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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Gurumurthy Kalyanaram was a professor at the University of Texas at Dallas. According to his pleadings, he informed his superiors at UTD that other professors and employees were misappropriating state funds. Later, UTD officers accused Kalyanaram of fraud and theft regarding his expense reimbursements and offered him the choice of resigning or having the information referred to the Collin County District Attorney for prosecution. Kalyanaram refused to resign. Subsequently, UTD referred the accusations to the district attorney and began termination proceedings. Kalyanaram filed suits related to these events against UTD, the University of Texas system and other university-related individuals, including a suit in Dallas County Court-at-Law No. 1. Subsequently, five of Kalyanaram’s suits were resolved in a settlement agreement and mutual general release. The county court dismissed with prejudice the suit before it. Kalyanaram filed a Plaintiff’s Original Petition for Bill of Review seeking to set aside the order of dismissal in the Dallas County Court-at-Law No. 1 suit. He alleged that under the terms of the settlement agreement, UTD and the university-related individuals agreed to abandon the criminal charges against him. He asserted that UTD nevertheless pursued the criminal charges on which he ultimately was found not guilty. Kalyanaram further alleged the settlement agreement and order of dismissal were obtained by extrinsic fraud and that the settlement agreement was fraudulently induced. He asserted a claim for attorneys’ fees for fraud and for breach of the settlement agreement. The defendants filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, asserting that: 1. Kalyanaram had no evidence of any of the elements of a bill of review; 2. there was no evidence that the defendants waived their sovereign immunity from suit or from liability to Kalyanaram’s intentional tort claims pursuant to ��101.021, 101.022 and 101.025 of the Texas Tort Claims Act; and 3. there was no evidence the defendants had waived their sovereign immunity from suit as to any of Kalyanaram’s breach-of-contract claims, because there had been no legislative consent to file suit. The defendants also filed a second motion for summary judgment, reiterating their no-evidence grounds of lack of waiver of sovereign immunity and also asserting that the evidence established that the individual defendants were entitled to official immunity. Subsequently, Kalyanaram filed a first amended petition, dropping his bill of review allegations, and asserting claims for breach of contract and fraud in the inducement as to the settlement agreement. As to his breach of contract claim, he alleged that the defendants agreed in the settlement agreement to refrain from making defamatory statements which could disparage or otherwise cast aspersions on him and to notify him if they were contacted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service or other government authorities. Kalyanaram alleged Lovitt breached the settlement agreement by failing to inform him of contacts with the district attorney. Kalyanaram also asserted a claim for attorneys’ fees for fraud and breach of the settlement agreement. Subsequently, the defendants filed a First Amended No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. Kalyanaram filed a consolidated response to the motions for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court signed a final judgment. It expressly granted the defendants’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment and their second motion for summary judgment and dismissed Kalyanaram’s suit with prejudice. Kalyanaram appealed. HOLDING:Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. In his first issue, Kalyanaram argued that the trial court erred in dismissing his breach of contract claim, because neither the no-evidence motion nor the second motion for summary judgment sought summary judgment on that claim and because he did not assert a breach of contract claim until he filed his First Amended Original Petition. The court disagreed. Both motions, the court stated, expressly sought summary judgment on Kalyanaram’s stated claim of “breach of contract attorney’s fees” on grounds of sovereign immunity. In his second issue, Kalyanaram argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing his claims, because such claims are not barred by sovereign immunity. Absent the state’s consent to suit, the court stated, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a suit against a state entity. The plaintiff has the burden to plead facts affirmatively showing that the trial court has jurisdiction, the court stated. Kalyanaram argued, citing the 2002 Texas Supreme Court opinion Texas A&M University-Kingsville v. Lawson that “[a] governmental entity, or its employees, simply cannot be allowed to settle a claim”with an agreement on which it cannot be sued.’” Thus, the Texas Supreme Court in Lawson allowed an exception to the rule that the government must consent to the suit and waive its immunity fully through statute or legislative resolution. Kalyanaram pointed to two of the five suits specifically settled in the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the court concluded that Kalyanaram met his burden under the no-evidence standards of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i) to produce summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact whether his claim for breach of the settlement agreement came within Lawson, thus waiving immunity from suit on the breach of contract claim. Therefore, the court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact “exists on the issue so as to preclude summary for the University of Texas System and UTD on Kalyanaram’s breach of contract claim.” The court, however, rejected Kalyanaram’s claims on appeal that the University of Texas System and UTD obtained the settlement agreement by fraudulent inducement or duress. The court also affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the university defendants in regard to the intentional tort claims. OPINION:Moseley, J.; Whittington, Moseley and O’Neill, JJ.

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