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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Victor Hugo Saldano and an accomplice forced the unnamed victim into the victim’s car in the parking lot of a grocery store. Saldano and his accomplice took the victim in his own car to a remote location and parked. Saldano led the victim into some woods while Chavez waited at the car. Saldano shot the victim five times with the last shot to the head at close range to make sure the victim was dead. Saldano was confrontational when the police arrested him about an hour later. That evening, several police officers observed that Saldano was unremorseful and that his situation seemed like “a joke to him.” One officer told Saldano several times that he should take his situation seriously and stop laughing. Saldano was involved in an attempted armed robbery about five days before the victim’s murder. In 1996, a jury convicted Saldano of capital murder and sentenced him to death. The conviction was upheld on direct appeal, but the death sentence was overturned in federal habeas corpus proceedings based on a procedurally defaulted claim of prosecutorial misconduct at Saldano’s 1996 trial. In 2004, a state trial court again sentenced Saldano to death at another punishment hearing in state court. Saldano again appealed, raising 66 points of error. Relevant to the second direct appeal, Saldano has resided since 1996 on death row, where he committed numerous acts of misconduct that resulted in him being placed in the most restrictive and isolated level of death row. The defense claimed that it intended to explain Saldano’s misconduct with testimony from a psychiatrist, who treated Saldano on death row “on well over 100 occasions” from “late 1997 or early 1998″ until “early 2001.” It appears that the psychiatrist would have testified that the conditions on death row caused Saldano to suffer psychological deterioration and to misbehave. The state claimed and the trial court agreed that the defense could not present the psychiatrist’s testimony without first having Saldano examined by a state psychiatric expert pursuant to the Court of Criminal Appeals’ 1997 decision in Lagrone v. State. But Saldano would not submit to a Lagrone examination so the defense could not present the psychiatrist’s testimony. The CCA stated that Saldano had three complaints regarding Lagrone. First, Saldano says he should not have been required to submit to a Lagrone examination. Second, Saldano believes that if he was required to submit to a Lagrone examination, this examination should have been limited to rebuttal of Peccora’s testimony on Saldano’s mental decline. Third, Saldano argues that if he was required to submit to a Lagrone examination, the state should have been precluded from using any evidence derived from the examination on the future-dangerousness special issue. HOLDING:Affirmed. Saldano’s points of error No. 1 through No. 3 and No. 5 related to the trial court’s conditioning of the admissibility of the psychiatrist’s testimony on Saldano submitting to a Lagrone examination. Specifically, Saldano claimed that the trial court constitutionally erred by not guaranteeing that any evidence the state obtained during this Lagrone examination would be limited to rebutting the psychiatrist’s testimony concerning Saldano’s mental decline on death row and by further failing to guarantee such evidence not be used by the state on the future-dangerousness special issue. The CCA, however, found that Saldano waived his Lagrone complaint, because to preserve it he had to submit to the Lagrone examination and suffer any actual use by the state of the results of this examination. In point of error No. 4, Saldano asserted that the future-dangerousness special issue is unconstitutionally vague. The court cited its precedent in dismissing this point of error. In points of error No. 6 through No. 16, Saldano claimed that the trial court erroneously denied his challenges for cause to 11 veniremembers. As a result of the trial court’s denial of these defense challenges for cause to these 11 veniremembers, Saldano claimed that he “suffered a detriment from the loss of [an] additional peremptory strike” and that “objectionable and biased jurors to the defense were seated on the Jury.” The record reflected that Saldano used a peremptory challenge to remove each veniremember identified in points No. 6 through No. 15 after the trial court denied Saldano’s challenges for cause to them. The record also reflected that Saldano received two extra peremptory challenges from the trial court. Saldano, however, had no peremptory challenges left when he challenged a venire member identified as Garfield for cause. The record reflected that Saldano challenged Garfield for cause on the basis that Garfield “would require the defense to have the burden to show mitigating circumstances.” But the CCA stated that a veniremember is not challengeable for cause “simply because he would place the burden of proof on mitigation on the defense.” In addition, the court found that the record did not support the assertion that Garfield stated he would require the defense to show mitigating circumstances. Thus, the CCA found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Saldano’s challenge for cause to Garfield. In addition, the CCA concluded that the trial court did not erroneously deny Saldano’s challenges for cause to veniremembers identified as Vanlokeren, Janszen, Gilbert, Wilson, Kunesh, Powers, Kleber and Gaus. In point of error No. 18, Saldano claimed that legally insufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that there was a probability that Saldano would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. But the court found sufficient evidence to support this finding. In point of error No. 17, Saldano claimed that the trial court erred in not allowing him to present, as constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, evidence that Saldano’s accomplice received a life sentence for his lesser role in the victim’s murder. But the CCA noted its previous holding that “evidence of a co-defendant’s conviction and punishment is not included among the mitigating circumstances which a defendant has a right to present,” in part because this evidence does not relate to the defendant’s “own circumstances.” The CCA rejected all of Saldano’s points of error regarding the jury charge and the admission of various evidence. Saldano also submitted several constitutional issues that the CCA previously ruled on, but the CCA declined to review any of its death penalty precedents. OPINION:Hervey, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which Keller, P.J., and Meyers, Keasler, and Holcomb, J.J., joined. CONCURRENCE:Price, Womack and Johnson, J.J., concurred. Cochran, J., concurred in points of error No. 1, No. 2, No. 3 and No. 5, but otherwise joined the opinion of the court.

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