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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:On Jan. 30, 2005, Sherriff’s Deputy W. Tipps sought a search warrant from a magistrate authorizing a search of Dennis Russell Callaghan’s motel room. He requested authorization to “enter the suspected place and premises without first knocking and announcing the presence and purpose of officers executing the warrant sought.” In his affidavit, Tipps also stated that he was familiar with Callaghan and knew him to be a methamphetamine user. In addition, Calleghan had a prior arrest for manufacturing methamphetamine and was in possession of a firearm when last arrested. Tipps also noted that methamphetamine traffickers and abusers are considered the “most violent drug offenders” and cited two examples in Texas where persons involved with methamphetamine were armed or threatened violence. The magistrate signed a search warrant authorizing Tipps to enter the motel and search for methamphetamine and any and all precursor chemicals. Notwithstanding Tipp’s request for a no-knock entry in his affidavit, the magistrate did not address the no-knock request in the warrant. When police later executed the search warrant, police did not knock and announce their presence before kicking open the door to the motel room. After entering, they seized methamphetamine oil, chemicals and components used in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory, and miscellaneous laboratory trash. Callaghan filed motions to suppress all evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the magistrate’s failure to specifically authorize a no-knock entry, coupled with the lack of any subsequent exigency, rendered the search illegal. At the motion-to-suppress hearing, Callaghan emphasized that the search warrant did not authorize a no-knock entry into the motel room. Callaghan directed the trial court to Wright v. State, a 2006 opinion by the 2nd Court of Appeals that held that a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to suppress under similar circumstances. The trial court granted Callaghan’s motion to suppress and indicated that it followed the holding of Wright. HOLDING:Reversed and remanded. Less than two months after the trial court’s hearing in this case, the court noted, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2006 handed down its decision in Hudson v. Michigan. In Hudson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that violation of the knock-and-announce rule does not require suppression of all evidence found in the search. Thus in the Callaghan case, the state argued that even if the no-knock entry in this case was unlawful, suppression of the evidence was not the appropriate remedy, because the exclusionary rule did not apply to knock-and-announce violations. The federal exclusionary rule, the 14th Court of Appeals stated, was established as a remedy for evidence that was unlawfully seized from a home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Hudson, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that authorities did not obtain the incriminating evidence as a result of noncompliance with the knock-and-announce rule. Rather, the Supreme Court stated, police seized the evidence through execution of the lawful search warrant. The Supreme Court further observed, according to the 14th Court’s summary of its opinion, that the exclusionary rule did not apply in Hudson because the knock-and-announce requirement focuses on protection of human life and limb, property and privacy, not “one’s interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant.” In the Callaghan case, the court stated that even if the court observed the knock-and-announce rule, it would have discovered the items named in the search warrant inside the motel room. Following Hudson, the court therefore held that the knock-and-announce violation did not warrant suppression of the evidence, “because it was not the unattenuated but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.” Similarly, the court found that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.23(a), the Texas exclusionary rule, did not require the evidence to be excluded, because there was no causal connection between the no-knock entry and seizure of the evidence. OPINION:Seymore, J.; Hedges, C.J., and Yates and Seymore, J.J.

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