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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Diamond Bermuda Ltd. is a Bermuda limited liability company with its principal place of business in Bermuda. Diamond Bermuda is an organization which employs offshore drilling workers. Diamond Bermuda’s employees work on drilling rigs located primarily in the North Sea. Robert Duncan Burn Quinn and Thomas Joseph McCartney are nationals of the Netherlands and former employees of Diamond Bermuda. In 1998, Quinn and McCartney entered into written employment contracts with Diamond Bermuda, whereby both men agreed to work aboard a gas drilling platform in the North Sea. Under the terms of the employment contracts, Diamond Bermuda had the right to assign Quinn and McCartney to work on any of its offshore drilling platforms or land facilities located outside of their home country. When Diamond Bermuda notified Quinn and McCartney of their pending transfer to another location, both men refused to accept the transfer, and Diamond Bermuda terminated their contracts. Quinn and McCartney filed suit in the Netherlands, alleging Diamond Bermuda violated Dutch employment laws. On May 8, 2002, a Dutch court entered two civil judgments against Diamond Bermuda in favor of Quinn and McCartney. On Jan. 7, 2004, Quinn and McCartney filed duly authenticated copies of their foreign-country judgments in the trial court pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code ��36.001-.008. Diamond Bermuda subsequently filed a special appearance, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction. In response, Quinn and McCartney argued Diamond Bermuda had continuous and systematic contacts with Texas and, therefore, was subject to general jurisdiction in a Texas court. Quinn and McCartney further argued, pursuant to the alter ego and single business enterprise theories, the Texas contacts of Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. and Diamond Offshore Management Co. should be imputed to Diamond Bermuda for the purpose of establishing general jurisdiction in Texas. Diamond Bermuda also filed, subject to the special appearance, a “Motion for Non-recognition” of the foreign judgment as provided by �36.0044. On May 3, 2006, the trial court signed an order granting Diamond Bermuda’s special appearance. The trial court did not rule on Diamond Bermuda’s motion for nonrecognition. Suzanne Elisabeth Haaksman, as beneficiary of Quinn, and McCartney appealed. HOLDING:Reversed and remanded. Chapter 36 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code is Texas’ version of the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act. But the court found no Texas case addressing whether a trial court in a Uniform Act proceeding must exercise in personam jurisdiction over the judgment debtor to recognize and enforce a foreign-country judgment. The court did find that courts in other states have held that although a judgment debtor may contest recognition by arguing that the foreign-country court lacked personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor, the judgment debtor may not assert that the court of the state in which the judgment is filed does not have in personam jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. Moreover, the court found that the Texas statute itself contained no requirement of personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor in Texas. Additionally, the U.S. Constitution does not require in personam jurisdiction over the judgment debtor in the state in which a foreign judgment is filed. In this case, the court found that Haaksman and McCartney properly followed the requirements specified in the Uniform Act. But Diamond Bermuda filed a motion for nonrecognition subject to the special appearance. The court stated: “When, as in this case, the judgment debtor files a timely motion for non-recognition, the trial court may grant the motion and refuse to recognize the foreign-country judgment if the motion, affidavits, briefs, and other evidence before the trial court establish grounds for non-recognition as specified in section 36.005 of the Uniform Act. . . However, under the express language of the Uniform Act, the trial court may not, under any circumstances, review the foreign-country judgment in relation to any matter not specified in section 36.005.” Under �36.005, the court stated, the trial court may refuse recognition of the foreign-country judgment if the foreign-country court did not have personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor; however, it is not a ground for nonrecognition that the Texas court lacks personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor in a Uniform Act proceeding. Therefore, the court stated, a nonrecognition proceeding is never one in which the trial court entertains claims against the judgment debtor or in which the trial court exercises personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. Accordingly, the court held the trial court erred in considering the issue of personal jurisdiction and in granting Diamond Bermuda’s special appearance. Instead, the court held that on remand, the trial court should address Diamond Bermuda’s motion for nonrecognition. OPINION:Anderson, J.; Anderson, Fowler and Frost, JJ.

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