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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Authorities indicted Kiheem Grant for murder and the matter went to trial. Outside the presence of the venire panel, the following conversation took place at the beginning of Grant’s trial: “THE COURT: This is Cause No. 90653, the State of Texas v. Kiheem Grant. Are you Mr. Grant? “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am. “THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Grant, it’s been brought to my attention that maybe you want to represent yourself in this case? “THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, yes, sir. “THE COURT: Are you sure about that? “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. “THE COURT: You understand that you have an absolute right if you can’t afford an attorney that I will appoint one. In fact, I’ve appointed a board certified attorney by the name of Doug Barlow to represent you. And Mr. Barlow has been working on your case and, from what I understand, is ready to go to trial on your behalf today. But you have an absolute right to represent yourself if that’s what you chose to do. “THE DEFENDANT: I want to represent myself. “THE COURT: Do you have any questions about the pitfalls, about how it’s not in your best interest for you to represent yourself? Do you have any questions about that? “THE DEFENDANT: No. “THE COURT: I’m gonna let you represent yourself. Mr. Barlow, you’re gonna be standby counsel. And we’re ready to proceed.” Grant represented himself through the trial. Appointed counsel and another attorney were present at trial to assist Grant as standby counsel. The trial court convicted Grant of murder. The jury assessed punishment at incarceration for life and a fine in the amount of $10,000. Grant appealed. HOLDING:Affirmed. In his first two issues, Grant argued that the trial court did not properly warn him of the dangers of self-representation and through his deficient self-representation, he contributed to his own conviction. The rights to assistance of counsel and to self-representation, the court stated, are protected by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the states by the 14th Amendment. A decision to represent oneself, the court stated, must be made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The court examined the totality of the particular facts and circumstances of the case in deciding whether Grant’s decision was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Grant’s invocation of his right to self-representation was clear and unequivocal, the court noted. The court noted that standby counsel made no effort to persuade the trial court that Grant’s decision was uninformed or involuntary. Standby counsel did not file a motion for new trial either. The same appointed counsel represented Grant in this appeal. Considering the totality of the particular facts and circumstances in the case, the court concluded Grant’s clear and unequivocal exercise of his constitutional right was an informed and voluntary decision. In issue three, Grant complained of the shackles used to restrain him during the trial. The record indicated the reason the trial court shackled Grant. According to the record, the court stated, Grant had assaulted a witness in the courtroom during an earlier criminal trial. The court noted that courts have held shackling to be harmful error when the shackles are detectable to the jurors or when the use of restraints unduly restricts a defendant’s ability to communicate with counsel. The record, the court stated, reflected that the trial judge took specific measures to prevent the jury from viewing Grant in shackles and did not put him in handcuffs. The record did not reflect that the jury saw the shackles, the court stated. In issue four, Grant raised error in the procedure followed for his opening statement. By requiring Grant to present his opening statement immediately after the state’s opening statement, the court found that the trial court did not follow Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 36.01. But the court found the error to be harmless. In issues five and six, Grant argued that the trial court erred in not giving him more time to review written statements of witnesses before cross-examination. The record, the court stated, revealed the trial judge gave Grant time to review both documents. Grant then cross-examined each witness. The court did not find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s management of the time allotted for Grant’s review of either document. OPINION:Gaultney, J.; Gaultney, Kreger and Horton, JJ.

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