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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:On April 16, 2006, Child Protective Services received a referral that drug use was occurring in apartment 120 on Las Vegas Trail in Fort Worth. CPS believed that Erica D. and her children, 7-year-old M.R. and 3-year-old W.M., were staying in that apartment with Erica’s parents, her brother, her brother’s girlfriend and their baby. CPS investigator Jeannie Maxie went to the apartment, but neither Erica nor the children were there. Maxie asked the family members to take a drug test, but they refused. Maxie made several attempts to locate Erica at that address and at the Sonic where she worked, but she was unsuccessful in finding her. At one point, Maxie spoke to Erica on the phone, and they set up an appointment to meet, but Erica did not show up. Erica made no attempts to contact CPS. On June 4, 2006, CPS received another referral that M.R. was wandering outside alone in front of a Motel 6. On June 8, 2006, CPS removed M.R. and W.M. from Erica’s custody under a court order titled Order for Protection of Child in Emergency. Neither father was available to take the children. M.R.’s biological father was living in Oklahoma, and W.P.M. was incarcerated at the time of the second referral and the removal. On June 26, 2006, CPS placed both children in foster care. While the children were in foster care, Erica repeatedly refused to follow her CPS service plan. For example, Erica refused to attend parenting classes or counseling sessions. Additionally, W.P.M. did not contact W.M.’s caseworker to inquire about W.M.’s well-being, although W.P.M. did testify that he asked his family and Erica’s friends for information about his son. M.R.’s father, Michael, attended the contested show-cause hearing on June 29, 2006, and provided a potential relative placement for M.R. Michael did not show up for a scheduled visit in November, but he later contacted CPS in January 2007 and claimed that he could not make the scheduled visit, because he had been in rehab again. He did ask about M.R., and CPS attempted to mail him a service plan, but the plan was returned. Michael did not make any further contact with M.R. or with CPS. At trial, the foster mother testified about outcry statements made to her by M.R. The foster mother stated that one morning while she was fixing M.R.’s hair and M.R. was brushing her teeth, M.R. was talking about how cute W.M. was as a baby and that “mommy started using drugs” about that time. The foster mother testified that M.R. talked about “when mommy started smoking” and described the pipe and “that smoke came out of the top of it.” M.R. also told the foster mother “that other people were doing drugs with mom” and named W.P.M., her aunt, uncle and grandparents. Additionally, the foster mother testified that M.R. talked about how people “would all come over and go into a room and smoke the Merry Wonka and she would be left in charge of [W.M.]” and two other babies. The foster mother also testified concerning other statements that M.R. made, such as how they found their food in dumpsters, drove around at 2 a.m. looking for a place to sleep and received spankings with belts from W.P.M. M.R. did not testify at trial, although according to CPS the child was available to testify. On May 10, 2007, after a three-day bench trial, the trial court terminated Erica’s parental rights to M.R. and W.M. and W.P.M.’s parental rights to W.M. HOLDING:Affirmed. In three issues, Erica argued that legally and factually insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s endangerment findings and that factually insufficient evidence supported its best interest findings as to both children. In 10 issues, W.P.M. contended that the trial court erroneously admitted M.R.’s outcry statements and that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment findings and best-interest findings as to W.M. The court found that although the outcry statements were not definite as to time, the specificity of the content and circumstances existing at the time of the outcry demonstrated the statements’ veracity. Moreover, there was evidence in the record “touching upon various indicia which courts often use to assess the reliability of a child’s outcry.” More importantly, the court found that “comparing those indicia to the evidence here supports the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that M.R.’s statements were reliable; thus the trial court did not erroneously admit the statements.” The court then reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence. Despite Erica’s repeated claims that she loved her kids and was a good mom, the evidence shows that Erica exposed her children to domestic violence, placed them in an environment of drug abuse and refused to participate in her CPS service plan. Based on the court’s review of the entire record, the court concluded that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Erica engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of M.R. and W.M. and knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical and emotional well-being. Therefore, the court held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s findings under Texas Family Code �161.001(1)(D) and (E). Next, based on its review of the entire record, the court concluded that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that W.P.M. engaged in conduct and knowingly placed W.M. with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of W.M. Therefore, the court held that factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s findings under �161.001(1)(E). Erica and W.P.M. both argued that insufficient evidence demonstrated that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the children’s best interest. But the court held that factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination is in M.R.’s and W.M.’s best interest. For example, the evidence showed that M.R. and W.M.’s lifestyle improved after CPS placed them with the foster family, evidence that supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. OPINION:Livingston, J.; Livingston, Dauphinot and Holman, JJ.

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