would not plan to terminate Plaintiff’s employment but for the fact that Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson, filed the instant lawsuit. 125. Defendant’s posting for an opening for Plaintiff, Rahn D. Jackson’s position is retaliation against Plaintiff, because he engaged in protected activity. 126. Defendant’s plan to terminate Plaintiff’s employment is retaliation against Plaintiff because he engaged in protected activity.
B. Tanya D. Barbour’s Individual Claims
127. Tanya D. Barbour is a 29 year old Black African-American female who was employed on an hourly basis as an Administrative Assistant for Microsoft from December, 1999, until March, 2000. 128. When Plaintiff inquired about a promotion she was told by Defendant’s Human Resources Department she had to be in her present position for at least 18 months before applying for any promotion. 129. In December, 1999, and January, 2000, two Caucasian employees, Heather Birnbaum and Melissa Boey, applied for and received promotions without spending 18 months on their respective jobs. In one case, the Caucasian employee was only on her job 6 months prior to being promoted. In each case, the Caucasian employees held similar positions to that of Plaintiff. 130. During Plaintiff’s term of employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was told by Kathryn Mihalich, Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, the “new manager” was going to “whip her into shape.” Plaintiff also had to suffer racially motivated statements and comments while working, causing her to reasonably terminate her employment to escape the poisoned atmosphere. 131. All the actions complained of herein were intentional adverse, disparate treatment taken on the basis of Plaintiff’s race and color. In each such action, Defendant gave preferential treatment to a similarly situated employees distinguished by race and color and lack of engagement in protected equal employment activity. 132. Defendant required all persons in management to attend training which included education on Federal anti-discrimination laws. 133. Defendant’s actions against Plaintiff were done with malice, evil motive, reckless and callous indifference to the federally protected rights of Plaintiff. In each instance, Defendant’s acts were intentional and knowing and wilful, and Defendant knew or should have known such acts were in violation of law. 134. In each action complained of herein, Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents took the action in the face of a perceived risk that the decision would violate Federal law. 135. Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents knew that taking race and color into account in making significant employment decisions, including but not limited to promotions and working conditions, violated Federal law. 136. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s decision-maker agents served Defendant in a managerial capacity, with authority and discretion to make the subject decisions adversely affecting Plaintiff. 137. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s agents acted within the scope of employment in refusing to promote Plaintiff and in other actions. Each action is the kind that Defendant’s agents were employed to perform, occurred within work hours and on work premises, and was actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve Defendant. 138. Defendant did not act in good faith to comply with Federal anti-discrimination statutes in numerous ways, including but not necessarily limited to the following: a. Black, African-American employees fear retaliation by Defendant for discrimination complaints; b. Defendant’s promotion procedures are deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provide Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; c. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in each element of an employee’s base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; d. Defendant prohibits all employees from discussing with any other employee or non-employee the facts of his or her compensation, which includes base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, on pain of termination of employment, with such secrecy used to mask discrimination; e. Defendant’s compensation plan is deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; f. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in approving an employee’s being able to apply for a promotion, without which approval the employee cannot apply; g. Defendant’s policies, jointly and severally, provide deliberately subjective methods to mask discrimination in hiring, promotions, compensation, and working conditions; h. Defendant routinely, since it created its Washington, D.C., office in 1985, has not hired or promoted a proportionate number of Black, African-Americans, despite the fact that the labor force of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area has a high percentage of qualified Black, African-Americans; i. Defendant has deliberately limited its recruiting to methods known to reduce and exclude applications by Black, AfricanAmericans; j. Defendant’s non-objective procedures which mask discrimination are consistent with Defendant not hiring or promoting Black, African-Americans. k. Defendant consistently has and does impose adverse disparate treatment against its Black, African-American employees. 139. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered loss of promotions, pay, stock option grants, merit increases, bonuses, loss of status, and damage to her career. 140. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of her positive reputation she has worked her whole life to build, negative changes in her relationships with family and friends, inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary damage. 141. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered pecuniary damage, including out of pocket expenses, attorney’s fees, court costs and incidental financial losses.
C. Jozette Joyner’s Individual Claims
142. Jozette Joyner is a Black, African-American female who was employed on an hourly basis as a Group Assistant to the Vice President at Microsoft’s Washington D.C. office. 143. When Microsoft hired Plaintiff, she had a bachelor’s degree and 6-7 years of experience. Plaintiff was hired as a group assistant, but was given the responsibilities of anadministrative assistant, a higher level position. 144. At the same time, Defendant also hired a Caucasian male with a bachelor’s degreebut without any experience. However the Caucasian male was hired as an administrative assistant. 145. Jozette Joyner requested a promotion every six months. Her reviews ranged from3.0 -3.5. The only time she received a level increase, except an increase given to everyone, was when she complained to the general manager about another manager degrading a potential Black African-American hire. At that time, Plaintiff received a [email protected] increase in pay and stock options. 146. During Plaintiff’s 2 � year tenure at Microsoft, Caucasian male and female groupassistants and administrative assistants with less time and less experience at the company werepromoted over Plaintiff. 147. The Caucasian male referred to in paragraph 142 above, made unauthorized purchases on his company credit card, was told by Defendant’s agents to call a meeting of all the other assistants (all Black African-Americans) to check their credit card purchases for stealing. 148. Plaintiff was also subject to verbal abuse from managers. On one occasion, amanager kicked her chair and told her “not to ask why, just do what he says.” 149. When Jozette Joyner complained to Human Resources, their resolution to herdiscrimination concerns was to call in a psychologist and replace managers. Plaintiff was toldto report to the general manager, as opposed to her direct manager, because of the poisoned atmosphere. 150. The facts described above caused Plaintiff to reasonably terminate her employment in March, 2000, to escape the poisoned atmosphere. 151. All the actions complained of herein were intentional adverse, disparate treatment taken on the basis of Plaintiff’s race and color. In each such action, Defendant gave preferential treatment to a similarly situated employee distinguished by race and color and lack of engagement in protected equal employment activity. 152. Defendant required all persons in management to attend training which included education on Federal anti-discrimination laws. 153. Defendant’s actions against Plaintiff were done with malice, evil motive, reckless and callous indifference to the federally protected rights of Plaintiff. In each instance, Defendant’s acts were intentional and knowing and wilful, and Defendant knew or should have known such acts were in violation of law. 154. In each action complained of herein, Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents took the action in the face of a perceived risk that the decision would violate Federal law. 155. Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents knew that taking race and color into account in making significant employment decisions, including but not limited to promotions and working conditions, violated Federal law. 156. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s decision-maker agents served Defendant in a managerial capacity, with authority and discretion to make the subject decisions adversely affecting Plaintiff. 157. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s agents acted within the scope of employment in refusing to promote Plaintiff and in other actions. Each action is the kind that Defendant’s agents were employed to perform, occurred within work hours and on work premises, and was actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve Defendant. 158. Defendant did not act in good faith to comply with Federal anti-discrimination statutes in numerous ways, including but not necessarily limited to the following: a. Black, African-American employees fear retaliation by Defendant for discrimination complaints; b. Defendant’s promotion procedures are deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provide Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; c. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in each element of an employee’s base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; d. Defendant prohibits all employees from discussing with any other employee or non-employee the facts of his or her compensation, which includes base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, on pain of termination of employment, with such secrecy used to mask discrimination; e. Defendant’s compensation plan is deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; f. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in approving an employee’s being able to apply for a promotion, without which approval the employee cannot apply; g. Defendant’s policies, jointly and severally, provide deliberately subjective methods to mask discrimination in hiring, promotions, compensation, and working conditions; h. Defendant routinely, since it created its Washington, D.C., office in 1985, has not hired or promoted a proportionate number of Black, African-Americans, despite the fact that the labor force of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area has a high percentage of qualified Black, African-Americans; i. Defendant has deliberately limited its recruiting to methods known to reduce and exclude applications by Black, AfricanAmericans; j. Defendant’s non-objective procedures which mask discrimination are consistent with Defendant not hiring or promoting Black, African-Americans. k. Defendant consistently has and does impose adverse disparate treatment against its Black, African-American employees. 159. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff has been denied the correct number and value of stock option grants because of intentional discrimination based on her race and color. 160. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered loss of promotions, pay, stock option grants and stock option splits, merit increases, bonuses, less than true value of stock options exercised, loss of professional status, and damage to her career. 161. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, feelings of paranoia, feelings of distrust, depression, sleep deprivation, nightmares when able to sleep, loss of consortium, sexual dysfunction, personality disorder, anxiety attacks, interference with life’s daily activities, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of his positive reputation he has worked his whole life to build, negative changes in his relationships with family and friends, inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary damage. 162. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered pecuniary damage, including out of pocket expenses, medical bills, attorney’s fees, court costs and incidental financial losses.
D. Derrick Washington’s Individual Claims
163. Derrick Washington is a Black African-American male who began his employment for Defendant in October, 1997, on a salary basis as a Technical Specialist at Microsoft’s Washington D.C. office. 164. Plaintiff Derrick Washington requested to be considered for a promotion while as a Technical Specialist. Plaintiff’s managers informed him that in order to be promoted to Technical Specialist II, he had to be certified. 165. During this same time period, Caucasian males were being promoted to TechnicalSpecialist II without being certified. 166. Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant as a support engineer. In this capacity, Plaintiff was to provide support to sales representatives. While a support engineer, Plaintiff’s manager, a Caucasian, told Plaintiff ” to get off his fat ass and go out with the sales representatives.” These comments were made in the presence of other Caucasian employees. 167. Plaintiff reasonably terminated his employment with Defendant in February, 2000, due to the poisoned atmosphere. 168. All the actions complained of herein were intentional adverse, disparate treatment taken on the basis of Plaintiff’s race and color. In each such action, Defendant gave preferential treatment to a similarly situated employee distinguished by race and color and lack of engagement in protected equal employment activity. 169. Defendant required all persons in management to attend training which included education on Federal anti-discrimination laws. 170. Defendant’s actions against Plaintiff were done with malice, evil motive, reckless and callous indifference to the federally protected rights of Plaintiff. In each instance, Defendant’s acts were intentional and knowing and wilful, and Defendant knew or should have known such acts were in violation of law. 171. In each action complained of herein, Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents took the action in the face of a perceived risk that the decision would violate Federal law. 172. Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents knew that taking race and color into account in making significant employment decisions, including but not limited to promotions and working conditions, violated Federal law. 173. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s decision-maker agents served Defendant in a managerial capacity, with authority and discretion to make the subject decisions adversely affecting Plaintiff. 174. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s agents acted within the scope of employment in refusing to promote Plaintiff and in other actions. Each action is the kind that Defendant’s agents were employed to perform, occurred within work hours and on work premises, and was actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve Defendant. 175. Defendant did not act in good faith to comply with Federal anti-discrimination statutes in numerous ways, including but not necessarily limited to the following: a. Black, African-American employees fear retaliation by Defendant for discrimination complaints; b. Defendant’s promotion procedures are deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provide Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; c. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in each element of an employee’s base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; d. Defendant prohibits all employees from discussing with any other employee or non-employee the facts of his or her compensation, which includes base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, on pain of termination of employment, with such secrecy used to mask discrimination; e. Defendant’s compensation plan is deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; f. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in approving an employee’s being able to apply for a promotion, without which approval the employee cannot apply; g. Defendant’s policies, jointly and severally, provide deliberately subjective methods to mask discrimination in hiring, promotions, compensation, and working conditions; h. Defendant routinely, since it created its Washington, D.C., office in 1985, has not hired or promoted a proportionate number of Black, African-Americans, despite the fact that the labor force of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area has a high percentage of qualified Black, African-Americans; i. Defendant has deliberately limited its recruiting to methods known to reduce and exclude applications by Black, AfricanAmericans; j. Defendant’s non-objective procedures which mask discrimination are consistent with Defendant not hiring or promoting Black, African-Americans. k. Defendant consistently has and does impose adverse disparate treatment against its Black, African-American employees. 176. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff has been denied the correct number and value of stock option grants because of intentional discrimination based on his race and color. 177. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered loss of promotions, pay, stock option grants and stock option splits, merit increases, bonuses, less than true value of stock options exercised, loss of professional status, and damage to his career. 178. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, feelings of paranoia, feelings of distrust, depression, sleep deprivation, nightmares when able to sleep, loss of consortium, sexual dysfunction, personality disorder, anxiety attacks, interference with life’s daily activities, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of his positive reputation he has worked his whole life to build, negative changes in his relationships with family and friends, inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary damage. 179. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered pecuniary damage, including out of pocket expenses, medical bills, attorney’s fees, court costs and incidental financial losses.
E. James Pipkins’ Individual Claims
180. Plaintiff James Pipkins began his employment for Defendant in 1995 as a level 10 software design engineer in Redmond, Washington. When Plaintiff was hired, he had no experience in this area and was handed a specification sheet with work assignments. Due to inexperience, he went to management seeking help. 181. Plaintiff’s supervisor, Mark Brodsky, a Caucasian, told Plaintiff he was to busy to help or deal with Plaintiff. Plaintiff complained about the lack of training or support to the Development manager, Phil Spencer, a Caucasian. As a result of this complaint, at the six month review, Brodsky gave Plaintiff a 3.0 rating. 182. After working with the company for 2 years, Plaintiff successfully wrote and was responsible for “Microsoft Money – 1999 edition,” a popular software program. Although Plaintiff received numerous inter office e-mails praising his work on the project and was given additional responsibilities, Plaintiff was told he was not performing at a level to be promoted. However, during this same time, Caucasian males were being promoted with less experience. 183. Plaintiff went to his supervisor, Dan Roth, a Caucasian, to outline what he needed to do to be promoted. Plaintiff was told he was working above expectations and in line for a promotion. However, at the end of six months, during his bi-annual review, he receive d a 3.0 on his evaluation, too low for a promotion. 184. After that incident Plaintiff left his group. When Plaintiff was at the new group,he once again requested a promotion. Plaintiff was told that he was doing a good job, but his history of receiving 3.0′s would hamper him in the new group. 185. Plaintiff received a 3.5 review on his first evaluation with the new group, but he did not get a promotion, pay increase or stock options. When Plaintiff complained he was told by HR development manager John Colleran, a Caucasian, to wait until his next review and he would not be disappointed. 186. Under the new ranking system for employees implemented by Defendant in 1999,Plaintiff was actually demoted. During Plaintiff’s time at Microsoft, Plaintiff witnessed numerous Caucasian males promoted ahead of him. Plaintiff actually interviewed and hired some of the Caucasians with less experience who were promoted over him. 187. All the actions complained of herein were intentional adverse, disparate treatment taken on the basis of Plaintiff’s race and color. In each such action, Defendant gave preferential treatment to a similarly situated employee distinguished by race and color and lack of engagement in protected equal employment activity. 188. Defendant required all persons in management to attend training which included education on Federal anti-discrimination laws. 189. Defendant’s actions against Plaintiff were done with malice, evil motive, reckless and callous indifference to the federally protected rights of Plaintiff. In each instance, Defendant’s acts were intentional and knowing and wilful, and Defendant knew or should have known such acts were in violation of law. 190. In each action complained of herein, Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents took the action in the face of a perceived risk that the decision would violate Federal law. 191. Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents knew that taking race and color into account in making significant employment decisions, including but not limited to promotions and working conditions, violated Federal law. 192. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s decision-maker agents served Defendant in a managerial capacity, with authority and discretion to make the subject decisions adversely affecting Plaintiff. 193. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s agents acted within the scope of employment in refusing to promote Plaintiff and in other actions. Each action is the kind that Defendant’s agents were employed to perform, occurred within work hours and on work premises, and was actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve Defendant. 194. Defendant did not act in good faith to comply with Federal anti-discrimination statutes in numerous ways, including but not necessarily limited to the following: a. Black, African-American employees fear retaliation by Defendant for discrimination complaints; b. Defendant’s promotion procedures are deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provide Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; c. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in each element of an employee’s base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; d. Defendant prohibits all employees from discussing with any other employee or non-employee the facts of his or her compensation, which includes base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, on pain of termination of employment, with such secrecy used to mask discrimination; e. Defendant’s compensation plan is deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; f. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in approving an employee’s being able to apply for a promotion, without which approval the employee cannot apply; g. Defendant’s policies, jointly and severally, provide deliberately subjective methods to mask discrimination in hiring, promotions, compensation, and working conditions; h. Defendant routinely, since it created its Washington State office in 1985, has not hired or promoted a proportionate number of Black, African-Americans, despite the fact that the labor force of the Washington State area has a high percentage of qualified Black, African-Americans; i. Defendant has deliberately limited its recruiting to methods known to reduce and exclude applications by Black, AfricanAmericans; j. Defendant’s non-objective procedures which mask discrimination are consistent with Defendant not hiring or promoting Black, African-Americans. k. Defendant consistently has and does impose adverse disparate treatment against its Black, African-American employees. 195. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff has been denied the correct number and value of stock option grants because of intentional discrimination based on his race and color. 196. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered loss of promotions, pay, stock option grants and stock option splits, merit increases, bonuses, less than true value of stock options exercised, loss of professional status, and damage to his career. 197. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, feelings of paranoia, feelings of distrust, depression, sleep deprivation, nightmares when able to sleep, loss of consortium, sexual dysfunction, personality disorder, anxiety attacks, interference with life’s daily activities, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of his positive reputation he has worked his whole life to build, negative changes in his relationships with family and friends, inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary damage. 198. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered pecuniary damage, including out of pocket expenses, medical bills, attorney’s fees, court costs and incidental financial losses.
F. Pamela Odom’s Individual Claims
199. Plaintiff Pamela Odom began her employment with Defendant in June, 2000. During her employment, Plaintiff filed a complaint with Defendant’s Human Resources Department alleging discriminatory acts that she witnessed. Following the complaint Plaintiff was told she could go on paid leave until the investigation was complete. 200. Shortly thereafter, Defendant concluded that its investigation found nodiscrimination. When Plaintiff returned to work approximately 6 weeks later, she was demoted from being in charge of the billers to becoming a biller. She was told the change was due to a number of errors found in her work. 201. After subsequently receiving a low evaluation and being denied a transfer, Ms. Odom was forced to resign in September, 2000, after being subjected to continuing intolerable discrimination. 202.All the actions complained of herein were intentional adverse, disparate treatment taken on the basis of Plaintiff’s race and color. In each such action, Defendant gave preferential treatment to a similarly situated employee distinguished by race and color and lack of engagement in protected equal employment activity. 203.Defendant required all persons in management to attend training which included education on Federal anti-discrimination laws. 204.Defendant’s actions against Plaintiff were done with malice, evil motive, reckless and callous indifference to the federally protected rights of Plaintiff. In each instance, Defendant’s acts were intentional and knowing and wilful, and Defendant knew or should have known such acts were in violation of law. 205.In each action complained of herein, Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents took the action in the face of a perceived risk that the decision would violate Federal law. 206.Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents knew that taking race and color into account in making significant employment decisions, including but not limited to promotions and working conditions, violated Federal law. 207.In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s decision-maker agents served Defendant in a managerial capacity, with authority and discretion to make the subject decisions adversely affecting Plaintiff. 208. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s agents acted within the scope of employment in refusing to promote Plaintiff and in other actions. Each action is the kind that Defendant’s agents were employed to perform, occurred within work hours and on work premises, and was actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve Defendant. 209.Defendant did not act in good faith to comply with Federal anti-discrimination statutes in numerous ways, including but not necessarily limited to the following: a. Black, African-American employees fear retaliation by Defendant for discrimination complaints; b. Defendant’s promotion procedures are deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provide Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; c. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in each element of an employee’s base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; d. Defendant prohibits all employees from discussing with any other employee or non-employee the facts of his or her compensation, which includes base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, on pain of termination of employment, with such secrecy used to mask discrimination; e. Defendant’s compensation plan is deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; f. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in approving an employee’s being able to apply for a promotion, without which approval the employee cannot apply; g. Defendant’s policies, jointly and severally, provide deliberately subjective methods to mask discrimination in hiring, promotions, compensation, and working conditions; h. Defendant routinely, since it created its Washington State office in 1985, has not hired or promoted a proportionate number of Black, African-Americans, despite the fact that the labor force of the Washington State area has a high percentage of qualified Black, African-Americans; i. Defendant has deliberately limited its recruiting to methods known to reduce and exclude applications by Black, AfricanAmericans; j. Defendant’s non-objective procedures which mask discrimination are consistent with Defendant not hiring or promoting Black, African-Americans. k. Defendant consistently has and does impose adverse disparate treatment against its Black, African-American employees. 210. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff has been denied the correct number and value of stock option grants because of intentional discrimination based on her race and color. 211.As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered loss of promotions, pay, stock option grants and stock option splits, merit increases, bonuses, less than true value of stock options exercised, loss of professional status, and damage to her career. 212. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, feelings of paranoia, feelings of distrust, depression, sleep deprivation, nightmares when able to sleep, loss of consortium, sexual dysfunction, personality disorder, anxiety attacks, interference with life’s daily activities, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of her positive reputation she has worked her whole life to build, negative changes in her relationships with family and friends, inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary damage. 213. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered pecuniary damage, including out of pocket expenses, medical bills, attorney’s fees, court costs and incidental financial losses.
F. Chima Echeruo’s Individual Claims
214. Plaintiff Chima Echeruo began his employment for Defendant in July, 1997 as a level 10 software design engineer/tester in Redmond, Washington. 215. During the initial three years of employment, Plaintiff consistently received evaluations ranging from 3.5 – 4.0. However Plaintiff was never promoted although he periodically requested promotions. 216. Plaintiff’s Caucasian manager informed Plaintiff he would receive a promotion in February, 2000. Plaintiff did not receive a promotion in February, 2000, and in fact, a less experienced Caucasian male with less seniority was promoted instead. 217. Plaintiff asked to be moved to a different department after this incident. Plaintiff was transferred to a different department, where he was consistently told he was working at a higher level than his grade. 218. Plaintiff was still denied promotions and currently is a level 61, less than his Caucasian colleagues who are similarly situated. 219. Plaintiff complained to his supervisors about this lack of promotionand as a result, has been verbally and emotionally harrassed by his immediate supervisor, Jean Emile, a Caucasian. 220. All the actions complained of herein were intentional adverse, disparate treatment taken on the basis of Plaintiff’s race and color. In each such action, Defendant gave preferential treatment to a similarly situated employee distinguished by race and color and lack of engagement in protected equal employment activity. 221. Defendant required all persons in management to attend training which included education on Federal anti-discrimination laws. 222. Defendant’s actions against Plaintiff were done with malice, evil motive, reckless and callous indifference to the federally protected rights of Plaintiff. In each instance, Defendant’s acts were intentional and knowing and wilful, and Defendant knew or should have known such acts were in violation of law. 223. In each action complained of herein, Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents took the action in the face of a perceived risk that the decision would violate Federal law. 224. Defendant and Defendant’s decision-maker agents knew that taking race and color into account in making significant employment decisions, including but not limited to promotions and working conditions, violated Federal law. 225. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s decision-maker agents served Defendant in a managerial capacity, with authority and discretion to make the subject decisions adversely affecting Plaintiff. 226. In each action complained of herein, Defendant’s agents acted within the scope of employment in refusing to promote Plaintiff and in other actions. Each action is the kind that Defendant’s agents were employed to perform, occurred within work hours and on work premises, and was actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve Defendant. 227. Defendant did not act in good faith to comply with Federal anti-discrimination statutes in numerous ways, including but not necessarily limited to the following: a. Black, African-American employees fear retaliation by Defendant for discrimination complaints; b. Defendant’s promotion procedures are deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provide Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; c. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in each element of an employee’s base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; d. Defendant prohibits all employees from discussing with any other employee or non-employee the facts of his or her compensation, which includes base pay, merit increases, bonuses, and stock option grants, on pain of termination of employment, with such secrecy used to mask discrimination; e. Defendant’s compensation plan is deliberately subjective and unstructured, which provides Defendant’s decision-maker agents corporate ability and approval to discriminate on the basis of race and color; f. Defendant’s managers have authority and subjective discretion in approving an employee’s being able to apply for a promotion, without which approval the employee cannot apply; g. Defendant’s policies, jointly and severally, provide deliberately subjective methods to mask discrimination in hiring, promotions, compensation, and working conditions; h. Defendant routinely, since it created its Washington State office in 1985, has not hired or promoted a proportionate number of Black, African-Americans, despite the fact that the labor force of the Washington State area has a high percentage of qualified Black, African-Americans; i. Defendant has deliberately limited its recruiting to methods known to reduce and exclude applications by Black, African-Americans; j. Defendant’s non-objective procedures which mask discrimination are consistent with Defendant not hiring or promoting Black, African-Americans. k. Defendant consistently has and does impose adverse disparate treatment against its Black, African-American employees. 228. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff has been denied the correct number and value of stock option grants because of intentional discrimination based on his race and color. 229. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered loss of promotions, pay, stock option grants and stock option splits, merit increases, bonuses, less than true value of stock options exercised, loss of professional status, and damage to his career. 230. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, feelings of paranoia, feelings of distrust, depression, sleep deprivation, nightmares when able to sleep, loss of consortium, sexual dysfunction, personality disorder, anxiety attacks, interference with life’s daily activities, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of his positive reputation he has worked his whole life to build, negative changes in his relationships with family and friends, inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary damage. 231. As a direct result of said discrimination, Plaintiff suffered pecuniary damage, including out of pocket expenses, attorney’s fees, court costs and incidental financial losses.
COUNT ONE: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS AND THE CLASS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 1981
232. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 233. Defendant has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of 42 U.S.C. � 1981 by a pattern and practice of (1) paying Black African-Americans employees less than similarly situated Caucasian employees; (2) denying promotions to qualified Black African-American employees on the basis of race and color; (3) giving Black African-American employees lower evaluations than Caucasian employees on the basis of race and color; (4) awarding Black African-American employees fewer stock options grants, merit increases, bonuses, and sales incentives; and (5) denying Black African-American employees equal terms and conditions of employment.
COUNT TWO: INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS AND THE CLASS IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
234. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 235. Defendant has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of 42 U.S.C. � 2000(e) by a pattern and practice of (1) paying Black African-Americans employees less than similarly situated Caucasian employees; (2) denying promotions to qualified Black African-American employees on the basis of race and color; (3) giving Black African-American employees lower evaluations than Caucasian employees on the basis of race and color; (4) awarding Black African-American employees fewer stock options grants, merit increases, bonuses, and sales incentives; and (5) denying Black African-American employees equal terms and conditions of employment.
COUNT THREE: RACIALLY DISPARATE IMPACT IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
236. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 237. Defendant’s policies and practices for determining compensation, including the use of Defendant’s performance evaluation system as a basis for determining compensation, including stock option grants, merit increases, bonuses, and sales incentives, have a disparate impact on Black African-American employees. 238. Defendant’s policies and practices for determining promotions and job transfers, including the use of Defendant’s performance evaluation system as a basis for determining advancement, have a disparate impact on Black African-American employees.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the Class respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief: a. Certify this case as a class action; b. Enter a judgment that Defendant’s acts and practices as set forth herein are in violation of the laws of the United States; c. Enter preliminary and permanent relief enjoining the discriminatory conduct necessary to end Defendant’s discriminatory practices and prevent current and future harm to Plaintffs and the Class; d. Award Plaintiffs and the Class lost wages, including back pay, front pay, lost stock option grants, lost merit increases, bonuses, and sales incentives, each with interest, and including, without limitation, any lost benefits that would otherwise have been included in the pension plans of Plaintiffs and the class, which resulted from the discrimination; e. Award Plaintiffs and the Class compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of five billion dollars ($5,000,000,000.00); f. Award Plaintiffs the costs of this action, including the fees and costs of experts, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees; g. Grant Plaintiffs and the Class such other and further relief as this Court findsnecessary and proper.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues of fact and damages in this action. Dated: January ___, 2001. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, ___________ GARY, WILLIAMS, PARENTI, FINNEY,LEWIS McMANUS, WATSON & SPERANDO By: Willie E. Gary (FL Bar No. 187843 By: Tricia P. Hoffler (FL Bar No. 0188646) D.C. Bar Pending To Federal CourtWaterside Professional Building 221 East Osceola Stuart, Florida 34994 Telephone (561) 283-8260 Fax (561) 221-2177 And ________________ Roy J. Bucholtz, Esq. Bar No. 18978 Bucholtz & Culbertson, P.C. 1801 Reston Parkway, Suite 302 Reston, Virginia 20190 Tel. (703) 471-9660 Fax (703) 471-5059 Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was sent via U.S. mail to counsel for Defendant Microsoft Corporation, Ellen M. .Dwyer, Esquire, Crowell & Moring LLP, 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004-2595, this ___rd day of January, 2001. _______________ Roy J. Bucholtz, Esq.

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