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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Around 11 a.m. on July 7, 2005, Jean Jobe received a call from her alarm company alerting her that her home alarm was going off at the back door. Jobe drove immediately to her home and, upon arriving, witnessed a man coming out of the back door of her house. Because he was not aware of her presence, she was able to observe the burglar’s profile for about a minute and a half. She then yelled at the burglar, catching his attention, and observed him face-to-face for another 45 seconds. The burglar fled the scene, and Jobe pursued him for half a block. While pursuing the burglar, she called 911, described the man and identified the direction he was running. No more than 30 minutes after Officer Herrera was dispatched to investigate the burglary call, he encountered Michael A. Williams, who matched the description of the burglar, in an alley about a block and a half or two blocks from Jobe’s home. Herrera told Williams that he was going to place him in the patrol car and transport him to a different location for identification, at which time, Williams stated, “I’ll tell you the truth. I tried to break into the house.” Herrera took Williams back to Jobe’s home for a “showup.” Upon arriving at Jobe’s house, Herrera told Jobe that “I need you to identify the man and then step away from the car.” Jobe approached the patrol car, observed Williams, and told the officers, “That’s him. He’s the one.” Williams was then placed under arrest and transported to jail by another officer on the scene. At trial, Williams filed a motion to suppress both the show-up identification and the statement he made to Herrera. Following a jury trial, authorities convicted Williams of burglary of a habitation, enhanced by a 1985 felony conviction of burglary of a habitation, and sentenced him to 45 years of confinement. On appeal, Williams challenged only the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his pretrial identification by Jobe, claiming that the impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure utilized tainted the in-court identification of Williams in violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. HOLDING:Affirmed. The court stated that trial courts must make two inquiries in determining whether a pretrial identification should be excluded: 1. whether the police used an impermissibly suggestive pre-trial identification procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification; and 2. if so, whether, under all the circumstances, there was a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Under the 1993 CCA case Delk v. State, the court found that Herrera’s method, whereby only a single individual was shown to Jobe, coupled with Herrera’s statement, made it possible that his procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Because under Delk it was only possible that the procedure was impermissibly suggestive, the court stated that the question thus became whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable despite the suggestive nature of the confrontation’s procedure. The court cited five factors to be “weighed against the corrupting effect of any suggestive identification procedure in assessing reliability under the totality of the circumstances”: 1. the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 2. the witness’ degree of attention; 3. the accuracy of the witness’ description of the criminal; 4. the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and 5. the length of time between the crime and confrontation. The court found that the record indicated that from the time Jobe received the phone call from the alarm company, she had a heightened degree of attention that continued throughout her observation, pursuit and description of the burglar. The court also found that the lapse of time between Jobe’s viewing of the burglar and her identification of Williams was insufficient for Jobe to forget the burglar’s facial features or physical characteristics and to result in irreparable mistaken identification. Having considered the factors for the determination of reliability of a suggestive identification procedure under the totality of the circumstances, the court held that the show-up procedure used by Herrera did not result in an irreparable mistaken identification. The court also noted that assuming arguendo that the trial court judge erred in admitting the show-up evidence, Williams was not harmed by the admission of the evidence, in light of William’s confession in the patrol car, OPINION:Hancock, J.; Campbell, Hancock and Pirtle, JJ.

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