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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:In 2001, the city entered into a contract with Swinerton Builders Inc. for the construction of an expansion of the George R. Brown Convention Center. Swinerton was to act as the project’s general contractor. The project was set to be completed by late October 2003, subject to reasonable time extensions. The contract price was $143,512,000. Swinerton substantially completed the project in early January 2004. Because time was of the essence, Swinerton alleges, it faced expenses far above and beyond the original contract price. Swinerton attempted to collect by filing claims with the city’s engineer as required by the contract, with no success. Swinerton filed suit in May 2006, asserting separate causes of action for breach of contract, quantum meruit and a violation of Texas Government Code ��2251.001-2251.055, the Prompt Payment Act. The city filed partial pleas to the jurisdiction on the quantum meruit and Prompt Payment Act claims, asserting in part that Swinerton had not pleaded any legislative waiver of immunity. In August 2006, Swinerton filed an amended petition, adding a jurisdictional paragraph that stated: “6. Suit against the City for breach of contract and quantum meruit claims is authorized by Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code �271.151-�271.160. Suit against the City for prompt pay violations is authorized by Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code �271.151-271.160 and Tex. Gov’t Code �2251.001-2251.055.” The city filed supplements to each of its pleas to the jurisdiction later that same month. The city asserted that the amended petition did not “cure the jurisdictional defect fatal to its quantum meruit claims,” and that it did not “cure the jurisdictional defect fatal to its Prompt Payment Act claims.” The city filed with the trial court a brief in support of its partial pleas to the jurisdiction. Swinerton filed a brief in reply. On Sept. 19, 2006, in a single order, the trial court denied the city’s plea to the jurisdiction on Swinerton’s quantum meruit claim and granted the city’s plea to the jurisdiction on Swinerton’s Prompt Payment Act claim. Both parties timely filed notices of accelerated appeal. On May 21, 2007, Swinerton filed an amended petition with the trial court that purported to abandon the claim in quantum meruit. Swinerton then filed a motion in the 1st Court of Appeals to dismiss both its own appeal and the city’s appeal, asserting among other things that its abandonment of its claim in quantum meruit rendered moot the city’s appeal of the denial of the city’s plea to the jurisdiction. The city responded, contending that the automatic stay imposed by �51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code prevented Swinerton from amending its petition in such a way as to “pull the rug out from under” the city’s appeal. HOLDING:The court reversed the trial court’s denial in part of the city’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Swinerton’s claim in quantum meruit. First, the court concluded that Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code �51.014 prevented Swinerton from amending its petition. Generally, the court stated, an appellant may amend its petition in such a way as to render an interlocutory appeal moot, thereby depriving an appellate court of jurisdiction. But Swinerton’s attempt to dismiss its quantum meruit claim, the court stated, is barred by the Legislature’s 2003 amendment of �51.014(b), which states in relevant part that: “An interlocutory appeal under Subsection (a)(3), (5), or (8) . . . stays all other proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of that appeal.” The city, the court stated, contended on appeal that the trial court erred by denying its plea to the jurisdiction on Swinerton’s quantum meruit cause of action, because the legislative waiver of immunity from suit in Texas Local Government Code �271.152 is limited to claims for breach of contract and does not encompass claims in quantum meruit. Section 271.152, the court stated, reads: “A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to the terms and conditions of this subchapter.” After conducting statutory analysis, the court concluded that the Legislature did not intend to include claims in quantum meruit in the statutory waiver of immunity contained in �271.152. Thus, the court held that the trial court erred in denying the city’s plea to the jurisdiction as to Swinerton’s quantum meruit claim, because �271.152 did not waive immunity from suit as to such claims. OPINION:Alcala, J.; Taft, Jennings and Alcala, JJ.

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