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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:In 2002, the city of Houston was engaged in a street repair project. In connection with this project, Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. received a letter dated Jan. 8, 2002, from the engineering firm of Lockwood, Andrews & Newman Inc. (LAN) on the city’s behalf. The letter offered to buy for $21,600 an easement on which stood a Clear Channel billboard. The letter stated that the city needed the easement as part of the Ella Boulevard Reconstruction Project. LAN indicated that it would be necessary for the city to acquire the parcel through eminent domain if negotiations were unsuccessful. LAN attached an appraisal report to the letter and a purchase agreement for Clear Channel to sign if it accepted the offer. The agreement was signed by Marty Kobs, an employee of LAN. On Jan. 9, 2002, Michelle Costa, president of Clear Channel’s Houston Division, signed and returned the purchase agreement. On April 10, 2002, Mayor Lee Brown presided over a Houston City Council meeting at which the council considered Motion 2002-0445, recommending that the city be authorized to condemn the property, including the billboard. The sign will be purchased and then demolished at the time of construction. The motion passed with no dissenting votes. Clear Channel subsequently received a letter dated June 11, 2002, from the city’s public works and engineering department, in which an official wrote that since the sign was not “legally permissible,” the city was “not required or obligated to compensate an owner for an illegal improvement” and thus withdrew its offer. Clear Channel sued the city for breach of contract, and the city responded with a plea to the jurisdiction asserting immunity from suit. The trial court overruled the plea, and the city brought an interlocutory appeal. While the case was on appeal, the Legislature enacted Texas Local Government Code ��271.151-.160. Under the terms of this legislation, local government entities waive immunity from suit for certain claims. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to give Clear Channel the opportunity to present arguments under the new legislation. On remand, the city filed its second plea to the jurisdiction asserting immunity from suit. The trial court denied the second plea, and this agreed interlocutory appeal ensued. HOLDING:Affirmed. A waiver of immunity must be clear and unambiguous, the court stated. Under �271.152, “[a] local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to the terms and conditions of this subchapter.” According to the definitional provisions of �271.151, a “[c]ontract subject to this subchapter” meant a “written contract stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental entity that is properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity.” The city contended that the purchase agreement was not “properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity,” because it was not signed by the mayor and the city controller. Clear Channel responded that �271.151 did not apply to this case, and pointed to another provision of the city’s charter: “Every ordinance, resolution or motion of the City Council shall, before it takes effect, be presented to the Mayor for its approval and signature. If the Mayor shall fail to sign any ordinance, resolution or motion within five days after adoption, it shall nevertheless be in full force and effect as if he had signed the same.” Clear Channel argued that because the city passed the motion to condemn the property and the requisite five days passed, the motion became law as if it had been signed. Section 271.152, the court noted, does not require that the contract at issue be properly executed by the governmental entity; rather, the requirements of the statute are satisfied if the contract was properly executed on behalf of the entity. Thus, the court concluded that, taken together, the purchase agreement and the motion constituted a written contract as that term was used in �271.151. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying the city’s plea to the jurisdiction. OPINION:Guzman, J.; Hedges, C.J., and Hudson and Guzman, JJ.

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