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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Falcon Transit, a corporation owned by Benjie Smith, leased property located at 523 Pontiac Avenue in Dallas from Dass Inc., a corporation owned by Steve McFalls, for 30 months beginning Feb. 1, 1999, and expiring on or about Aug. 1, 2001. Falcon Transit operated a scrap metal business called Oak Cliff Metals on the property. The lease terms provided that when the lease expired, Falcon Transit would become a month-to-month tenant. By letter dated Oct. 26, 2005, Dass notified Falcon Transit it was terminating its lease and that Falcon Transit should vacate the property by Dec. 1, 2005. On Jan. 24, 2006, Smith filed suit seeking a temporary injunction to prevent Dass from evicting Falcon Transit. Smith alleged that when the lease term expired in 2001, he purchased the property located at 523 Pontiac from McFalls and had the right to possession and title to the property. At the temporary injunction hearing, Smith testified that McFalls approached him when the lease expired in 2001 about buying the property and the equipment Smith had leased from Texas Industrial Recycling, a company also owned by McFalls. Smith agreed to purchase the property and the equipment. Smith introduced into evidence a document entitled “Pending Sale of Land,” which was purportedly signed on Aug. 31, 2001, by Smith and McFalls and purported to sell the property to Smith individually. Smith also introduced into evidence a canceled check dated Aug. 2, 2001, from Smith to McFalls in the amount of $175,000, which Smith said was a down payment on the purchase price of the land and equipment. Smith testified the amount of the monthly payments due under the sale agreement was $1,450 (down from $2,000 per month under the lease). Smith introduced into evidence canceled checks from Oak Cliff Metals to Dass for $1,450 or multiples thereof, which he testified fully paid the amount due under the sale agreement. McFalls also testified at the hearing. He said he did not sign the “pending sale of land” agreement and that his signature was forged. He said Dass did not sell the property to Smith. He explained that Smith asked if he could purchase the equipment and if he could reduce his monthly lease payment for the property from $2,000 to $1,450. McFalls agreed to sell him the equipment for $200,000 and testified the check for $175,000 was in partial payment of that purchase. He also agreed temporarily to accept a reduced lease payment of $1,450. After hearing the evidence, the trial court granted the temporary injunction on the grounds that Smith would suffer loss or disruption of his business, be without any adequate remedy at law, the loss or disruption of Smith’s business would be an irreparable harm, and Smith and Falcon Transit would be deprived of the use and enjoyment of the real property at 523 Pontiac Ave. in Dallas. HOLDING:Affirmed. The court first concluded that the determination of the right to immediate possession of the property requires a resolution of the title dispute; thus, the district court had jurisdiction over the dispute. The court also concluded that Smith had standing to seek an injunction against Dass, because he alleged a distinct injury and a real controversy between the parties that would be resolved by the suit. The court then examined whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the injunction. The court noted Smith’s testimony that if Falcon Transit was evicted from the property, it would interrupt Smith’s possession and enjoyment of the property. Smith, the court stated, testified that physically moving the business would take at least two to three months, additional time would be required to obtain the appropriate permits and certificates from the government to operate a scrap metal business in another location and the business would suffer a loss of cash flow during the time required to relocate the business. Although the loss of cash flow would be Falcon Transit’s loss, the court stated that trial court could have reasonably concluded that Smith established a probable distinct injury if Dass evicted Falcon Transit, because the business is a source of Smith’s personal income. In addition, the court stated, Smith proved a probable right that Falcon Transit was not Dass’ tenant but instead was Smith’s tenant. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding Smith established a probable right to the relief sought and probable irreparable harm for which he had no adequate remedy at law unless the temporary injunction was granted. OPINION:Lang-miers, J.; Wright, O’Neill and Lang-Miers, J.J.

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